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INTRODUCTION
As water law and policy evolve to meet the challenges of a
sustainable future, the role of community water institutions
* Professor of Law, University of Washington School of Law, Seattle,
Washington.
** Professor of Anthropology and Ethnic Studies, University of Washington,
Seattle. The conception and execution of this article was altogether a shared
effort grounded in Professor Pefia's years of fieldwork in the acequia communities
of the Culebra watershed. The authors would like to express their thanks to Hans
Baade, David Benavides, Fred Cheever, Malcolm Ebright, David Getches and
Donald Pisani, whose comments and questions have led us to a better
understanding of our topic. Thanks are owed, too, to the people of San Luis de la
Culebra, and especially to Corpus A. Gallegos, Joseph C. Gallegos, Charlie
Jaquez, Adelmo and Veronica Kaber, Evan Valdez, and Ernesto Vigil for sharing
their understanding of the acequia-hood. We are also indebted to Vickie Parker
for her work in preparing the manuscript and to the Special Collections librarians
of the Colorado Historical Society, the Colorado State Archives, the New Mexico
State Records Center and Archives, and the Tutt Memorial Library of The
Colorado College for their research assistance. Travel funding for this project was
provided by the University of Texas Law School Foundation, the University of
Washington Center for Labor Studies, and the University of Washington Law
School Foundation. Additional support was provided by a grant from the National
Endowment for the Humanities, Grant RO-22707-94. The views expressed by the
authors do not reflect the official policies or views of the funding agencies or
colleagues acknowledged above.
UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW
that have proved themselves as successful models of
engagement with resource landscapes becomes more
important. Durable and ecologically sound institutions are
valuable in and of themselves.1  Communities that have
internalized norms of resource use consistent with the public
interest offer models of natural resource management and may
create opportunities for successful devolution of authority over
natural resources to local institutions.2 This article presents
an account of the landscape and water institutions of the
acequia communities of Colorado's Rio Culebra watershed. The
physical and social landscape of the Culebra watershed, a
product of water institutions introduced by Hispano settlers in
the years immediately following the Mexican War, and the
persistence of those institutions after the introduction of the
system of prior appropriation, offers an instance of a successful
engagement of community water institutions in the creation of
a sustainable and resource-rich watershed landscape. The
ultimate goals of this article are threefold. First, the article
describes the acequia landscape and its social, cultural, and
legal norms, to reveal the necessity of a multicultural
perspective on water rights and water use in one community in
the American West. Second, we explore the lessons that the
history and waterways of Hispano irrigation communities offer
to policymakers seeking to adapt water law and water
1. DOUGLAS S. KENNEY, RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AT THE WATERSHED
LEVEL: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE CHANGING FEDERAL ROLE IN THE EMERGING ERA
OF COMMUNITY-BASED WATERSHED MANAGEMENT (1997); NATIONAL RESOURCE
COUNCIL, OUR COMMON JOURNEY, A TRANSITION TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY
(1999); ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 50-55, 58-61, 88-102 (1990).
2. OSTROM, supra note 1, at 50-55, 58-61, 88-102; see also Daniel C. Esty,
Toward Optimal Environmental Governance, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1495 (1999); Sean
T. McAllister, The Confluence of a River and a Community: An Experiment with
Community-Based Watershed Management in Southwestern Colorado, 3 U. DENV.
WATER L. REV. 287, 288-90 (2000). The concepts of watershed-based polities and
of the organization of political and social communities defined by hydrographic
boundaries are strongly associated in the history of the water policy of the
American West with the work of John Wesley Powell. See JOHN WESLEY POWELL,
REPORT ON THE LANDS OF THE ARID REGION OF THE UNITED STATES: WITH A
MORE DETAILED ACCOUNT OF THE LANDS OF UTAH (Wallace Stegner ed., 1962);
John Wesley Powell, Institutions for the Arid Lands, CENTURY MAG. May-Oct.
1890, at 111, 114 [hereinafter Institutions for the Arid Lands]. The communal
water systems of Mormon and Hispanic communities seem to have been
significant influences in the development of Powell's ideas. See WALLACE
STEGNER, BEYOND THE HUNDREDTH MERIDIAN: JOHN WESLEY POWELL AND THE
SECOND OPENING OF THE WEST 228-29, 308 (1954).
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institutions to support community well being and the
flourishing of the natural environment. Third, this paper
explores the ecological principles on display in the Culebra
acequia communities, and the requirements for maintaining
acequia institutional arrangements so as to promote the
survival of a landscape that is collectively managed for
optimum watershed functionality.
The heart of the matter in the Rio Culebra acequias is a
continuing loyalty to a system of water allocation that depends
on common maintenance of a network of earthen ditches and
on a common commitment to the principle that water is to be
shared in times of scarcity. The following anecdote from the
drought summer of 2002 illustrates those commitments and
their importance to the survival of acequia communities.
During the 2002 planting season in the Culebra
watershed, the state district water commissioner denied most
of the Culebra acequias their scheduled irrigation water
deliveries. There simply was no water available to serve any
but the most senior water rights. Adelmo Kaber, who farms
forty acres, typically planted in corn, fava beans and potatoes,
and served by the Cerro Ditch, was among the acequia farmers
whose lands would receive no water because of the junior
status of his ditch rights. He turned to a neighbor, Joseph
Gallegos, who has senior water rights served by the San. Luis
People's Ditch, seeking permission to plant a crop on a portion
of Gallegos' land. The rules of water law prohibited a diversion
of Gallegos' water to Kaber's fields, so the farmers instead
adopted the expedient approach of having Kaber farm some of
Gallegos' land.
The request was situated in their relationship as farmers
each of whom knew the other to be deeply committed to the
acequia system as the defining institution in their lives as
farmers. Gallegos is the mayordomo (ditch boss) of the San
Luis People's Ditch and an articulate voice for the communal
values that depend upon and find expression through the
acequia. Kaber is an exceptionally gifted traditional farmer,
whose knowledge of the management of water and whose
commitment to such critical communal activities as seed saving
and seed sharing and the maintenance of the system of earthen
ditches, make him a pivotal member of the community of
acequia farmers. Under their arrangement, Kaber paid
Gallegos with a portion of the crop grown on Gallegos' land, but
the return to Gallegos was less than it would have been had he
2003]
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farmed the ground himself. In Gallegos' view, the absence of
comp] 2te payment was offset by the value to the community of
Kaber's ability to have a crop and to weather a difficult year.
By sharing land lying on an acequia with water, the farmers
found a way of maintaining their commitment to the customary
principle of shared scarcity, an essential element in assuring
long term community survival by offering protection to
vulnerable members of the community.
The sharing of scarcity did not eliminate the fact of
scarcity, nor did the sharing occur without cost. Their
arrangement meant that Gallegos would have less land to farm
than otherwise, while the amount of land that Gallegos was
able to make available to Kaber fell far short of the acreage
that Kaber would normally have under cultivation.
Such arrangements of mutual aid are far more common
than might be supposed and indeed are expressions of the
persistence of acequia culture, but they must not be
romanticized. As the narrative that follows makes plain, the
arrangement between Kaber and Gallegos was as much a sign
of the vulnerability of acequia landscapes and of changes in
those landscapes, as it was a sign of the persistence of acequia
values. The arrangement arose from the lack of water in the
Rio Culebra's junior ditches and was compelled by strict
necessity. That failure, in turn, was attributable not only to
short term climactic conditions, but also to causes grounded in
Colorado's water law and water history that have made the
conditions of contemporary acequias precarious. No amount of
mutual accommodation among farmers will ever succeed in
assuring the long-term viability of acequia farming and acequia
watershed landscapes unless elements of contemporary water
law and watershed management are adjusted to address the
increasingly common experience of water scarcity among the
acequias. The reasons for those scarcities and their effect on
the physical and social landscapes of the Culebra acequias are
explored in detail in this article. Here, at the outset, we wish
simply to note the willingness of modern day acequia farmers
to honor the reciprocal commitments required for the survival
of a watershed landscape.
The acequia irrigation communities of the American
Southwest have their origins in patterns of settlement under
Spanish, and later Mexican, colonial authority, and in
390 [Vol. 74
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indigenous and local practices. 3 Acequias are among the oldest
institutions in the United States for local self-governance and
natural resource management. They are also widely hailed as
a sustainable irrigation technology, as discussed in Part III
below.
The building of irrigation communities on an arid frontier
required common effort, and settlers and their descendants
cooperated to establish and maintain the irrigation structures
on which the livelihoods of all depended.4 From their inception,
the communities were bound together in arrangements of
mutuality for the allocation of water and for the sharing of
other common resources.
5
Acequia institutions produced characteristic landscapes in
the river valleys of the high Southwest, a product of gravity-fed
earth ditches delivering snow melt mountain waters to fields
3. IRA G. CLARK, WATER IN NEW MEXICO: A HISTORY OF ITS MANAGEMENT
AND USE 9-17 (1987); MICHAEL C. MEYER, WATER IN THE HISPANIC SOUTHWEST,
A SOCIAL AND LEGAL HISTORY 1550-1850 3-23 (1984); JOSE A. RIVERA, ACEQUIA
CULTURE: WATER, LAND, AND COMMUNITY IN THE SOUTHWEST 1-8 (1998);
Richard E. Greenleaf, Land and Water in Mexico and New Mexico 1700-1821, 47
N.M. HIST. REV. 85 (1972); Wells A. Hutchins, The Community Acequia: Its
Origins and Development, 31 SW. HIST. Q. 261 (1928).
4. JOHN 0. BAXTER, DIVIDING NEW MEXICO'S WATERS 1700-1912 6-12
(1997); CLARK, supra note 3, at 15; Hutchins, supra note 3, at 271-73; RIVERA,
supra note 3, at 5-8; Richard L. Nostrand, The Century of Hispano Expansion, 62
N.M. HIST. REV. 361, 361-67 (1987).
The water institutions of the Hispanic Southwest were not the only instance
of communal regulation of water to support subsistence agriculture in frontier
communities in the American West. The system of water administration among
the early Mormon communities similarly depended on communal construction of
irrigation networks. The Mormon water master, like the mayordomo of the
acequia, was charged with distribution
of the very life-blood of the community. [H]e distributed water by a
system of rotation, delivering to each user a "stream" of irrigation water
for a certain length of time, depending on the user's needs. He was
usually in charge of the repair of ditches in the spring, requesting the
labor of each user in proportion to that person's use of the
water .... When controversies arose, he was the first "court" of
arbitration.
ROBERT G. DUNBAR, FORGING NEW RIGHTS IN WESTERN WATERS 16 (1983).
5. BAXTER, supra note 4, at 10; VICTOR WESTPHALL, MERCEDES REALES:
HISPANIC LAND GRANTS OF THE UPPER RIO GRANDE REGION 6, 12 (1983); Marc
Simmons, Spanish Irrigation Practices in New Mexico, 47 N.M. HIST. REV. 140
(1972); John R. Van Ness, Hispanic Land Grants: Ecology and Subsistence in the
Uplands of Northern New Mexico and Southern Colorado, in LAND, WATER AND
CULTURE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON HISPANIC LAND GRANTS 141 (Charles L. Briggs
& John R. Van Ness eds., 1987).
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and pastures in areas of little rain.6 The acequia system of
irrigation and community control of water access was not
simply an instance of "folk culture" but a tool for achieving
coordination between land grants and access to the water
resources required to inhabit and produce sustenance from
those lands. The defining features of the acequia landscape as
realized were the networks of diversion works, typically
consisting of earthen ditches and of head gates and check dams
built from locally available materials, and the parceling out
and physical arrangement of private land holdings so that all
settlers owned arable lands served by the ditch system.7 It was
also typical in acequia communities to maintain tracts of
common lands to provide to all community members grazing
and forest resources not available on individual farmsteads.8
Defining features of the acequia system as a water rights
regime also reflected this concern with communal and
individual flourishing, and included allocation of water on the
basis of equity and need as well as protection of reliance
interests grounded in patterns of past use.9 The acequia
6. BONDS THAT BIND: A HISTORY OF THE SAN Luis VALLEY 105 (Maclovio C.
Martinez ed., 1998) [hereinafter BONDS THAT BIND]; CLARK, supra note 3, at 15;
Alvar Ward Carlson, Rural Settlement Patterns in the San Luis Valley: A
Comparative Study, 44 COLO. MAG. 111, 113, 116-19 (1967); Van Ness, supra note
5, at 141-52. See also infra text accompanying notes 192-200 for discussion of
acequia history and vocabulary.
7. Devon G. Pefia, Cultural Landscapes and Biodiversity: The Ethnoecology
of an Upper Rio Grande Watershed Commons, in ETHNOECOLOGY: SITUATED
KNOWLEDGE/LOCATED LIVES 107-32 (Virginia D. Nazarea ed., 1999) [hereinafter
Pefia, Cultural Landscapes].
8. BAXTER, supra note 4, at 3-16; CLARK, supra note 3, at 15-16; RIVERA,
supra note 3, at 2-5; DANIEL TYLER, THE MYTHICAL PUEBLO RIGHTS DOCTRINE,
WATER ADMINISTRATION IN HISPANIC NEW MEXICO 37 (1990); Carlson, supra note
6, at 115-19; Greenleaf, supra note 3, at 97-104; Hutchins, supra note 3, at 272-
75; David W. Lantis, Early Spanish Settlement in the San Luis Valley, 20 SAN
LuIS VALLEY HISTORIAN 5, 7-13 (1988); Simmons, supra note 5, at 135; Van Ness,
supra note 5, at 159-61.
9. BAXTER, supra note 4, at 19, 32-34, 74-77; CLARK, supra note 3, at 15;
MEYER, supra note 3, at 163-64; RIVERA, supra note 3, at 34, 168-71, 177-80;
TYLER, supra note 8, at 13, 29, 161-64; Malcolm Ebright, Sharing the Shortages:
Water Litigation and Regulation in Hispanic New Mexico, 1600-1850, 76 N.M.
HIST. REV. 3, 13-25 (2001); Greenleaf, supra note 3, at 99; Simmons, supra note 5,
at 144. The idea of prior use is not to be confused with that of temporal priority
under appropriative rights regimes. Prior use under the Mexican system was
merely one among a number of factors that might establish equity. It did not give
the prior user a preferred claim on water over neighbors who could establish
equally compelling equity on the basis of such considerations as need. See
Ebright, supra, at nn.4, 16.
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system continues to be administered by mayordomos (ditch
bosses) and comisionados (commissioners), who are typically
elected on a one landowner, one vote basis rather than under a
voting structure indexed to the size of one's land holding. 10
Other features of the acequia system include the requirement
that water users contribute labor to maintain the acequia
system" and the principle that rights in water arise from and
depend on a landowner's holding arable land in the acequia
community.12 Water rights thus have the character of private
10. See, e.g., Wilson v. Denver, 961 P.2d 153 (N.M. 1998) (showing instances
of one-person-one-vote acequia voting systems). For discussion of the roles of
mayordomos and comisionados, see BAXTER, supra note 4, at 66, 70, 88-90;
CLARK, supra note 3, at 25-26; STANLEY CRAWFORD, MAYORDOMO, CHRONICLE OF
AN ACEQUIA IN NORTHERN NEW MEXICO (1988); MEYER, supra note 3, at 64-65;
Simmons, supra note 5, at 140-41. In New Mexico in the early twentieth century,
during a period when acequia institutions were being reshaped to conform their
operation to the features of the prior appropriation system and to centralized
control of water allocation by the State Engineer's Office, the institution of equal
voting rights for all landowners voting in acequia elections was invalidated by the
state supreme court precisely because voting rights were not proportional to each
elector's interest in water in the ditch. State ex rel. Cmty. Ditches or Acequias v.
Tularosa Cmty. Ditch, 143 P. 207, 214-15 (N.M. 1914). The New Mexico Court
has more recently reaffirmed the view that acequias may validly choose among a
number of voting systems, including the customary one-landowner-one-vote
system, effectively overruling the contrary holding in Tularosa. Wilson, 961 P.2d
at 153. In the case of the Culebra watershed, the by-laws of the San Luis Peoples
Ditch establish a share-based voting structure but informalpractices follow the
customary one parciante-one vote pattern (see infra notes and text at 175-76).
Also see SAN LUIS PEOPLES DITCH CORP., BYLAWS (Sept. 16, 1966) (on file with
author).
11. BAXTER, supra note 4, at 70; CLARK, supra note 3, at 25; CRAWFORD,
supra note 10, at 140-41; RIVERA, supra note 3, at 176; TYLER, supra note 8, at
37. The Spanish Archives of New Mexico (SANM) and the Mexican Archives of
New Mexico (MANM) contain records both of municipal ordinances and of legal
proceedings reciting the obligation of community members to construct and
maintain acequias, and the legal consequences of non-compliance. See, e.g.,
ORDENANZAS MUNICIPALES, vol. I, reel 6, frs. 46-62 (1846) (on file with the
SANM); Journal of the Ayuntamiento of Santa Fe, reel 14, frs. 990-91 (Apr. 12,
1832 ) (on file with the MANM). The territorial statutes of both New Mexico and
Colorado were to adopt the requirement of the contribution of labor to the
maintenance of community acequias and to establish penalties for non-
compliance. See Act of Jan. 7, 1852, § 9, 1852 N.M. Laws 2d Sess. Territorial
Assemby (an Act relating to ditches (Acequias) and currents of water) [hereinafter
1852 N.M. Ditches Act]; Act of Feb. 5, 1866, ch. 61, § 9, 1866 Colo. Laws 5th Sess.
Legislative Assembly Territory (an Act to regulate ditches used for farming
purposes in the counties of Costilla and Conejos).
12. CLARK, supra note 3, at 15 (community control of water); CHARLES R.
CUTTER, THE LEGAL CULTURE OF NORTHERN NEW SPAIN, 1700-1810 143 (1995);
RIVERA, supra note 3, at 33-39 (acequia as community asset); TYLER, supra note
8, at 45 (community control of water); G. Emlen Hall, Tularosa and the
Dismantling of New Mexico Community Ditches, 75 N.M. HIST. REV. 77 (2000);
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usufructuary rights in a community resource. Fragments of
that landscape and of those allocational norms and governance
structures persist in the Upper Rio Grande watershed of
northern New Mexico and Southern Colorado. 13 To this day the
Simmons, supra note 5, at 140. One of the most important consequences of
community control of water was that the allocation of water in times of scarcity or
abundance lay with community water authorities. The adoption of the law of
prior appropriation, privatizing water rights, and the development of centralized
state water agencies as the sole entities authorized to allocate initial water rights
brought an end both to the community character of water ownership and to the
formal power ofacequia authorities to allocate water. See Hall, supra.
13. There are at present approximately one thousand community acequias
recognized under New Mexico law and more than one hundred acequias
recognized in Colorado. New Mexico in particular has embraced the acequia as a
cultural asset and as a viable structure for the supply of irrigation waters. State
law in New Mexico has preserved some features of acequia governance and
recognized the power of acequias to hold, use and transfer water rights in their
own right, but the acequia visions of water as a community resource are
subordinated to the operation of the system of prior appropriation. Thus, the
recognition of water rights in acequias as such is subject always to the
requirement of actual beneficial use of water by the acequias, and where
individual water rights holders within an acequia system wish to transfer their
rights, they may do so, subject to the operation of normal rules governing water
transfers. The acequias no longer have the authority to decree the allocation of
water among water users or to hold water in their own right pending a later
application to beneficial use. Individual rights holders have on occasion sold their
water rights away from acequia lands, relying on transfer rules under the law of
prior appropriation, undermining the functioning of acequia systems. See, e.g.,
CRAWFORD, supra note 10, passim; Joseph C. Gallegos, Acequia Tales: Stories
from a Chicano Centennial Farm, in CHICANO CULTURE, ECOLOGY, POLITICS:
SUBVERSIVE KIN 235 (Devon G. Pefia ed., 1998) [hereinafter Gallegos, Acequia
Tales]; RIVERA, supra note 3, at 147-72; Jose A. Rivera, Irrigation Communities of
the Upper Rio Grande Bioregion: Sustainable Resource Use in the Global Context,
36 NAT. RESOURCES J. 491 (1996) (containing accounts of the contemporary face
and viability of acequia institutions and landscapes in the face of political, legal
and economic challenges). For the New Mexico statutes describing and governing
the management, operation and legal character of community ditches and
acequias, see N.M. STAT. ANN. § 73-2-1 et seq. (Michie 1978)); see also NEW
MEXICO OFFICE OF THE STATE ENGINEER, ACEQUJAS (July 1997),
available at http://www.seo.state.nm.us/water-info/acequias/acequias-ditches.html
(last modified Oct. 29, 1998). For accounts of the absorption of acequias into the
system of prior appropriation and their modification by that system, see Hall,
supra note 12; Rivera, supra, and infra note 31.
The literature on contemporary and historic acequia institutions and
landscapes is rich. For a bibliography of sources, see NANCY N. HANKS, AN
ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF NEW MEXICO ACEQUIAS PREPARED FOR THE NEW
MEXICOACEQUIA COMMISSION (Nov. 8, 1995).
The publications and advocacy of the New Mexico Acequia Association and of
the regional community press in New Mexico and Colorado offer perhaps the best
sense of the depth of continuing political and cultural commitment to acequia
institutions. For examples of these sources see LA JICARITA NEWS (a community
advocacy newspaper for northern New Mexico) published in Chamisal, N.M.
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cooperative and communitarian imperatives that shaped the
first organization of acequia towns and settlements inform not
only their physical landscapes but also their civic and economic
life and their visions of water.
The Culebra watershed, the immediate subject of this
study, is located in the southeastern quadrant of Colorado's
San Luis Valley ("Valley") (see Drawing 1 below). The Valley is
a high altitude alpine desert located at an average elevation of
7,800 feet above sea level and surrounded by high mountain
ranges, including the Sangre de Cristo Range to the east and
the San Juan Range to the west, each with numerous 14,000
foot-high peaks (see Map 1 below). The headwaters of the 360-
square mile Culebra watershed are in the southernmost
segment of the Sangre de Cristo Range in Colorado.
Historically, an average of six to seven hundred farming
families irrigated with acequias in this watershed. After the
enclosure of the common lands of the Sangre de Cristo land
grant in 1960, the number of family farms declined
precipitously so that now approximately 270 families are using
acequia water delivery systems to irrigate some 24,000 acres of
crop and pasture lands.
Water flows to users delivered by earth ditches maintained
by common labor. The relatively modest scale of the Culebra
watershed makes it comprehensible, and local knowledge about
the movement of water through the network of natural streams
and built ditches is good. 14 These are communities of small
holders bound together in informal networks for the exchange
of labor, resources and mutual support.15 The descendants of
the original nineteenth century settlers own much of the
irrigated land in the watershed and they irrigate and work
their croplands and grazing lands in ways that are based on
the capacities and water delivery methods of the acequia
87521, and available at www.lajicarita.org; LA SIERRA NEWSLETTER, P.O. Box
124, San Luis, Colo. 81152; the publications of the New Mexico Acequia
Association (a statewide advocacy and educational organization), available from
the association at P.O. Box 1229, Santa Cruz, NM 87567, or available at
http://www.nmacequias.org. Another excellent source of information on
contemporary and historical acequia topics is The Center for Land Grant Studies
at P.O. Box 342, Guadalupita, N.M. 87722, available at www.southwestbooks.org.
14. See infra discussion accompanying notes 212-224.
15. ARNOLD A. VALDEZ & MARIA A. VALDEZ, THE CULEBRA RIVER VILLAGES
OF COSTILLA COUNTY, VILLAGE ARCHITECTURE AND ITS HISTORICAL CONTEXT
1851-1940 16, 19, 33-35 (1991); Lantis, supra note 8, at 10-13, 23-24.
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networks of earthen ditches. Patterns of cooperative communal
labor and mutual aid are quite evident. 16
The original pattern of land apportionment was first
designed to assure that each land holding would have access to
the acequia system and be amenable to irrigation through
gravity-fed systems .17 Farms are still laid out as relatively
narrow strips running perpendicular to the principal streams
and built ditches. 18 Each property incorporates a portion of the
arable alluvial soils lying near the watercourses. 19 Water flows
through the community of users, supplying individual rights
holders while providing many benefits to the commons
including irrigation of a community grazing commons and
sustaining environmental assets of value to the community as
a whole on land that is uncultivated or not privately owned.20
16. See Devon G. Pefia & Ruben 0. Martinez, Upper Rio Grande Hispano
Farms: A Cultural and Environmental History of Land Ethics in Transition,
1598-1998. Final Report submitted to the National Endowment for the
Humanities, Grant No. 22707-94; Rio Grande Bioregions Project, Department of
Anthropology, University of Washington, Seattle (Jan. 2000).
17. VIRGINIA MCCONNELL SIMMONS, THE SAN LUIS VALLEY: LAND OF THE
SIX-ARMED CROSS 47-48 (1979); VALDEZ & VALDEZ, supra note 15, at 16-17;
Carlson, supra note 6, at 115-18; Lantis, supra note 8, at 7-9.
18. Carlson, supra note 6, at 115-18; Lantis, supra note 8, at 7-9.
19. Carlson, supra note 6, at 115-18; Lantis, supra note 8, at 7-9.
20. The depth from the surface of the ground to the top of the first
impermeable underground layer that underlies the unconfined aquifer
constituting the alluvium of Culebra Creek and its major tributaries is quite
shallow through much of the Culebra Creek watershed. The shallowness of this
unconfined aquifer, combined with the low gradient of slopes and the relatively
light and porous soils in the alluvium produce a high level of interaction between
the movement of surface waters and of ground waters in the unconfined aquifer of
the watershed. Phillip. A. Emery, Water Resources of the San Luis Valley,
Colorado, in GUIDEBOOK OF THE SAN LUIS BASIN, COLORADO 129-32 (H.L. James
ed., 1971). One result is that much of the water that seeps into the alluvium from
the surface remains available in the rooting zones of many trees and shrubs. This
water also provides subirrigation to grasses and plants with shallower root
systems. In years of good water flow, the water table is often quite high,
sustaining base flows in both natural stream reaches and irrigation ditches.
These physical features of the watershed have been relied on historically as
elements of the system of water delivery.
See Steven J. Shupe, Wasted Water: The Problems and Promise of Improving
Efficiency Under Colorado Water Law, in TRADITION, INNOVATION AND CONFLICT:
PERSPECTIVES ON COLORADO WATER LAW 74-75 (Lawrence J. MacDonnell ed.,
1987) for a discussion of the importance of considering the effects of water
diversion and application practices on watershed functioning and stream flows in
evaluating whether the effect of those practices can properly be characterized as
wasteful or beneficial. Colorado water law may be receptive to treating
traditional irrigation systems as beneficial because of the environmental and
irrigation services they provide rather than as wasteful because of their
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The acequia system and the network of community ties they
have created constitute structures that are reliable, well
understood, governed by accepted rules, and that depend on
technologies within the economic reach of the communities.
The physical and social landscape of the "acequia-hood" as it
has been labeled by Gallegos, mayordomo of the San Luis
People's Ditch,21 has continuing value to the community of
users because it promotes their common flourishing. It has
wider public value for the stability of settlement and the suite
of natural resource assets it has created.
A. Communitarian Rights and the Tensions Created by
the Modern Law of Appropriative Rights
An uneasy relationship has existed for more than a
century between the imperatives and opportunities of
Colorado's law of prior appropriation, on the one hand, and on
the other, acequia practices based on the law and customs of
provincial Mexico, and, later, of territorial New Mexico. Those
older laws were in effect when the Culebra acequia towns were
first established in the years following the end of the Mexican
War, before the organization of Colorado Territory in 1861.22
It is important to recognize that the Culebra watershed,
which is now part of Colorado, was inside New Mexico
Territory and subject to its laws from 1851 until 1861 when the
watershed was included as part of the Colorado Territory.
Even with the organization of the Colorado Territory, the older
water rights regime persisted and for a time was
accommodated by Colorado territorial law and early Colorado
state law.23 Under the older Mexican water rights system,
porousness. See GEORGE VRANESH, VRANESH'S COLORADO WATER LAW 155
(James N. Corbridge & Teresa A Rice eds., 1999); see also infra discussion
accompanying notes 176-191; WATER IN THE VALLEY: A 1989 PERSPECTIVE ON
WATER SUPPLIES, ISSUES, AND SOLUTIONS IN THE SAN Luis VALLEY, COLORADO
(Colorado Ground-Water Ass'n ed., 1989).
21. See infra discussion accompanying notes 212-214.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 39-91.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 92-100, 116.
This more complex history is at odds with the ringing statements of the
Colorado courts that the state and territory have had no water law other than
that defined by the system of prior appropriation. Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6
Colo. 443 (1882). The Colorado Supreme Court has repeated the assertion on
occasion. See, e.g., Am. Water Dev. Inc. v. City of Alamosa, 874 P.2d 352, 365
(Colo. 1994).
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water rights typically arose from the actual use of water, never
from riparian status and rarely from an actual grant of water.24
The character of water rights that could be obtained from the
use of water was thus fundamentally different both from the
system of riparian rights and from the type of ownership later
recognized by Colorado's current law of appropriation. The
fundamental allocational principle of current law is that prior
beneficial use establishes a prior right to water. In the case of
water scarcity the claims of senior rights holders are filled
before those of later comers. Under Mexican law, all users,
whatever their priority, would find themselves included in a
structure of access to a state-owned patrimony that looked to
principles of equitable sharing and necessity to allocate water
among all users.25 Within the acequias, water use rights would
have arisen by virtue of ownership of land served by the
acequia system and from the recognition by authorities of one's
status as a parciante within the acequia system, that is to say
from one's status as a participant in the structure of mutual
rights and obligations that defined acequia water use. Specific
allocation was based on apportionment of available supplies
among all users on the basis of need and fairness. 26
The striking aspect of water management in the Culebra
acequias is the persistence of water practices and customs
grounded in the allocational principles of Mexican water law
long since superseded. Water rights, now defined by the law of
prior appropriation, remain situated in a tradition that views
water as a communal resource to be allocated on the basis of
necessity and equity and managed to further both a natural
resource commons and a civic commons rather than for other
efficiencies alone.27 Water is still viewed as an asset in-place,
tied to the landscape and to the community economy it has
created, rightfully belonging to the community that built the
irrigation structures that first made the water available.28 It is
the continuing commitment to that tradition, and to the
landscape that has been sustained by that tradition, which
creates opportunities for sustainable and ecologically beneficial
watershed management.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 61-68.
25. Id.
26. See infra text accompanying notes 47-70.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 212-224.
28. See infra text accompanying notes 185-214.
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One of the complications of giving a fair account of the
extent of the Culebra watershed's present-day commitment to
its earlier water law and tradition is that water rights holders
in the Culebra acequia communities are acutely aware of the
relative priority of their water rights under present day
Colorado law. They often insist on those priorities. 29 The long
establishment of appropriative water rights in Colorado and
the recognition that property rights in water are grounded in
that system and not another, have necessarily made people
attentive to their rights and willing to act to defend them in
terms that the law requires. 30 In addition, the long established
law of temporal priority has made it more difficult to enforce
conformity to the old norms of sharing, especially in times of
scarcity when those norms most count. Because the law no
longer insists on sharing in times of scarcity, nor offers formal
encouragement to acequia institutions, commitment to the
older norms must of necessity be voluntary and based on
mutual persuasion by those within the acequia communities.31
29. See infra text accompanying notes 185-192.
30. See infra text accompanying notes 181-182.
31. See infra text accompanying notes 185-192.
New Mexico, by contrast, has allowed some elements of the earlier water law
and culture of Spain and Mexico to continue to play a role in shaping
contemporary water law and policy, though the persistence of acequia traditions
has been situated within the state's commitment to a system of appropriative
water rights based on seniority of appropriation. See supra note 13. Recognition
by the Territory, and later, by New Mexico of acequia water rights and
institutions has varied considerably over time. In the years preceding and in the
years immediately following the establishment of United States dominion under
the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo (1848) there was first the Kearny Code,
promulgated in 1846 by General Stephen Watts Kearny during his occupation of
the Mexican province of New Mexico. ORGANIC LAW FOR THE TERRITORY OF NEW
MEXICO COMPILED UNDER THE DIRECTIONS OF GENERAL KEARNY, reprinted in
OCCUPATION OF MEXICAN TERRITORY, S. DOC. NO. 896, 62nd Cong., 2d. Sess. 10,
175 (1912). The so-called Kearny Code provided that water rights and water
institutions established under Mexican dominion would continue under the new
United States sovereignty. Id.; see also SISTER MARY LOYOLA, THE AMERICAN
OCCUPATION OF NEW MEXICO 1821-1852 59-66, 100-01 (1976). Neither the
Kearny Code nor the undertaking in the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo that
property rights in existence under Mexican dominion would be protected under
the laws of the United States had the effect of making property rights and
institutions arising under Mexican law immune from lawful redefinition and
reshaping under United States law, either as a matter of established
international law or of United States domestic law. See, e.g., Albuquerque Land
& Irrigation Co. v. Gutierrez, 61 P. 357, 366 (N.M. 1900); 1 D.P. O'CONNELL,
STATE SUCCESSION IN MUNICIPAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 109, 239-44, 248-50
(1967); LOYOLA, supra, at 71; HERBERT A. WILKINSON, THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE
OF STATE SUCCESSION 37-52, 117-34 (1934). Nonetheless, for many years after
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the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, the Territory of New Mexico did not modify the
essential attributes of acequia water rights and institutions, and indeed confirmed
them. See, e.g., Statutes and Laws of the Territory of New Mexico, art. 1, ch. 1, §
8, Act of July 20, 1851; 1852 N.M. Ditches Act, supra note 11. A strong political
culture had evolved that resisted alteration of substantive water rights as they
had been defined under Mexican law. Reflections of that tradition can be seen in
laws and official statements throughout the nineteenth century. As late as 1898,
the New Mexico Water Commission concluded that the acequia system is "just
and progressive and simple" and should not be changed. Id.
The 1905 and 1907 territorial water codes recognized acequia water customs
and practices as a distinct set of valid water institutions, but each struck an
ambivalent note in stating the law's commitment to their protection. Each statute
acknowledged and endorsed the decentralized and communal authority over
water implicit in acequia governance but at the same time made clear that the
foundation of water rights lay in appropriation and beneficial use. The 1907
water code further limited acequia authority by insisting on the centralized
allocational authority over water of the territorial government and the territorial
engineer. Compare Laws 1905, ch. 102, §§ 2, 10, 29, 37 (codified at N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 72-1-2, -4-19, -9-2 (Michie 1978)), with Laws 1907, ch. 49, §§ 2, 23, 57, 59
(codified at § 72-9-1). Section 37 of Chapter 102 of the Laws of 1905 had provided
that the territorial board of water control (established to make all adjudications of
water within New Mexico) had no power to hear, determine or adjudicate any
rights affecting acequias, without the unanimous consent of all interested parties.
This striking limitation on government power was repealed, and the authority of the
territorial engineer to adjudicate matters involving acequia rights declared, in the
1907 Water Code. See §§ 72-4-19, -9-2; see also BAXTER, supra note 4, at 104-05.
Following the change in statutory law, the earlier pattern of judicial
deference to acequia governance of water was altered decisively with the 1914
decisions in Snow v. Abalos, 140 P. 1044 (N.M. 1914) and State ex rel. Cmty.
Ditches or Acequias v. Tularosa Cmty. Ditch, 143 P. 207, 214-15 (N.M. 1914). It
became clear through those decisions that acequias, as such, and distinct from
their member-irrigators, could no longer own and could not control water
communally. It was the individual parciantes who in the eyes of the law
beneficially used the water and who were considered to hold the water right.
Snow, 140 P. at 1048-51. Further, the acequias, as entities, had no power to
control or to make dispositions with respect to water, which, until appropriated by
a beneficial user, lay within the state's power to allocate. Tularosa, 143 P. at
213-14; see also BAXTER, supra note 4, at 99-104; Hall, supra note 12.
More recently, New Mexico has embraced the heritage and public resource
value of the acequia system, struggling, however, with the task of defining the
extent to which acequias should enjoy the power to control and allocate water or
the extent to which the state should reshape concepts of beneficial use and waste
to support customary acequia methods of water diversion and application. New
Mexico law now allows acequias to acquire water rights from their parciantes, to
transfer those rights, and to protect them from the risk of loss for nonuse. N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 73-2-22 (Michie 1978). .There has been significant skirmishing
between the State and the acequias on the vital question whether customary
acequia methods of water use and diversion are compatible with prevailing
theories of beneficial use. See, e.g., Letter of Special Master Vickie L. Gabin in the
Rio Chama Adjudication to the Parties, State v. Aragon, U.S. District Court for
New Mexico (No. CV 7941 SC) (October 30, 1997); Acequias Brief on Initial Legal
Issues, New Mexico v. Aragon, U.S. District Court for New Mexico (No. CIV-7941);
Acequias Response Brief on Initial Legal Rights Relating to Acequia Diversion
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In practice, acequia water users have often chosen to
adjust the exercise of their water rights to the needs of their
junior neighbors and to the functioning of the acequia delivery
system as a whole. 32 Acequia governance is usually based on a
one landowner, one vote system for the election of mayordomos
and commissioners, compelling officials to be responsive to
small holders individually and in the aggregate.3 3  The moral
authority of the mayordomo or of community leaders is often
successful in persuading neighbors to remain true to a water
heritage that the law no longer compels, perhaps by passing up
a turn in order to accommodate a neighbor, by receiving water
on a schedule that is fitted to the delivery capacity of the
acequia system, or by agreeing, as did Adelmo Kaber and
Joseph Gallegos, to share scarcity. 34 Elements of the culture
and the custom of water sharing, of water allocation on
principles other than temporal priority, and of commitment to
the acequia as the common delivery system thus survive,
constantly pressured by the rights structure of prior
appropriation.
A fair characterization of the contemporary state of affairs
might be that there is sufficient discomfort with the
consequences of temporal priority as a commanding allocation
Rights, New Mexico v. Aragon, U.S. District Court for New Mexico (No. CIV-7941)
(Oct. 14, 1997).
There nonetheless remains a deeply seated commitment in New Mexico to
acequias as structures of community resource allocation and as foundations of
cultural identity. That commitment has served as a foundation for an assumed
legitimacy of acequias in the ongoing legal, administrative and legislative
dialogue about the role and powers of acequias. See, e.g., RIVERA, supra note 3, at
148-50 (discussing, as indications of acequia legitimacy, the creation by
gubernatorial Executive Order, of the New Mexico Acequia Commission as a
water advisory body, and passage of the Water Resources Development Act of
1986, Pub. L. 99-662, 100 Stat. 4082 "direct[ing] the Army Corps of Engineers 'to
consider the historic Acequia systems (community ditches) of the southwestern
United States as public entities [allowing them] to enter into agreements and
serve as local sponsors of water-related projects'"); see also John R. Brown & Jose
A. Rivera, Acequias de Comun: The Tension Between Collective Action and
Private Property Rights 10-11, 19-22 (2000) (unpublished man-
uscript, available at http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/documents/dir/00/00/02/
dlc-0000027-00/rivierajO41300.pdf) (a paper presented at the Annual Meetings of
the International Association for the Study of Common Property
Feb. 13-15, 2000).
32. See infra text accompanying notes 208, 212-214.
33. See infra text accompanying notes 209-211, 240-242.
34. See Gallegos, Acequia Tales, supra note 13. The vulnerability of such
systems of voluntary compliance within acequia communities has been noted in
Brown & Rivera, supra note 31, at 20-22.
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tool that older ways are at times preferred. That discomfort is
based on the conviction that community solidarity and the good
order of the landscape and the acequia system may depend on
commitment to other principles of allocation than temporal
priority.3 5  For those reasons, acequia practices of water
allocation, grounded in the circumstances of original settlement
and once compelled by law, continue to shape conduct and
expectations with respect to water use.
B. Overview
This article will describe the origins and the persistence of
acequia practices in the Culebra watershed communities. Part
of the story to be told is that of the atrophying of a set of
collective water institutions under pressure from a new legal
order and other social change. The acequias, a system of
community water control, were formally supplanted in the late
nineteenth century by a state-administered system of water
rights grounded in appropriation and ownership of water by
individual rights holders.36 It is unquestionably the case that
the loss of legal authority to regulate water as a community
asset has reduced the effectiveness of acequias as governance
structures.
A second theme, however, is the survival of practices and
commitments of acequia water management, and the reasons
for their survival. Briefly stated, acequia practices have
survived because they contribute to the functioning of the
watershed as a productive landscape, providing services to
individual rights holders and to the community that would be
difficult to replicate under feasible alternative institutional
orders. This functionality of the acequia system is especially
important because of the specific form that it takes. Reliance
on earthen, gravity-fed ditches allows water to move through
the landscape, supporting crop irrigation while providing an
array of environmental and ecosystem services that would not
likely survive the abandonment of acequia institutions or the
abandonment of the physical systems of acequia water
conveyance. It is the intersection of a particular technology
with a particular landscape and a social and cultural order that
35. See Gallegos, Acequia Tales, supra note 13; see also infra text
accompanying notes 184-191, 209-211, 240-242.
36. See infra text accompanying notes 117-183.
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produces watershed functioning of a particularly high order.3v
For those reasons, this paper advocates appropriate
adjustments in the prevailing law to accommodate acequia
functioning. Because of their singular position as institutions
that are legitimate in the eyes of long established communities
and effective at providing ecosystem services, the acequias may
represent a form of social and natural resource capital whose
survival should be encouraged.
The narrative that follows is divided into four Parts. Part
I offers a description of the founding of the Rio Culebra acequia
communities and of the reshaping of their water institutions in
the last decades of the nineteenth century as a result of the
coming of the law of prior appropriation. That part of the
narrative explores the consequences for the acequias of the loss
of formal legal protection under Colorado law of the acequia
37. We do not make a claim for the universal efficacy of acequia institutions
or for the universal beneficial consequences of acequia diversion and irrigation
methods. The particular features of watersheds, including their scale, their water
production, and the dynamics of ground and surface water interaction will be
critical factors in determining the efficacy of acequia techniques in managing
water in particular watersheds. Our ultimate argument is one in favor of
embracing variant institutions of watershed governance and differing visions of
efficiency and efficacy of water use, at least where specific local adaptations
indicate their effectiveness and their conformity with desirable watershed
functioning and social good.
For varying perceptions of the effectiveness of acequia systems, see, e.g.,
BAXTER, supra note 4, at 13-16, 95; FREDERICK HAYNES NEWELL, REPORT ON
AGRICULTURE BY IRRIGATION IN THE WESTERN PART OF THE UNITED STATES AT
THE ELEVENTH CENSUS 193-99 (1890); MAPS AND PANORAMAS:TWELFTH ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE UNITED STATES GEOLOGICAL SURVEY OF THE
TERRITORIES, 1878 273. The latter two documents reflect Newell's alternatively
contemptuous and bemusedly admiring assessments of modest scale and
technologically simple acequia systems as irrigation mechanisms. Newell was not
alone in expressing a notably culturally-grounded hostility to the hispanic
irrigation communities in the southwest. See HUBERT H. BANCROFT, HISTORY OF
NEVADA, COLORADO, AND WYOMING 1540-1888 593 (1890). For other, varying
assessments by strangers to acequia systems, see JOSIAH GREGG, COMMERCE OF
THE PRAIRIES 104-108 (Max L. Moorhead ed., 1954); JANE E. NORRIS & LEE G.
NORRIS, WRITTEN IN WATER, THE LIFE OF BENJAMIN HARRISON EATON 24-32
(1990) (describing Eaton's admiring encounters with Hispano acequia systems in
New Mexico while a young man and before the beginning of his public life as
territorial legislator, governor and irrigation advocate and promoter in Colorado);
ZEBULON M. PIKE, 1 THE JOURNALS OF ZEBULON MONTGOMERY PIKE 401 (Donald
Jackson ed., 1954); CLYDE PORTER & MAE REED PORTER, RUXTON OF THE
ROCKIES 161 (LeRoy R. Hafen ed., 1950); Hutchins, supra note 3, at 274-75.
Donald J. Pisani has noted the absence of discussion of the Spanish and Mexican
water legacy to the American West by leading early scholars of western water
institutions. DONALD J. PISANI, WATER, LAND, AND LAW IN THE WEST: THE
LIMITS OF PUBLIC POLICY, 1850-1920 18 (1996).
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water allocation regime. Part II describes the acequia as a
structure of governance and as an institution for collective
action and decision-making for a community-built natural
resource commons. Part III describes the ecology of the Rio
Culebra watershed acequias, focusing on the acequias as
generators of natural resource wealth and as a natural
resource management system that performs valuable
environmental and ecosystem services. Part IV offers
suggestions for an approach to protecting the value and use of
water-in-place in acequia watersheds. Four main policy areas
are addressed in Part IV: (1) protection of the community
interest in water-in-place in acequias by recognizing
appropriate acequia authority to limit water transfers
inconsistent with watershed and ditch functioning; (2)
modifications to the doctrine of beneficial use to produce more
considered treatment of the ecological and economic value of
traditional irrigation practices and water institutions; (3)
strengthening the law's commitment to effective regulation of
land use practices that affect watershed functioning; and (4)
the promotion of reliable community-based watershed
management organizations capable of preserving the natural
capital represented by ecologically beneficial and sustainable
uses of water.
I. HISTORY OF THE ACEQUIAS OF COLORADO'S RIO CULEBRA
WATERSHED
This Part offers a history of the Rio Culebra acequias. It
begins with their foundation as New Mexico frontier
settlements established in the decade following the Mexican
War and concludes with the decisive events that absorbed the
acequia communities into the water rights regime of Colorado
at the end of the nineteenth century.
The first phase of the history of the acequias of the Rio
Culebra involves the application of established New Mexican
community irrigation technologies, governance structures and
legal arrangements to a distant watershed on the New Mexico
Territory's northern frontier. The second phase of the history
involves the absorption of those New Mexican watershed
institutions into Colorado's emergent legal and social order in
the years after the organization of Colorado Territory in 1861.
The history reveals strong continuing commitment by the
Hispano farmers to the originally established governance
[Vol. 74
20031 COMMUNITY ACEQUIAS
principles and rights structures, and the difficulty of
maintaining those commitments under the appropriative water
rights regime definitively established in the watershed in the
years after 1889 following an earlier period of accommodation
of acequia institutions by Colorado law.
A. Establishment of the Rio Culebra Acequia
Communities
The first attempts at settlement of Colorado's Culebra
River watershed by Hispano colonists may have occurred as
early as the 1820s or 1830s, but it was not until the years
immediately following the conclusion of the Mexican War that
permanent settlements supported by acequia water delivery
systems were established.38 The Culebra watershed lay within
38. Carlson, supra note 6, at 113-14; Nostrand, supra note 4, at 372-74;
Forbes Parkhill, Colorado's Earliest Settlements, 34 COLO. MAG. 241-43 (1957);
SIMMONS, supra note 17, at 43, 46; Marianne L. Stoller, Grants of Desperation,
Lands of Speculation: Mexican Period Land Grants in Colorado, in SPANISH &
MEXICAN LAND GRANTS IN NEW MEXICO AND COLORADO 24, 26, 34 (John R. Van
Ness & Christine M. Van Ness eds., 1980); VALDEZ & VALDEZ, supra note 15, at
1-2, 9-12, 18.
There is some dispute among the commentators about the role that the first
establishment of a United States military presence in the San Luis Valley may
have played in permitting permanent settlement of the Hispano acequia
communities of the Culebra. Some accounts seek to nest the Hispano settlements
into a structure of stability created only through a series of campaigns by the
United States against the Utes beginning in 1849 and culminating in 1855 with a
treaty. See, e.g., LEROY R. HAFEN, COLORADO, THE STORY OF A WESTERN
COMMONWEALTH 96-100 (1933); SIMMONS, supra note 17, at 46, 51-53; LeRoy
Hafen, Mexican Land Grants in Colorado, 4 COLO. MAG. 83-87 (1927); Lantis,
supra note 8, at 9. Members of the San Luis Hispano community maintain that,
following initial sharp hostilities, a modus vivendi was worked out with the Utes
independently of the United States military presence. The latter version of the
relationship with the Ute people is in part verified by the oral history of the Ute
people, and by Frank White (part Ute-part Chicano) who argues that the
relationships between the Utes and the early Hispano settlers were complex but
in time largely friendly, complicated by the United States War against Mexico and
the coming of a United States military presence in its aftermath. Interview by
Devon G. Pefia with Frank White, Ute Nation member and retired teacher (June
1991) (on file with the author); see also JAMES JEFFERSON, ET AL., THE SOUTHERN
UTES: A TRIBAL HISTORY (Floyd A. O'Neil ed., 1972); David J. Weber, American
Westward Expansion and the Breakdown of Relations Between Pobladores and
"Indios Barbaros" on Mexico's Far Northern Frontier, 1821-1846, in DAVID J.
WEBER, MYTH AND HISTORY OF THE HISPANIC SOUTHWEST 117-132 (1988). In
any case, although the first effort to establish acequia communities was repelled
by Ute resistance in 1850, the first acequia community on the Culebra was
established a year thereafter, more than a year before the establishment of Ft.
Massachusetts as a permanent U.S. cavalry garrison (at the foot of the Sierra
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the boundaries of the one million-acre Sangre de Cristo Land
Grant conferred by Mexican authorities in 1844 to Stephen
Luis Lee, sheriff of Taos, New Mexico, and Narciso Beaubien,
the minor son of an influential Taos trader and entrepreneur,
Carlos Beaubien. 39  Such grants were an instrument of a
Mexican government policy intended to populate and stabilize
frontier regions .40 The grant petition submitted by Lee and
Beaubien recited the intention to establish settlers on the grant
lands .41
Repelled by Indian resistance and delayed by the U.S.
invasion of New Mexico in 1846, settlement efforts did not
succeed until the end of the 1840s.42 By that time, dominion of
New Mexico had been transferred to the United States, and the
original grantees had been murdered in the Taos Uprising of
1847. Carlos Beaubien, successor to the interests of Lee and
Blanca mountains and a good distance to the north of the Culebra watershed) and
more than three years before the end of effective Ute resistance. See SIMMONS,
supra note 17, at 47, 51-53. The acequia communities do not seem to have
awaited control of the frontier by the United States before they established
themselves on lands where the Ute nation still held sway. The willingness of the
Hispano settlers to move into an area that was not secure has been attributed in
part to their poverty and the opportunity represented by an unsettled land grant,
in part to their character as a settler people of partial Indian ethnicity,
comfortable that they could adapt to frontier circumstances and the indigenous
population, and in part to the security of being part of an organized settlement
effort. See SIMMONS, supra note 17, at 47, 51-53; Lantis, supra note 8, at 6-7, 9;
Nostrand, supra note 4, at 361-64, 372; Stoller, supra, at 38.
39. Spanish Archives of New Mexico, Records of the Sangre de Cristo Land
Grant, Reel No. 12, frs. 690-703; Stoller, supra note 38, at 31.
40. DAVID J. WEBER, THE SPANISH FRONTIER IN NORTH AMERICA 147-235,
passim (1992); Nostrand, supra note 4, at 361-67; Stoller, supra note 38,
at 22, 24, 27.
41. Stoller, supra note 38, at 22; John R. Van Ness, Spanish American v.
Anglo-American Land Tenure and the Study of Economic Change in New Mexico,
13 Soc. Sci. J. 45, 47-48 (1976). Stoller and Van Ness maintain that the
expectation of settlement attached both to community land grants and to
substantial grants conferred on individuals. The expectation of settlement was
plainly an element of the Sangre de Cristo Grant but not a requirement for its
confirmation. See Petition By Luis Lee and Narciso Beaubien to Governor
Manuel Armijo (Dec. 27, 1843), and the Confirmation of the Grant By Mexican
Authorities in Advance of Effective Settlement, (available at SPANISH ARCHIVES
OF NEW MEXICO, supra note 39, at fr. 690). A recitation of the history of the
application for and confirmation of the Sangre de Cristo Grant appears in
Tameling v. US. Freehold Land & Emigration Co., 93 U.S. 644, 647 (1876), affg 2
Colo. 411, 416 (1874). The original grantees and, after their deaths in 1847, their
successor, Carlos Beaubien, father of Narciso, sought to fulfill the obligation to
settle the grant lands. THOMAS L. KARNES, WILLIAM GILPIN, WESTERN
NATIONALIST 302 (1970); Stoller, supra note 38, at 31, 34.
42. See supra note 38.
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his son, worked diligently to recruit settlers in conformity with
the promises in the original grant petition and in spite of the
fact that Mexican authorities had already confirmed the grant
in 1844 in advance of successful settlement.43 Although the
formal grant had already been issued by Mexican authorities,
and in advance of successful settlement, Beaubien in all
likelihood believed that strict conformity with all promises
made to Mexican authorities by the original petitioners would
facilitate ultimate confirmation of the grant by United States
authorities. 44 It was a turbulent period, and it would have been
unclear whether the United States as successor sovereign
would confirm the grant, or, given the then fluid state of the
law on the question of grant confirmation, what the conditions
of any such confirmation might be.45 By 1852, the first acequia,
the San Luis People's Ditch, was established and delivering
water to settlers in the chief Culebra settlement of San Luis de
la Culebra. 46
This establishment of an acequia community on the
Culebra was but one episode in the longer history of Hispano
settlement of the Rio Grande watershed.47 The diffusion of
43. See KARNES, supra note 41; Stoller, supra note 38; SPANISH ARCHIVES
OF NEW MEXICO, supra note 39.
44. See KARNES, supra note 41, at 302; Stoller, supra note 38, at 34-35. In
1850, the U.S. Supreme Court reasserted its insistence that compliance with
Spanish and Mexican law was necessary to perfect land titles within territory
acquired by the United States. U.S. v. Boisdor6, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 63 (1850).
45. PISANI, supra note 37, at 73, offers a description of the then state of the
law. The U.S. Supreme Court had ruled on dozens of contested Spanish land
titles in Louisiana and Florida and in a majority of the cases had emphasized the
paramount right of American settlers to establish title to unoccupied land through
preemption. The sanctity of Spanish grants had been emphasized in a minority of
the cases. The Court in 1850 in United States v. Boisdorg, restated its formal
commitment to the principle that the grants of Mexican grantees who conformed
with the requirements of Mexican law would be confirmed by the United States.
There nonetheless existed a strong natural rights-grounded sentiment that large
Mexican grants should be suspect in themselves, because their scale was
inconsistent with the achievement of a democratic landscape reflecting
Harringtonian and Lockean principles. Settling the Sangre de Cristo Grant
would thus have served a dual purpose for Beaubien, conforming with normal
Mexican expectations for such grants, and peopling with small holders an empty
and extensive land grant.
46. 1 COLORADO AND ITS PEOPLE 118 (1948); HAFEN, supra note 38, at 96-
97; SIMMONS, supra note 17, at 48; Carlson, supra note 6, at 114-16; Francis T.
Cheetham, The Early Settlements of Southern Colorado, 5 COLO. MAG. 5 (1928);
Lantis, supra note 8, at 10; Nostrand, supra note 4, at 372.
47. See SIMMONS, supra note 17, at 47-48; Carlson, supra note 6, at 113-19;
Lantis, supra note 8, at 7-13; Nostrand, supra note 4, at 372.
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acequia irrigation techniques and institutions along the Rio
Grande and its arable tributaries had proceeded for
generations with the expansion of Hispano settlement.48 From
the eighteenth until the mid-nineteenth century, Hispano
settlement probed north and west from older established
communities along the Rio Grande searching out watersheds
amenable to irrigation.
The settlers of the Culebra had come principally from
towns and communities elsewhere in the northern New Mexico
Territory, 49 and they brought with them a commitment to
irrigation techniques and institutions of water governance
cultivated for many years.50 The construction and maintenance
of the irrigation system lay at the heart of new settlements.51
Individual farmsteads were apportioned rights in the
community irrigation system.52 Intending settlers were obliged
to contribute their labor to the building and maintenance of the
irrigation system and their persons to the common defense. 53
It is important to emphasize that the diffusion of acequia
techniques and culture involved more than the successive
application of a proven and adaptable technology to new
watersheds. The people also carried with them a commitment
to the institutional arrangements of acequia governance,
embodied in long-standing law and custom, 54 sometimes
written down but often not, and created for the allocation of
water and other natural resources in new settlements.55 These
48. See CLARK, supra note 3, at 12-16; RICHARD L. NOSTRAND, THE HISPANO
HOMELAND 361-66 (1992); RIVERA, supra note 3, passim; Hutchins, supra note 3,
at 271-75.
49. See NOSTRAND, supra note 48, at 372-75; SIMMONS, supra note 17, at
47-48; John Philip Andrews, History of Rural Spanish Settlement and Land Use
in the Upper Culebra Basin of the San Luis Valley, Costilla County, Colorado
(1972) (unpublished Master's thesis, University of Colorado, on file with author).
Summary descriptions of the origins of the Culebra watershed settlers appear in
Carlson, supra note 6, at 114; Cheetham, supra note 46; Parkhill, supra note 38;
Edmond C. Van Diest, Early History of Costilla County, 5 COLO. MAG. 141 (1928).
50. Carlson, supra note 6, at 116-19; Lantis, supra note 8, at 6-10;
Simmons, supra note 5, at 135-144.
51. Carlson, supra note 6, at 116-19; Lantis, supra note 8, at 6-10;
Simmons, supra note 5, at 135-144.
52. Carlson, supra note 6, at 116-19; Lantis, supra note 8, at 6-10;
Simmons, supra note 5, at 135-144.
53. See supra notes 47, 50.
54. See MALCOM EBRIGHT, LAND GRANTS AND LAwsuITs IN NORTHERN NEW
MEXICO 62-63 (John R. Van Ness ed., 1994); RIVERA, supra note 3, at 33;
Greenleaf, supra note 3, at 97-104.
55. See infra text accompanying notes 57-60, 69; BAXTER, supra note 4, at
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sources of community water practices are a reason for their
great durability and for the depth of commitment to them even
in our own time.
The chief concerns of the New Mexico water law regime
were the assurance of the stability of settlements and the
expansion of settlement within the limits of the environmental
capacity of the landscape. 56 The frontier was precarious and
the achievement of community stability was crucial. 57 The law
of community acequias had a collectivist cast, grounded in
custom and the institutional requirements of establishing
organized settlement in an arid frontier. Stable settlement
depended on shared duties in the construction and
maintenance of the community water supply systems and a
sharing of water in times of scarcity.58  Customs of allocation
based on these principles might vary from locality to locality,
59
but variations were grounded in a consistent commitment to
the recognition of the importance of equity and necessity, and
to methods of allocation and dispute resolution that would
promote the distribution of sufficient water to all for the most
essential uses.6 0
1-14; CLARK, supra note 3, at 15-16, 25-26; CUTTER, supra note 12, at 1-11, 19-
30, 69-128; MEYER, supra note 3, at 145-64; RIVERA, supra note 3, at 25-41;
Carlson, supra note 6, at 111-19; Ebright, supra note 9, at 3,passim.
56. See PISANI, supra note 37, at 18; MARC SIMMONS, SPANISH
GOVERNMENT IN NEW MEXICO 39, 74-75, passim (1968). Simmons emphasizes
the precariousness of many of the New Mexico settlements and the great
importance placed on promoting their stability. See also BAXTER, supra note 4, at
21, 32-36; MEYER, supra note 3, at 148-52, 159-64. BAXTER, supra note 4, at 34-
35; EBRIGHT, supra note 54, at 29-32; and Hall, supra note 12, each discuss
controversies arising from the effort to accommodate newcomers to watersheds
where existing users were already established. Their discussions illustrate the
tension that could exist between the desire to stabilize existing settlements and
the desire to accommodate new arrivals and new uses of resources, typically
resolved by fitting the new demands into the existing structure of use to the
extent possible and allocating water on principles that considered not only prior
use but equity and the needs of all, including new comers and new uses.
57. See SIMMONS supra note 56, at 39, passim, and WESTPHAL, supra note 5,
at 6, 9, for especially clear expositions of the effect that the vulnerability of a
frontier condition had on Spanish and Mexican government policy with respect to
the establishment of settlements. Simmons notes the imposition of penalties on
settlers who abandoned their communities.
58. See MEYER supra note 3, at 161, 163.
59. See BAXTER, supra note 4, at 31-42; EBRIGHT, supra note 54, at 27, 62-
63; RIVERA, supra note 3, at 38; TYLER, supra note 8, at 21-29; Ebright, supra
note 9, at 9, passim.
60. See BAXTER, supra note 4, at 19, 44-46, 68-70; MEYER, supra note 3, at
159-64; RIVERA, supra note 3, at 49-62; TYLER, supra note 8, at 15-29, 40-41;
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What was the basis of water rights in the Rio Arriba region
of the Rio Grande valley? What rights did the Culebra settlers
have in water, and what was the foundation for those rights?
It seems clear, first of all, that rights in water did not arise as a
result of the ownership of riparian land.61 Also, grants of land
were not considered to create grants of water by implication,
however much the settlement and development of the lands
might depend on access to water.6 2 Express grants of water,
although possible under Mexican and Spanish law, were
neither typical nor common .6  The default rule, which would
have applied in all cases where a land grant was silent with
respect to rights in water, as is the case with the Sangre de
Cristo land grant,64 was that all natural water bodies within a
land grant remained the property of the sovereign, available to
the people for their uses and to be allocated among them on the
basis of need and fairness.65 That is to say, a settler on grant
lands obtained access to water by using it, but the rights that
any such user could secure never ceased to be subject to the
universal rights of others to share available water when
scarcity required rationing.66 In particular, an established use
did not give the earlier user a clear right based on her seniority
to take water while newer users went without.67  The
continuing public character of the resource and the continuous
operation of the twin principles of necessity and fairness as the
basis of allocation precluded such an outcome. Prior use and
established reliance might be factors in determining equity of
Ebright, supra note 9, at 32-33.
61. See State v. Valmont Plantations, 346 S.W.2d 853, 859-65 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1961), affd, Valmont Plantations v. State, 355 S.W.2d 502 (Tex. 1962), and
sources cited).
62. MEYER, supra, note 3, at 133-44, through his emphasis on acquisition of
water rights by formal grant, may seem to suggest that such grants were the
common and typical method of securing access to water in those portions of the
Spanish and later Mexican dominions that were to become parts of the American
Southwest. The teaching of the historical sources cited in Valmont Plantations,
346 S.W.2d 853, is otherwise. See also HANS W. BAADE, The Historical
Background of Texas Water Law - A Tribute to Jack Pope, 18 ST. MARY'S L.J. 2,
67-75 (1986). Ebright's commentary of New Mexico sources on this point also
indicates the comparative rarity in New Mexico of formal grants of water with or
without grants of land. See Ebright, supra note 9, at 8, and sources cited.
63. Valmont Plantations, 346 S.W.2d 853; Ebright, supra note 9, at 8.
64. See, SPANISH ARCHIVES OF NEW MEXICO, supra note 39.
65. Valmont Plantations, 346 S.W.2d at 859-65.
66. Id.
67. See Ebright, supra note 9, at 9-11.
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allocation, but under conditions of scarcity the law required
allocation on the basis of criteria whose ultimate concerns were
fairness to all and responsiveness to need.68
It was a system of water law and water management
deeply seated in the communities where it was applied. This
law had been articulated and enforced by varying
administrative and judicial authorities during the different
phases of the Spanish colonial and Mexican government of New
Mexico. 69 Municipal and town councils, provincial governors
and justices of the peace, local water judges and ditch bosses
(mayordomos or repartidores de aguas) were variously charged
with interpretation and enforcement of rights and duties with
respect to waters and acequias.70
There were few trained lawyers on the New Mexico
frontier, and available compilations and digests of the law
offered only broad general principles for the resolution of
particular disputes where books were available at all.71 The
distance of most of the New Mexico settlements from
administrative centers meant that resolution of most water
disputes and allocational questions was accomplished by local
authorities and community leaders who applied to particular
disputes the commonly accepted principles of allocation.
72
Hearing records or the resolution of water disputes were not
usually put in writing, but if appealed the substance of the
dispute and its resolution would be reduced to writing.
7 3
Though the written sources of law might often be unavailable
68. Id.
69. Id.; see also TYLER, supra note 8, at 14-29. For an account of the
structures of provincial and local government and of judicial proceedings in New
Mexico during the late Spanish colonial period, see SIMMONS, supra note 56,
passim.
70. BAXTER, supra note 4, at 17-48; CUTTER, supra note 12, at 1-11, 19-30,
69-128; MEYER, supra note 3, at 145-63; RIVERA, supra note 3, at 52-60;
SIMMONS, supra note 56, at 135-44; Ebright, supra note 9, at 9-11.
71. See CUTTER, supra note 12, at 77-80, 87-88, 99-102; SIMMONS, supra
note 56, at 39, 176, (discussing the availability of legal materials, including
treatises, codes and compilations of laws, the state of training in the law by major
and minor officials and administrators in New Mexico, and the role of the written
law in adjudicated disputes); see also MEYER, supra note 3, at 145-64; Malcolm
Ebright, Frontier Land Litigation in Colonial New Mexico: A Determinant to
Spanish Custom and Law, 8 W. LEGAL HIST. 199, 200-03 (1995); Joseph W.
McKnight, Law Books on the Hispanic Frontier, in SPANISH AND MEXICAN LAND
GRANTS AND THE LAND 74-84 (Malcolm Ebright ed., 1989).
72. EBRIGHT, supra note 54; MEYER, supra note 3; Ebright, supra note 71.
73. EBRIGHT, supra note 54.
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to those who interpreted and applied the law, adjudicated
outcomes were grounded in consistent principles of decision
governing the allocation of water, including necessity, equity,
the common good, and prior use.74
The substance of the Mexican water law survived the
transfer of dominion to the United States. Especially in the
years immediately following the transfer of dominion from
Mexico to the United States, New Mexico Territory legislative
assemblies maintained and protected existing acequia
institutions.7 5 The laws of the first sessions of the New Mexico
territorial legislature were particularly forceful in asserting the
continuity of customary rules established by community
acequias.76 The statutes adopted tended to crystallize the
74. See MEYER, supra note 3, at 145-64 (consideration of the factors used by
decision makers in adjudicating water disputes); RIVERA, supra note 3, at 33;
Ebright, supra note 9, at 9-11 (distinguishing between the meaning of prior use
as a basis for allocation under Mexican law and the quite different notion of
priority of rights under the modern western law of prior appropriation).
The enforcement of acequia rights and duties through informal adjudication
processes by persons lacking formal training in the civil law seems to suggest that
acequia rules and customs may have been a bit unmoored from the structure of
civil law adjudication. It is important first to emphasize that the practices and
rules of community acequias were viewed by government authorities as structures
of enforceable obligations and rights in acequia communities. Second, the
Spanish and Mexican civil law traditions allow for the development of customary
practices and rules as valid expressions of the civil law and indeed invite
interpretation and local variation in the meaning of law by promulgating laws in
the form of statements of broad principles for the determination of substantive
rights. Mexican and Spanish laws governing water allocation in frontier
communities are often laws of this very character. See MEYER, supra note 3, at
145-64; RIVERA, supra note 3, at 31; Ebright, supra notes 9; and 71, at 200-03.
Acequia authorities or local municipal authorities, whether or not they knew to
situate a particular decision as an expression of a specific code provision, typically
sought to conform their decisions to broad principles of equity and necessity
known to be prevailing. See MEYER, supra note 3, at 145-64; Ebright, supra note
9, at 9-11. The main pressure for the conformity of rulings with well-established
principles of water allocation was that affected communities of users were aware
of and committed to those principles. See BAXTER, supra note 4, at 38-48. It is a
misapprehension of the civil law tradition to suppose that valid law may not
consist of elastic standards to be weighed in adjusting rights and duties or that
the content of the formal law may not be shaped and defined by an evolving body
of customary interpretations of broadly stated legal principles and rules. Law is
no less law in the civil system for consisting of sets of standards that decision
makers must seek to apply with reasonable consistency in specific fact situations.
Nor do customary rules and practices necessarily fail as expressions of law. See
EBRIGHT, supra note 54, passim.
75. See BAXTER, supra note 4, at 61-67; CLARK, supra note 3, at 24-26.
76. See BAXTER, supra note 4, at 61-67; CLARK, supra note 3, at 24-26.
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received pattern of rights and duties of landowners whose
lands were served by acequias.71
An 1856 Act of the New Mexico Territory's fifth legislative
assembly fitted the newly formed communities of the Culebra
watershed into the prevailing structure of early territorial New
Mexico water rights jurisprudence. The Act reads:
An Act Establishing Three Additional Precincts in the
County of Taos
Be it enacted by the Legislative Assembly of the Territory of
New Mexico:
SECTION 1. That all the settlements on the Culebra River
shall compose one Judicial precinct, separated from the
Costilla precinct, designated precinct number 15.
SECTION 4. That the judge of probate of Taos County
shall, immediately after the passage of this act, order an
election to be held in the precincts herein formed, for the
purpose of electing one justice of the peace and one
constable for each precinct.78
The special significance of this legislation is that water
rights and irrigation matters were an important part of the
jurisdiction of justices of the peace.7 9  Their authority also
included adjudication of the rights and common duties of
owners of lands watered by acequias and the supervision of the
election of mayordomos.80 For the New Mexican settlers of the
Culebra, the assurance that there was law in that frontier
community, including a magistrate to adjudicate water matters
along familiar lines, would have been important.
77. See supra note 31 for a description of the profound qualification of the
commitment to acequia institutions in later years in New Mexico.
78. Act of Jan. 10, 1856, 1856 N.M. LAWS 24, ch. 10 (act establishing three
additional precincts in Taos County).
79. See supra note 11, 1852 N.M. Laws at 276-77 (act relating to ditches
and water streams); see also sources cited supra note 53.
80. See Act of Jan. 9, 1852, 1852 N.M. LAws 309, 2d Sess. (act establishing
justice courts and defining the duties of justices of the peace).
20031
UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74
The bill's proponent is unknown, but Antonio Ortiz,
member of the territorial legislative assembly from Taos
County, offered the motion for its passage.81 It is unknown
whether Carlos Beaubien played any role in promoting the bill.
He was at the time working to attract new settlers to the
Sangre de Cristo grant and to stabilize the communities that
had already been established.8 2 Beaubien had earlier set up
rules for conduct of the colony, including the requirement that
newcomers obtain permission to live in the town either from
him or from the justice of the peace with jurisdiction over the
area.8 3 It is not too fanciful to imagine him favoring legislation
to name a new justice of the peace in the principal watershed of
his distant grant lands. 84
The population of the Culebra settlements grew steadily
from the first establishment of San Luis in 1851. The San Luis
People's Ditch was constructed in April 1852, and six other
acequias were established in the Culebra watershed by the end
of 1855.85 Eight others followed between early 1856 and the
81. Territorial Archives of New Mexico, Min. entry of Jan. 4, 1856, Council
Journal of the Sixth Legislative Assembly, Reel 1, fr. 571.
82. See supra text accompanying notes 40-44; Nostrand, supra note 4, at
372-73; Stoller, supra note 38, at 31, 34.
83. See Deed Record Book No. 1, 256-57 (Costilla County, Colo.) (on file with
authors); Cheetham, supra note 46, at 6; SIMMONS, supra note 17, at 48. The
Beaubien rules for settlers were adopted as a county ordinance by the Costilla
County Commissioners on May 18, 1863. Proceedings of the Costilla County
Commission (Book I) (on file with authors).
84. Beaubien was a ubiquitous figure in the political and administrative life
during the latter years of Mexican dominion and in the early years of New Mexico
Territory. See HERBERT 0. BRAYER, WILLIAM BLACKMORE: THE SPANISH-
MEXICAN LAND GRANTS OF NEW MEXICO AND COLORADO 1863-1878 63 (1949);
KARNES, supra note 41, at 153; LOYOLA, supra note 31, at 37-40; Lawrence R.
Murphy, Charles H. Beaubien, in 6 THE MOUNTAIN MEN AND THE FUR TRADE OF
THE FAR WEST 23 (LeRoy R. Hafen ed., 1968); Stoller, supra note 38, at 31, 34.
Public records show him serving in Taos as a justice of the peace and later as a
judge of the Superior Court. He regularly appears in records of court expenses as
a recipient of fees for his services as a translator in court proceedings. E.g.,
Territorial Archives of New Mexico, Records of the U.S. District Court for the
First Judicial District and of the New Mexico Territorial Circuit Court of Rio
Amber and Taos Counties, 1848-1865. His grant holdings and his influence in
the territory would have made him sensitive to the desirability of taking all
actions needed to assure confirmation of his grant. See supra text accompanying
notes 40-48.
85. See SIMMONS, supra note 17, at 47-48; Cheetham, supra note 46, at 6;
Nostrand, supra note 4, at 372-73; and sources cited therein for narrative
descriptions of the founding of the acequia communities of the Culebra watershed.
An official indication of their founding dates is available in the June 14, 1889
decrees for waters from the Culebra River in Costilla County Colorado. In re
2003] COMMUNITY ACEQUIAS
transfer of political jurisdiction from New Mexico to Colorado
Territory in 1861.86 By 1860, when Beaubien's ownership of
the Sangre de Cristo was confirmed by the United States
government, 7  seventeen hundred people, mainly from
communities in Taos County, were living in the Culebra
watershed. 88
The point of this detailed narrative of the early water law
history of the Culebra is to make plain that the settlers who
came to the Culebra River villages were people who arrived
with a particular water rights regime and who carried with
them an understanding that adherence to the law and custom
of acequias was necessary for their common flourishing on the
frontier.89 The water rights regime that they inherited and
transmitted was anything but a set of vaguely articulated
casual arrangements. From the first settlement of the Culebra
villages until 1861 when the portion of modern day Colorado
lying south of the thirty-seventh parallel was separated from
New Mexico Territory and made a part of the newly organized
Water District No. 24, (D. Ct. Colo. 1889) [hereinafter the 1889 Decrees], setting
the priority dates for water rights with reference to the diversion of water by the
several community ditches.
86. See the 1889 Decrees, supra note 85.
87. See H.R. ExEc. Doc. 36-14 (1st Sess. 1860); see also BRAYER, supra note
84, at 63; KARNES, supra note 41, at 302 (accounts of confirmation of the Sangre
de Cristo Grant). The application for approval of the grant, together with
supporting documents and the report of the United States Surveyor General's
Office at Santa Fe, recommending congressional approval of the grant can be
found in the Spanish Archives of New Mexico, supra note 39, at Reel 12,
frs. 690-715.
88. See EIGHTH U.S. CENSUS (1860); VALDEZ & VALDEZ, supra note 15, at
21; Stoller, supra note 38, at 34.
89. See supra text accompanying notes 45-58. The doctoral dissertation of
Estevan Rael Gdlvez, currently New Mexico State Historian at the New Mexico
State Records Center and Archives, documents the diffusion of families in the
frontier regions of New Mexico. His work indicates that in spite of the remoteness
of settler communities, the settlers themselves were never isolated or separated
culturally from their places of origin. Settlers, once established, frequently went
"home" on significant or pressing occasions. Newcomers to established
settlements often were members of the families of original settlers. Rael Gilvez
suggests that this process may have reinforced the tendency of settlers to remain
committed to the practices and customs of their home areas. Telephone Interview
with Estevan Rael GAlvez, New Mexico State Historian, New Mexico State
Records Center and Archives (Oct. 15, 2001) (notes on file with authors); Estevan
Rael GAlvez, Identifying Captivity and Capturing Identity: Narratives of
American Indian Slavery in Colorado and New Mexico, 1776-1934 (2002)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan) (on file with authors).
His hypothesis is shared by other commentators. See generally RIVERA, supra
note 3; Nostrand, supra note 4.
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Colorado Territory, 90 the Hispano settlers of the Culebra looked
to the law and water culture of New Mexico to define water
rights and provide principles of governance for community
water systems.91
B. Territorial and Early Statehood Years (1861-1882): A
Period of Accommodation
The content of water law and of acequia water rights seem
not to have changed in the years immediately following
transfer of political control of the Culebra watershed to
Colorado in 1861. The Hispano settlers of the Rio Culebra
continued to look to the old law as a foundation for ordering
rights and responsibilities. More important, there is strong
evidence that their understanding of the continuity of basic
water institutions was justified in light of Colorado law in the
territorial period and in the early years of statehood.
Colorado session laws concerned with irrigation practices
in the southern counties of the Territory are consistent in their
recognition and protection of acequia institutions during the
period 1861-1876. Legislation was passed in 1866 for Costilla
and Conejos counties, and in 1872 was extended to Huerfano
and Las Animas counties, giving acequia authorities the legal
power to insist upon the contribution of labor by persons using
water supplied by acequias, and establishing the duties of
mayordomos and their manner of election. 92 More important,
the same 1866 and 1872 statutes recognized a preference for
water uses by agricultural acequias over industrial and milling
uses irrespective of priority, and required public acequias to
prefer agricultural water uses over non-agricultural uses
during the farming season, irrespective of the temporal priority
90. See LeRoy R. Hafen, Status of the San Luis Valley, 1850-1861, 3 COLO.
MAG. 46, 46-49 (Mar. 1926).
91. See discussion accompanying infra notes 105-113 for a description of the
effect of New Mexico law on the Culebra settlers' understanding of their land and
water rights on the Sangre de Cristo grant.
92. See Act of Feb. 6, 1866, 1866 Colo. Sess. Laws 61, 63, 5th Sess., §§ 4, 12
(regulating ditches used for farming purposes in Costilla and Conejos counties);
Act of Jan. 22, 1872, 1872 Colo. Sess. Laws 143, 9th Sess. (act to make the Act of
Feb. 6, 1866 applicable to the County of Huerfano); Act of Feb. 9, 1872, 1872 Colo.
Sess. Laws 145, 9th Sess. (act to make the Act of Feb. 6, 1866 applicable to Las
Animas county).
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of the non-agricultural use.93 Another characteristic acequia
rule-that the irrigation of forage crops could be limited where
necessary to assure water availability for more essential food
crops 94-probably lay behind an otherwise puzzling special act
passed for Huerfano County at as late a date as 1876:
That from and after the passage of this act, it shall be
unlawful for any person to divert the water of any stream,
in the county of Huerfano from and after the 20' day of
June, until the 31st day of August of each year, from its
natural course, for the purpose of irrigating meadow or hay
land.9 5
Such a regulation, preferring grain crops, gardens and
orchards over forage and fodder crops, was a common practice
of acequia water allocation.96
The recognition and protection of acequia institutions can
be seen as part of a broader pattern of integration of Hispano
93. See Section 12 of the Act of Feb. 6, 1866, which states: "[tihat public
acequias, during the farming season, shall have preference over all ditches used
for any mills, machinery, or any other ditch that may not be exclusively used for
farming purposes." 1866 Colo. Sess. Laws 61, 63, 5th Sess.
The provision is not quite comparable to Colorado laws of the period that
obliged companies orgai.ized to construct ditches to prefer water users using
water in a way consistent with the terms of the ditch company's certificate. See,
e.g., Act of Aug. 15, 1862, 1862 Colo. Sess. Laws 48, § 14 (enabling road, ditch,
manufacturing and other companies to become corporate bodies):
Any company constructing a ditch under the provisions of this act shall
furnish water to the class of persons using water in the way named in
the certificate as the way the water is designated to be used, whether
miners, millmen or farmers... and shall at all times give the preference
to the use of the water in said ditch to the class of persons so named in
the certificate.
Section 12 has a different sense. It states a categorical preference for
agricultural uses by community acequias and a preference for water use by
acequias over other classes of diverters. Id. § 12.
94. See BAXTER, supra note 4, at 75 (describing the general preference for
farmland over meadow and pasture irrigation, though grassland irrigation was
also deemed worthy of encouragement). See also RIVERA, supra note 3, at 33-37
(discussing principles of allocation of water in times of scarcity and of the practice
of preferring uses deemed most essential).
95. Act of Feb. 10, 1876, 1876 Colo. Sess. Laws 79 (preventing the use of
water in meadow lands in the county of Huerfano during certain months).
Legislative acts promoting acequia institutions seem not to have been
uncommon in this period. In addition to the laws noted, see also Act of Feb. 12,
1874, 1874 Colo. Sess. Laws 167-168 (concerning irrigation, for the establishment
of an "Acequia Madre" by the inhabitants along the San Francisco river in Las
Animas County).
96. See supra note 94.
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communities into the life of the new territory. Annual
resolutions in Colorado session laws of the period provided for
the translation of session laws into Spanish for distribution in
the southern counties.9 7  Governor Benjamin Harrison Eaton
and others involved in territorial government, such as
Lafayette Head, a member of the territorial legislative
assembly and later of the state senate, recognized the value of
acequia institutions in the localities where they had been
established, both for their functionality and for their stability
as settled institutional structures. 98
These indications of accommodation of acequia practices
should not be surprising. While it is an article of faith in some
quarters that Colorado has never had any water law but the
law of "first in time, first in right,"99 early water institutions of
the state and territory indicate a more complex picture. The
water law during the territorial and early statehood period
suggests strongly that the commitment to prior appropriation,
and especially the commitment to the complete preference for
senior rights in times of scarcity, may not have been as
unqualified as the courts of the state were later to insist. In
the earliest session laws of the territorial legislature, the
Session Laws of 1861, there is a strong intimation that water
sharing by agricultural users in times of scarcity was a
prevailing practice, protected by law. Section four of those laws
provided that in times of scarcity commissioners would be
appointed by the justice of the peace nearest to the stream or
river to apportion,
in a just and equitable proportion, a certain amount of said
water upon certain or alternate weekly days to different
localities, as they may, in their judgment think best for the
97. See, e.g., 1862 Colo. Sess. Laws 151; 1864 Colo. Sess. Laws 258; 1865
Colo. Sess. Laws 150; 1866 Colo. Sess. Laws 48, 6th Sess.; 1872 Colo. Sess. Laws
159-161; 1876 Colo. Sess. Laws 84.
98. For a description of Eaton's early interest in Hispano water institutions,
see NORRIS & NORRIS, supra note 37, at 24-26, 27-32.
Lafayette Head, leader of the Conejos Colony, and a member of the territorial
legislative assemblies first of New Mexico and later of Colorado, is known to have
played an active role in the territorial assemblies of both Colorado and New
Mexico to promote the interests of the Conejos Colony and its acequia
communities. See FRANK C. SPENCER, THE STORY OF THE SAN Luis VALLEY 48-
49 (1925). Head served as President of the Colorado State Senate from 1876 to
1878. COLO. LEGIS. COUNCIL, PRESIDENTS AND SPEAKERS OF THE COLORADO
GENERAL ASSEMBLY 3-4 (1980).
99. See supra note 23.
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interests of all parties concerned, and with a due regard to
the legal rights of all.. ° °
The provision may have been intended only to create a
structure for water use rotation within the structure of senior
rights preferences. Indeed the court in Coffin v. Left-Hand
Ditch Co. was later to conclude as much. 101 The passage,
however, strongly emphasizes the idea of equitable sharing
among all water users, whatever their temporal priority.
While the passage sounds somewhat like the common law
riparian rights doctrine, its phrasing and content are
remarkable for their similarity to provisions in Mexican law for
the apportionment of water in times of scarcity, right down to
the appointment of commissioners to oversee the process of fair
allocation among all users. 10 2 The principle that water is to be
100. 1861 Colo. Sess. Laws 67.
101. 6 Colo. 443, 448 (1882).
102. Formal authorization of commissioners under New Mexico territorial
law to inspect water flows along acequias and to evaluate disputes first appears in
statutes of 1863 and 1865, providing for the appointment by probate judges and
justices of the peace of three-member commissions of "hombres peritos" (expert
men) to assist the mayordomo in matters of acequia governance. 1863 N.M. Laws
34 and 1865 N.M. Laws 2-3; COLECCION DE LEYES DEL TERRITORIO DE NUEVO
MEXICO (Estanislas N. Ronquilla ed., 1881). The naming of such commissioners is
in all probability grounded in the practice of naming and relying on the advice
and good judgment of hombres buenos (good and true men) in formal proceedings
of conciliation of water disputes overseen by local judges, a practice dating at least
as far back as the beginning of the nineteenth century in New Mexico and a
remedy that had to be pursued to its conclusion before water litigation could be
commenced. See BAXTER, supra note 4, at 38-39, 44-46; TYLER, supra note 8,
at 24-27.
NORRIS & NORRIS, supra note 37, at 116-18, describes an attempted
conciliation between farmers at the Greeley Colony and appropriators in the Ft.
Collins area during the summer of 1874. The Ft. Collins irrigators, junior
appropriators, proposed a plan of conciliation involving appointment of "a
disinterested referee to divide the water for the remainder of the year according to
the greatest need, pledging that enough water would be sent downstream
immediately so that Greeley's permanent plantings and grains might be saved."
The men of the Union Colony were skeptical. "There could be no rest until some
kind of irrigation legislation brought reason and a measure of security to those
who were investing their all in a way of life that now stood in jeopardy." The
episode indicates both that water users believed that priority in time was not
firmly established as the basis for allocation, and that need and fairness might be
relevant allocational considerations, and the unwillingness of a senior rights
holder to have its rights determined on such grounds.
Donald Pisani describes an 1854 act of the California legislature which
ratified a community water control system that had prevailed in southern
California since the Mexican period. The act authorized the creation of water
commissions in townships in nine agricultural counties. These commissions were
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allocated without prejudice to any members of the community,
but in the best interest of all, and grounded in principles of
equitable sharing, scarcity, and realization of the common
good, lay at the heart of the Mexican legal regime for water
allocation within community acequias03
The possibility that Section four may have had a
provenance in the Hispanic irrigation regime is speculative,
but the structure of the provision's wording is immensely
suggestive and far more consonant with the Mexican system of
community water allocation than with either American
riparian or appropriative law. It would be very helpful if one
could answer definitively the question of the relationship that
Section four contemplates between equitable sharing and "legal
rights" as bases for allocation. That is to say, were the ideas of
"equitable sharing" and "legal right" intended to be iterative, or
instead, to operate as independent, separate considerations in
allocating water in times of scarcity? Under common law
riparianism, the right to a correlative share would be a
complete description of the content of each water user's legal
right. The law of prior appropriation, by contrast, would view
the principle of proportionality or equitable sharing as useful
only to allocate scarce water among rights holders of parallel
seniority. The Mexican system, however, would view both
elements-equitable sharing and a due regard for rights
arising from prior use and reliance-as operative and as
separate relevant considerations in making appropriate
allocations in times of scarcity. 10 4  Whatever Section four's
intent, what does seem clear is that it did not look to temporal
priority as the exclusive basis for allocating water in times of
scarcity.
Section one of the 1861 Session Law also seems to approve
the allocation of water on principles other than temporal
priority:
All persons who claim, own or hold a possessory right or
title to any land or parcel of land within the boundary of
Colorado territory... when those claims are on the bank,
required "to examine and direct such water courses, and apportion the water
thereof among the inhabitants of their district, determine the time of using the
same, and upon petition of a majority of persons liable to work upon ditches, lay
out and construct ditches." PISANI, supra note 37, at 18.
103. See supra notes 57-60, 64-68 and accompanying text.
104. Id.
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margin or neighborhood of any stream of water, creek or
river, shall be entitled to the use of the water of said stream,
creek or river for the purposes of irrigation, and making
said claims [in the land] available, to the full extent of the
soil, for agricultural purposes. 105
The plain intent is to promote the full agricultural
development of arable land lying along watercourses and in the
vicinity of watercourses. In the earliest days of the territory,
the difficulties of irrigating bench lands away from the riparian
zone were well understood. 10 6  The technical challenges of
upland irrigation were recognized as the major hurdle to the
expansion of irrigation. 107 Thus, a law that encouraged full
development of the irrigation potential of riparian and near-
riparian lands, in some measure restraining experiments in
upland irrigation, is true to the times. 0 8
Both sections one and four of the 1861 statute received
rough handling in the pivotal decision of Coffin v. Left Hand
Ditch Co.109 in 1882. Interpreting Section four, the Court
seized upon the phrase, "the legal rights of all," to sweep away
the act's focus on apportionment and sharing of scarcity,
discovering instead a provision intended to protect the
priorities of senior rights holders." 0 Section one of the 1861
Session Laws was found to have been superseded by
subsequent legislation."' It is now accepted that the Coffin
Court's peculiar vehemence in rejecting the claim that other
theories of water rights had ever been recognized in the state
or territory of Colorado arose from a need for a clear system for
setting water priorities." 2 The decision occurred against the
background of hectic competition among entrepreneurs to
105. 1861 Colo. Sess. Laws 67.
106. See NORRIS & NORRIS, supra note 37, at 85-94.
107. Id.
108. The law by no means prohibited irrigation away from riparian
corridors. Section two of the same Act protects the right to divert water to farm
lands not lying along stream courses. Section one of the Act instead seems to
create a preference for full development of lands on the bank, margin or near
vicinity of streams. 1861 Colo. Sess. Laws 67; see also infra note 115 and
accompanying text.
109. 6 Colo. 443 (1882).
110. Id. at 448.
111. Id. at 451-52.
112. DUNBAR, supra note 4, at 80-81; NORRIS & NORRIS, supra note 37, at.
116-18, 137-39; DONALD J. PISANI, To RECLAIM A DIVIDED WEST: WATER, LAW,
AND PUBLIC POLICY 1848-1902 55-58 (1992); VRANESH, supra note 20, at 3-9.
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obtain control of water in a time of rapid development." 3 What
can now be acknowledged, as well, is that the push in Coffin for
an unambiguous law suited to the needs of its time was
preceded by an earlier period in Colorado water law when other
principles of water rights and water allocation, at odds with the
emerging prior appropriation doctrine, were recognized and
protected by law. 114
The ambivalent state of early Colorado law is evident
elsewhere in the 1861 Session Laws. The same Act in which
sections one and four are found also contains, in Section two, a
provision that protects senior appropriative rights, and the
right to divert water to non-riparian lands. 115  The
inconsistency of Section two with the language of sections one
and four reflects the simple fact that conflicting impulses
coexisted in the law of the time. Patterns of water use and
113. See sources cited supra note 112. See also HAFEN, supra note 38, at
227-30, for a brief account of irrigation expansion in the 1880s.
114. The vehemence of Coffin is still to be found in Colorado decisions. In
American Water Development v. City of Alamosa, 874 P.2d 352 (Colo. 1994),
successors in interest to the grantees of Baca Land Grant No. 4 argued that local
law and custom, prevailing in the San Luis Valley at the time of the conveyance to
their predecessors in interest by the United States government in 1864, defined
the scope of water rights appurtenant to the land. Id. at 363-64. They
maintained that local law and custom prevailing in the San Luis Valley at the
relevant time supported their claim to own, as an attribute of the lands and not
dependent upon appropriation, ground water underlying the granted lands. Id. at
365. The Colorado Supreme Court rejected any possible relevance of local custom
and law inconsistent with generally prevailing territorial law:
We believe that at least after Colorado was organized as a territory on
February 28, 1861, the proper inquiry concerning local law and custom is
to be made on a territory-wide basis. The use of the term "law" indicates
that we should look to the body empowered to make law-here the
territorial legislature-and suggests that "custom" should be examined
within the same territorial compass.
Id. at 366 n.21. The court went on to find that relevant territory-wide law
defining water rights in surface waters and tributary ground water after
February 28, 1861 was the rule of appropriation, relying on the 1882 decision in
Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443 (1882), for its assertion that prior
appropriation had been recognized at all relevant times as the only basis for the
obtaining of water rights in Colorado. Am. Water Dev., 874 P.2d at 366 n.21.
While AWDI's effort to establish the existence of an appurtenant water right
grounded in Mexican law may well have been ill-founded as a matter of Mexican
law, the court spoke too broadly in supposing a uniformity of water law in
territorial Colorado. The court's statements are indicative of the potency of the
Coffin Court's inaccurate description of the history of Colorado water law and
institutions.
115. An Act to Protect and Regulate The Irrigation of Lands, 1861 Colo.
Sess. Laws 67.
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settlement varied considerably and included mining
establishments, westering communities of farmers from the
states, and the acequia institutions of the recently absorbed
Hispano communities of the south. The law of that early
period seems to have accommodated a number of existing and
serviceable approaches to water allocation rather than
committing itself to a single structure. That this was likely so
is no more surprising than the later insistence in the Coffin era
that a single law of water rights must be established and had
indeed always prevailed. While the face of state law changed
decisively after the adoption of the 1876 Constitution and with
the Coffin decision, the essential point is that there is good
evidence of a more complex water history in Colorado than was
acknowledged at the time of the Coffin decision.
The acceptance of multiple water institutions by Colorado
territorial law and in the earlier years of statehood is
meaningful for the present study. It suggests a reason why the
San Luis valley acequia communities may have continued in
their customary ways after the shift of political jurisdiction of
the valley from New Mexico to Colorado. In the early period of
territorial government and state government in Colorado, it
might well have well seemed to Hispano settlers in acequia
communities that the familiar structure of water rights and
governance they had known as New Mexicans would continue
under Colorado law. The older ways had not been outlawed by
Colorado. They had been accommodated. Especially given the
number of special laws passed in favor of acequia
institutions, 116 it would have been rather natural for the
acequia communities to view the emerging law of prior
appropriation as not quite applying to their circumstances and
certainly not intended to force the abandonment of their
customary approaches to water allocation.
C. First Stirrings of the Doctrine of Prior Appropriation:
The 1889 Decree
It was in the last decade of the nineteenth century that the
law of appropriation first became consequential for the Culebra
acequias. The change was prompted by a series of challenges
to acequia water rights initiated by the United States Freehold
116. See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
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Land & Emigration Company ("U.S. Freehold") in the years
following the Coffin decision.
U.S. Freehold was established in 1869 to finance the
development and promotion of the Costilla Estate, the southern
half of the original Sangre de Cristo Land Grant confirmed to
Carlos Beaubien by the United States government in 1860.117
The company came into being following a series of transactions
between the end of 1862 and the fall of 1864, in which William
Gilpin, governor of the newly organized Colorado Territory,
bought five-sixths of the grant lands from Beaubien's widow
and former partners.118  Following an evaluation of the
investment potential of the lands and the assembly of investor
groups to promote and develop the lands, Gilpin and his
associates divided the grant in 1869 into northern and
southern estates of roughly 500,000 acres to create more
manageable investment units.119 The Culebra watershed lay
within the southerly 500,000 acre Costilla Estate. In 1871 all
lands within the Costilla Estate were sold by the original
investment group to U.S. Freehold, and William Gilpin was
named resident manager to coordinate efforts to sell the lands
to intending settlers drawn from the East and from abroad.1 20
The rights of the earlier Hispano settlers became a matter
of active concern for U.S. Freehold in the early 1870s.121
Beaubien's original New Mexican settlers opposed the
company's development plans, claiming as their own the lands
and water the company wished to promote and sell. 122 The
company's ownership was also clouded by the claims of settlers
who arrived in the years after Beaubien's conveyance to Gilpin
and who could not claim rights from Beaubien. Throughout the
period, there was a stream of Hispano settlers, newcomers who
were part of an outward push from older New Mexico
settlements.' 23 They were viewed by U.S. Freehold and by later
117. BRAYER, supra note 84, at 107-15; Stoller, supra note 38, at 35.
118. BRAYER, supra note 84, at 65-66. Gilpin was later to acquire by
purchase the remaining one-sixth interest in the grant from James Quinn in
1871. Id. at 67.
119. Id. at 72-86.
120. Id. at 79, 95.
121. Id. at 107-08.
122. Id. at 108-10.
123. See Lantis, supra note 8, at 17-21; David William Lantis, The San Luis
Valley, Sequent Rural Occupance in an Intermontane Basin 146-49 (1950)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University) (on file with the authors);
Stoller, supra note 38, at 35.
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owners of the Costilla and Trinchera estates as no better than
squatters, and that characterization was often accurate. The
sense of frustration of the new corporate owners at not being
able to resist or manage this continual influx of unwanted
newcomers was profound. 124 Correspondence by U.S. Freehold
officials during the period indicates a continual effort to
differentiate between "squatter" claims and those that would
have to be honored. 125 Some claims were resolved by selling
squatters the land they occupied. 12 6 The more important point,
though, is that the new owners viewed the Hispano occupants,
Beaubien settlers and later arrivals alike, as an impediment to
clear title and to development. 127  The fact that there were
Hispano squatters on the land seems to have been an irritant
that shaped the company's response to all Hispano occupants
whether or not they had been invited to settle by the previous
owners. A certain presumption of illegitimacy seems to have
tainted the company's view of all Hispano settlers and their
claims. The company attempted first to negotiate a limitation
of the settlers' land claims in the choice lands near the town of
San Luis, 128 and later, in the years after the Coffin decision,
mounted challenges to acequia water rights.
The resistance by Hispano settlers to U.S. Freehold's
efforts to dislodge them from the lands they had chosen for
their acequia systems was to be expected. It was assured,
however, as a result of Carlos Beaubien's last visit to San Luis
de la Culebra in May of 1863. While in San Luis, Beaubien
granted more than one hundred deeds to settlers already
124. See, e.g., BRAYER, supra note 84, at 108-10. Disputes with Hispano
settlers became quite protracted, and resolution of claims to land did not occur in
some cases until the first decade of the twentieth century. See, e.g., Letter of
Edmund C. Van Diest to Paul B. Albright (Feb. 25, 1906), describing terms of
settlement with settlers in Costilla basin (available at the Van Diest Collection,
Box 76, Copybook B, pp. 322-23, Tutt Library, The Colorado College) (hereinafter
the Van Diest Collection).
125. Letter of Edmund C. Van Diest to Paul B. Albright (Feb 25, 1906)
(available at the Van Diest Collection).
126. The correspondence of Edmund C. Van Diest, U.S. Freehold's resident
manager from 1886 through 1903, contains numerous letters and receipts
chronicling payments and postponements of obligations arising from such sales.
See, e.g., List of Lands Sold by United States Freehold Land and Emigration
Company and Costilla Land and Investment Co. (available at the Van Diest
Collection, Box 74, Copybook D, pp. 262-66).
127. BRAYER, supra note 84, at 108-10.
128. Id.
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established along Culebra Creek.12 9  He also executed a
document ("Beaubien Document") describing his understanding
129. See GRANTOR/GRANTEE INDEX COSTILLA COUNTY COLORADO (Book 1)
(Grantor index). Professor Hicks has counted 105 recorded deeds filed in the
weeks following Beaubien's visit that confirm conveyances by Beaubien to
Hispano grantees of land lying along Culebra Creek. Lists of Beaubien's
donations to individual settlers appear in the J.L. Gaspar papers, which are
available at Land Grant File, Colorado State Historical Society. Beaubien had
appointed Gaspar as his agent in 1862. Stoller, supra note 38, at 35 n.49. In a
letter of January 21, 1890 to prospective investors in the Costilla Estate, Edmond
C. Van Diest, company agent of U.S. Freehold, suggests that Gaspar may himself
have executed the 1863 deeds, naming Beaubien as grantor, and may have
exceeded his authority in doing so. Letter from Edmund Van Diest to prospective
investors (Jan. 21, 1890) (available at the Van Diest Collection, Box 74, Copybook
2, pp. 102-05) [hereinafter the Beaubien Document].
The text of the Beaubien document, translated into English, reads:
Plaza of San Luis de la Culebra, May 11, 1863
It has been decided that the lands of the Rito Seco remain uncultivated
for the benefit of the community members (gente) of the plazas of San
Luis, San Pablo and Los Ballejos and for the other inhabitants of these
plazas for pasturing cattle by the payment of a fee per head etc.[,] and
that the water of the said Rito remains partitioned among the
inhabitants of the same plaza of San Luis and those from the other side
of the vega who hold lands almost adjacent to it as their own lands, that
are not irrigated with the waters of the Rio Culebra. The vega, after the
measurement of three acres from it in front of the chapel, to which they
have been donated, will remain for the benefit of the inhabitants of this
plaza and those of the Culebra as far as above the plaza of Los Ballejos,
including with them those who lives as far as along the side of the Rito of
the deceased Jose Gregorio Martin. Those below the road as far as the
narrows will have the right to enjoy the same benefit. The plaza, it is
understood, and I have recently determined that the drains (chorrerras)
and rights for the households are on the east, fifty varas of land, as well
as on the west side, and no one has rights to the south, nor to the north,
nor in any other direction and cannot, as some have believed, place any
obstacle or obstruction to anyone in the enjoyment of his legitimate
rights, and if anyone has done so, he will have to remove the obstacle
immediately and without delay. Also, the regulations for the roads will
be observed well without allowing those who travel and have business to
conduct within the limits of the farm lands to be injured. Likewise, each
one should take scrupulous care in the use of water without causing
damage with it to his neighbors nor to anyone. According to the
corresponding rule all the inhabitants will have enjoyment of benefits of
pastures, water, firewood and timber, always taking care that one does
not injure another. Furthermore, the mills which have been built
without damage to a third party may remain in their respective places.
For the well being and protection of the plantings and animals, except
those needed solely for domestic service, will not be allowed for a
distance of one league from the farm land. It will be understood that
every person who comes into the place with rights, by purchase, or in
another manner has to give personal service, the same as all do, or by
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of the land, water and natural resource rights held by the
Hispano settlers who owned farmsteads on the grant. The visit
seems to have been intended to set the stage for Beaubien's
sale of the Sangre de Cristo Grant to Gilpin and his syndicate
of investors. 130 It had the effect of confirming Beaubien's
settlers in a sense of the privileges and rights they enjoyed
under the original terms of settlement.
The purpose of the Beaubien Document seems to have been
to clarify certain rights of the settlers as owners of grant lands
and to provide reassurance that their mutual duties to each
other and their rights of access to natural resources on grant
lands would survive the transfer of ownership to Gilpin.'' The
document has little to say about the essential matter of water
allocation, and refers to acequia governance only obliquely,
restating the duty of community members to contribute labor
to maintain the acequia system. 132 The broad thrust of the
document, however, is to confirm that the established practices
and customs of the Culebra settlements would continue. 133
means of a representative, that he is obligated to maintain weapons
sufficient for defense and to comply with the municipal duties, the same
as the rest, this being among others, the requisite condition of his
admission.
Carlos Beaubien
Witnesses, J.L. Gaspar
Nasario Gallegos
Note:
The limits of the plaza of San Luis de la Culebra are: on the south side of
the acequia which is located adjacent to the mill of the Senores St. Vrain
and Easterday; on the north as far as facing the foot of the mesa; to the
entrance of the vega, and the houses which are built without permission
further above this point and from the chapel (their owners) will have to
pay five pesos for each twenty varas from north to south and in
proportion to their corresponding rights from east to west. The rights of
the chapel in the four directions will be 50 varas, and 200 varas to the
north from the rights of the limits for the chapel there is set aside 100
square varas, it being understood that the inhabitants will have to fence
them well, immediately and sufficiently, in order to prevent animals
from coming into the cemetery, etc.
Carlos Beaubien
Witnesses, J.L. Gaspar
Nasario Gallegos
Id.
130. KARNES, supra note 41, at 304-05.
131. See Beaubien Document, supra note 129.
132. Id.
133. The mix of the suggestive and the specific in the Beaubien document
has made its exact meaning a matter of controversy. Its elliptical style greatly
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If one imagines the setting of the drafting of the Beaubien
Document-a public meeting in San Luis on the eve of transfer
of the grant lands to new owners, attended by Beaubien and
the very settlers he had recruited a few years earlier-then the
obliqueness and incompleteness of the document with respect
to such critical matters as commons rights and water allocation
seems less strange and less hostile to the expectation of
continuity. A critical part of the context of the document and of
the meeting would have been a set of shared assumptions
about water rights and acequia governance. Beaubien and the
settlers would have assumed the customary rules of water
rights and water allocation to be of continuing validity without
discussion or specification. Those principles, including
community water governance and proportional water sharing
in times of scarcity, were so deeply situated in the custom and
practice of Hispano settlement that the settlers would have felt
no need to insist upon them or to recapitulate them in
writing. 134 Further, the Colorado law with respect to acequia
rights would also have indicated to the settlers that their water
rights were secure.135 The meeting with Beaubien was an
important way station in the early history of San Luis, forming
a shared understanding among settlers and their descendants
about their rights and status as members of the community. It
no doubt solidified the settlers in their sense of the legality of
their presence and of their claims to land, water and to the
other commons resources thought to be essential to the
founding of the Culebra settlements.
The company was not successful in ousting the Hispano
settlers from their settlement sites along the Culebra and
complicated the effort of modern descendants of Beaubien's colonists to establish
that Beaubien intended that the grant lands would, after transfer, remain subject
to the customary usufructuary hunting, fishing, firewood gathering, timber, and
wildcrafting rights enjoyed by settlers in common on the uncultivated lands of
Mexican grants. See Rael v. Taylor, 876 P.2d 1210 (Colo. 1994). The Colorado
Supreme Court has recently decided that the Beaubien Document, together with
other evidence surrounding the terms of settlement of the Sangre de Cristo Grant
and the actual use by settlers and their descendants of grazing, timber and
firewood resources on grant lands, has established rights of access to those
resources through prescriptive easement, easement by estoppel and an easement
from prior use. Lobato v. Taylor, 2002 WL 1360432, at *5 (Colo. June 24, 2002).
The Court issued the following advisory with respect to its opinion: "Notice: This
opinion has not been released for publication in the permanent law reports. Until
released, it is subject to revision or withdrawal." Id.
134. See supra text accompanying notes 48-92.
135. See supra text accompanying notes 93-111, 117.
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seems not to have attempted to challenge acequia water rights
directly until its 1889 petition for the adjudication of water
rights. 136 That proceeding resulted in a water rights decree
dated June 14, 1889 ("1889 Decree") quantifying rates of
instantaneous flow and establishing the priority of water rights
in the Culebra. Priority dates from 1851 to 1860 were assigned
for the longest established of the Culebra acequias, incidentally
making them the most senior of all Colorado water rights. 137
The acequia water rights were also recast as a set of
individualized property rights held by parciantes and not by
the community of acequia users. 13
D. Aftermath of the 1889 Decree: Destabilizing Effects of
Watershed Crowding
The June 14, 1889 decree and its placement of acequia
water rights within the structure of prior appropriation
produced immediate consequences. On August 2, 1890, U.S.
Freehold sued all acequia rights holders under the 1889
Decree, maintaining that the acequia appropriations were
excessive and that the diversion works that supported them
represented a continuing trespass against the riparian rights
of U.S. Freehold.' 39 The odd claim of a violation of riparian
rights was apparently based either on the premise that
riparian water rights might attach to U.S. Freehold's land
ownership as a result of the confirmation of their predecessor
Beaubien's title by action of the government of the United
States, or on the premise that riparian rights may have
attached as a consequence of the original Mexican land
grant.' 40 The proceedings never progressed far enough to deal
136. See the 1889 Decrees, supra note 85. The delay in challenging the
water. rights of the acequias is striking in view of U.S. Freehold's prompt
challenge of certain land titles of Hispano settlers and their successors in interest.
See BRAYER, supra note 84. The basis for challenging land claims may have
seemed clearer at the earlier date than the basis for challenging water rights,
given the state of Colorado water law at the time. See supra text accompanying
notes 80-95.
137. BRAYER, supra note 84, at 5-7; COLO. WATER CONSERVATION BD. &
COLO. A&M COLLEGE, A HUNDRED YEARS OF IRRIGATION IN COLORADO, 100
YEARS OF ORGANIZED AND CONTINUOUS IRRIGATION 1852-1952 3 (1952).
138. See the 1889 Decrees, supra note 85.
139. Complaint of United States Freehold Land & Emigration Company,
U.S. Freehold Land & Emigration Co. v. Gallegos (D. Colo. June 19, 1890).
140. Although Colorado had by this time rejected the "California Doctrine"
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with either of those misapprehensions of law. Instead, in
response to a motion by the acequia water rights holders to
dismiss the U.S. Freehold claims, the court held that U.S.
Freehold had adequately stated a valid cause of action. 141 The
ruling prompted a settlement embodied in a 1900 water rights
decree finally entered a decade later ("the Hallett Decree"). 142
Under the Hallett Decree, ninety-one cubic feet per second of
the total 197 cubic feet per second decreed to acequia rights
holders in the original 1889 adjudication were ceded to U.S.
Freehold. 143  The settlement provided, however, that U.S.
Freehold could divert the ceded amounts only after the twenty-
three senior acequias involved in the settlement had satisfied
their calls on the Culebra or its tributaries. 44  In effect, U.S.
Freehold had been granted the twenty-fourth priority in the
waters of the Culebra for an instantaneous flow equal to forty-
six percent of the water originally decreed in 1889 to the oldest
Culebra acequias. The water lost to each of the twenty-three
acequias corresponded closely to the overall percentage loss,
and in each case caused the water rights associated with an
in Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443 (1882), U.S. Freehold's claim of
riparian rights suggests that its lawyers may have viewed the action of the United
States in 1860 confirming the Sangre de Cristo grant in Carlos Beaubien as
tantamount to the conferring of a grant by the United States to Beaubien, with
the effect of conferring riparian water rights as an attribute of the grant of lands.
Under the "California Doctrine," grants of riparian public domain lands made
prior to 1866 carry riparian water rights. Lux v. Haggin, 10 P. 674, 724-28 (Cal.
1886). Alternatively, U.S. Freehold's lawyers may have thought that riparian
rights arose under the original Mexican grant, indicating a misapprehension of
the nature of water rights under Mexican law and of Mexican practices with
respect to grants of water in connection with grants of land. See supra text
accompanying notes 61-68 for a description of the water rights that would have
existed under Mexican law. The U.S. Supreme Court was not to decide until 1909
that congressional patents granted pursuant to the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo
created no new water rights and that parties with confirmed land grants acquired
water rights either under state or territorial law or retained water rights granted
under the law of the predecessor sovereign. Boquillas Land & Cattle Co. v.
Curtis, 213 U.S. 339, 344 (1909).
141. U.S. Freehold Land & Emigration Co. v. Gallegos, 89 F. 769 3(8th Cir.
1898).
142. In re U.S. Freehold Land & Emigration Company v. Gallegos, Decrees
for Water from the Culebra River and Other Streams in Costilla County, U.S.
Circuit Court for the District of Colorado (July 17 1900) (hereinafter The Hallett
Decrees).
143. Id.
144. Id.
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acequia to approximate a duty of water of one cubic-foot per
second instantaneous flow for each eighty acres of land.145
The settlement seems a curious one in light of then-
prevailing law. While Colorado law was quite clear at the time
of the Hallett Decree that a decreed water right could be
curtailed if less water than the decreed amount was
beneficially used, 146 the standards of efficient water use were
not so clear or uniform as to make the amounts that had been
decreed to the acequias in 1889 obviously vulnerable to
attack. 147 The Colorado court's handling of the 1897 appeal in
X.Y Irrigating Ditch Co. v. Buffalo Creek Irrigating Co'48 offers
some insight into the lax standards then prevailing for
establishing the scope of a water right. X.Y. Irrigating Ditch
Co. appealed a decree in favor of Buffalo Creek Irrigation Co.,
arguing that Buffalo Creek had not adequately established the
number of acres continuously and beneficially irrigated by its
ditch. In a decision wholly affirmed by the Colorado Supreme
Court, the Colorado Court of Appeals found that the degree of
certainty of proof of irrigated acres and of water beneficially
used should be responsive to the fact that water users' records
were either poor or non-existent. While the court commended
X.Y.'s exact proofs of its own irrigation use, it did not consider
145. Id. The Hallett Decrees nowhere recite a standard duty of water or
articulate a standard of water use efficiency, a common omission at the time
because the law required only that court decrees establishing priorities state
those priorities in cubic feet per second of time or with reference to the carrying
capacity of the ditch serving the decree. Irrigation, ch. 69, § 2403, MILLS COLO.
ANN. STAT. 678 (1891) (repealed 1943); see Water Supply and Storage Co. v.
Larimer & Weld Irrigation Co., 51 P. 496, 501 (Colo. 1897). Each set of acequia-
based water rights was reduced to a level to produce a right of one cubic-foot per
second instantaneous flow per eighty acres. That standard was not made explicit
until a later 1905 Culebra adjudication, see infra note 164.
146. See, e.g., New Mercer Ditch Co. v. Armstrong, 40 P. 989 (Colo. 1895).
147. Doctrines of waste and efficient utilization were just emerging. See,
e.g., REPORT OF THE STATE ENGINEER TO THE GOVERNOR OF COLORADO FOR THE
YEARS 1883 54-58, 83-85 (1884); FIFTH BIENNIAL REPORT OF THE STATE
ENGINEER TO THE GOVERNOR OF COLORADO, 1889-1890 46-47 (1890);
PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE DUTY OF WATER, BULLETIN NO. 22, THE STATE
AGRICULTURAL COLLEGE, THE AGRICULTURAL EXPERIMENTAL STATION (Ft.
Collins 1893); Shupe, supra note 20, at 93-95; see also Cache La Poudre Irrigating
Co. v. Larimer & Weld Reservoir Co., 53 P. 318, 320 (Colo. 1898); X.Y. Irrigating
Ditch Co. v. Buffalo Creek Irrigating Co., 55 P. 720, 721 (Colo. 1898); Combs v.
Agricultural Ditch Co., 28 P. 966, 968 (Colo. 1892). The reservoir which was to
hold the water lost to the acequias and transferred to U.S. Freehold was to be
named for one of the persons elected to the committee of negotiators working on
the farmers' behalf, A. A. Salazar.
148. 49 P. 264 (Colo. App. 1897), affd, 55 P. 720, 721 (Colo. 1898).
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that quality of evidence as necessary or even as a desirable
benchmark for satisfactory proof of acres irrigated or historic
beneficial use:
[This court] cannot declare, in the face of the fact that
disastrous consequences would in many cases assuredly
follow, that the proof necessary to maintain water rights,
which affect interests of such immense value in this state,
must be measured by such a standard only, and stand or fall
thereby. Such a rule would be especially inequitable and
unjust to the early appropriators of water. They were the
pioneers of their respective localities, and founded their
homes when the supply of water was abundant,-in excess
of all demands,-and neither law, custom, nor necessity
required them to keep an accurate account of the quantity of
water used, or the amount of land cultivated or irrigated. It
should be remembered, too... "that in the early years of
water adjudications in this state priorities were decreed
upon the capacities of the ditches."149
The decision seems to tolerate some generosity, too, in the
computation of the amount of water needed to irrigate a given
parcel. The Court of Appeals approved the adjudication
referee's conclusion that an allowance of one cubic-foot per
second per forty-four acres of land was appropriate, and
consistent with beneficial use. 10
The easy approach to proof of beneficial use and duty of
water in X.Y. Irrigating Ditch makes the result of the Hallett
Decree very puzzling. The effect of the 1889 Decree had been
to establish a right of continuous flow of one cubic-foot per
second for each 39.5 acres of acequia land. It was a generous
estimate, but not outlandish by the standards of the time,'
and the eighty-acre figure substituted by the Hallett Decree
149. Id. at 265.
150. Id. See also DUNBAR, supra note 4, at 98 and 215, for a discussion of
the problematic duties of water claimed by nineteenth century water users and
approved by water courts.
151. Edmond Van Diest, manager of U.S. Freehold's interests on the Costilla
Estate and a serious student of irrigation methods, reported in 1888 and 1889
letters to prospective investors that competent eqtimates of appropriate duties of
water for the Culebra watershed lands ranged between fifty-five and eighty acres
for each cubic-foot per second of instantaneous flow. Report on Irrigation of Part
of the Costilla Prairie (July 27, 1888) (available at the Van Diest Collection, Box
74, Copybook 2, at 13).
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seems rather severe in view of then-prevailing assumptions of
water use in the Culebra watershed. 152
What happened? In a comment on the terms of the
settlement, Moses Hallet, the presiding judge said:
The litigation which resulted in the rendition of the
foregoing decrees was commenced in the month of January,
1890, and terminated in July, 1900. The water rights of
several hundred settlers were involved. The settlers were
represented by a committee selected by them. This
committee consisted of the following persons: Hon. William
H. Meyer, Hon. A. A. Salazar, and Hon. Louis Cohn. The
result as embodied in the following decrees being
satisfactory to all the parties in interest."153
There is reason, however, to believe that the Citizens
Committee may not have been the best representatives of
acequia interests, and indeed may have been inclined to favor
the interests of U.S. Freehold. Each of the members, Mr.
Meyer, Mr. Salazar and Mr. Cohn, was a leading merchant in
Costilla County. 5 4 Two of them, Mr. Meyer and Mr. Salazar,
were friends and business associates of the land manager for
U.S. Freehold, Mr. Edmond C. van Diest. It was to W.H.
Meyer that Mr. Van Diest was later to write a valedictory
letter, looking back at their long, shared battles to oust the
Beaubien and other Hispano settlers and to develop U.S.
Freehold lands:
The time will come when the Costilla people will grant their
lower Culebra, the Trinchera their prairies, when some
means of providing water for stock will be devised or
brought about and if it comes in 10 years from now, will you
still have the energy, the power and the will, or even the
desire to compel? 155
152. Mr. Van Diest's calculations for necessary reservoir capacity to develop
U.S. Freehold's lands consistently adopted a duty of water of one cubic-foot per
second of flow for each sixty acres of irrigated land. Id. at 135-42. It is striking
that the Culebra Hispano settlers were moved to accept a water allocation of one
cubic-foot per second for each eighty acres.
153. The Hallett Decrees, supra note 142, at 59.
154. See SIMMONS, supra note 17, at 58, 152.
155. Letter from Edmund Van Diest to W.H. Meyer (Dec. 7, 1903) (available
at the Van Diest Collection, Box 82, Folder A Letter).
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And, on February 23, 1899, while the Hallett Decree
proceeding was pending, Mr. Van Diest wrote to W.H. Meyer's
father, Ferdinand, to A. A. Salazar, and to Louis Cohn to
advise them in the management of their mercantile business
with its largely hispanic clientele:
A noted economist, speaking of the prevailing credit system
in the Philippines, and Malay Archipelago, and of the
natives, in a manner quite applicable to the conditions here
prevailing, says, 'Another temptation he (the native) cannot
resist is to get goods on credit. . . It extends trade, no
doubt, for a time, but it demoralizes the native, checks true
civilization, leads to no permanent increase in the wealth of
the country, and in no way benefits the individual, the trade
'or the community.' An advantage of no small importance is
the opportunity afforded the store keeper for directing his
energies to the development of his private enterprises, such
as lands, cattle, etc. without in any way losing any portion
of the control or direction of the parent business .... 156
Mr. Van Diest is clear in expressing his view that the
commercial relationships of colonial merchants to "natives" in
Southeast Asia may be instructive in setting up a mercantile
operation in the San Luis Valley and defining an appropriate
role for the Hispano settlers in the local economy. 157 The fact
that he communicated this vision to Cohn, Salazar and the
senior Meyer also points to a certain shared commercial vision
among these men for development of the valley.
A more exact sense of the possible loyalties of the Citizens
Commitee is suggested in a January 2, 1902 letter from Mr.
Van Diest to General William J. Palmer of Colorado Springs.
In that letter describing how the Hallett Decree have resulted
in U.S. Freehold's obtaining control of water supplies needed to
156. Letter from Edmund Van Diest to Fred Meyer (Feb. 23, 1899)
(available at the Van Diest Collection, Box 83, Copybook of letters dated Dec. 13,
1898 through Sept. 3, 1899).
157. Mr. Van Diest was born in Buitzenzorg, Batavia, Dutch East Indies, in
1865, the son of a Dutch colonial official. He moved to Colorado with his family at
the age of six, when his father was asked by the Dutch government to look after
the interests of its citizens in the mining region centered on Rosita, Colorado. A
biographical sketch of Mr. Van Diest appears as part of A RESOLUTION ON THE
DEATH OF MR. EDMUND C. VAN DIEST BY THE TRUSTEES OF THE COLORADO
COLLEGE (Oct. 13, 1950) (available at the Van Diest Collection, Box 82, "Memories
Book"). It is unknown at this writing whether Mr. Van Diest's earlier background
may have informed the views expressed in the letter quoted in the main text.
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develop the company's lands, Mr. Van Diest indicates that he
viewed Mr. W.H. Meyer as a decidedly friendly presence on the
Citizens Committee:
As to the actual condition of these [legal] settlements, Mr.
W.H. Meyer is fully conversant with the water settlement,
as after some difficulty he was made Chairman of the
Committee for the people, to settle the matter with me for
the Co.15 8
What may have happened in this strange business of the
Hallett Decree is that the local farmers were advised by the
Citizens Committee to avoid the consequences of a full hearing
on the validity of their water rights and were persuaded to
settle the dispute with U.S. Freehold. The terms of the
settlement seem quite disadvantageous given the lax standards
of the day with respect to the computation of appropriate
amounts of water for irrigation. The acequia farmers may
simply have been misled about the vulnerability of their rights
under the law, but the expense and risk of a protracted dispute
may also have made settlement seem attractive. In any case,
the entry of the Hallett Decree represented a significant victory
by U.S. Freehold in diminishing acequia water claims and in
establishing useable water priorities for the company.
Soon after entry of the Hallett Decree, U.S. Freehold began
to develop plans for the construction of reservoirs and ditches
to make use of its new water rights. 159 Exceptionally low
runoffs in the upper Rio Grande basin in three of the four years
following the settlement meant, however, that the available
flows in the Culebra were exhausted before the turn of the
company's twenty-fourth priority came up.160 In the end, U.S.
Freehold never succeeded in attracting prospective buyers for
its lands before its debts became overwhelming. In 1902, the
company was forced to sell its interest to a successor
corporation, the Costilla Estate Development Company for a
158. Letter from Edmond C. Van Diest to General William J. Palmer (Jan.
2, 1902) (available at the Van Diest Collection, Box 76, Copybook 9, at 416).
159. See Report on Irrigation (December 7, 1900) (available at the Van Diest
Collection, Box 75, Copybook 8, at 367-78).
160. See COLO. Div. OF WATER RESOURCES, Rio GRANDE RIVER ANNUAL
CALENDAR YEAR FLOWS 1890-2000 (2001) (hereinafter RIO GRANDE FLOWS);
Lantis, supra note 123, at 348; BONDS THAT BIND, supra note 6, at 110.
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token amount, shifting to a new group of investors the hopes of
large scale development of the Sangre de Cristo grant lands.161
The attacks on acequia water rights continued after U.S.
Freehold had passed from the scene. There were three
exceptionally good water years beginning in 1906, renewing
hope that a challenge of acequia rights might produce useable
water for the arid uplands eastward of the acequia
communities. 162  In 1907, the Costilla Land & Investment
Company, an investor in Costilla Estates Development
Company, contracted a survey of acequia diversions in an
attempt to learn what water might be made available for
development efforts if acequia use could be further reduced.
163
The specific hope was to make good the paper rights conferred
under the 1900 Hallett Decree as well as a set of supplemental
water rights that had been conferred by a 1905 decree. 164 It is
perhaps typical of the American west that good water years
trigger optimism and spates of new water rights applications
161. See BONDS THAT BIND, supra note 6; BRAYER, supra note 84, at 123;
Lantis, supra note 123, at 348. A continuous sequence of tax delinquencies and
tax sales dogged the U.S. Freehold lands in the hands of successor owners for
decades thereafter. BRAYER, supra note 84, at 123.
162. See RIO GRANDE FLOWS, supra note 160. The correspondence of
Edmond C. Van Diest during 1905 and 1906 reflects the hopes of developing the
arid uplands east of San Luis. He had by this time entered the employ of General
William J. Palmer and was overseeing the interests of an investor group, the
Costilla Land & Investment Company, in the Costilla Estate lands. His
correspondence of the period reflects a keen interest in obtaining water from the
Culebra, especially the unappropriated spate flows of the spring and summer run-
offs and the excessive appropriations of the acequias to support reservoir and
ditch development. See, e.g., Letters from Edmond Van Diest to Albert Smith of
Denver (May 19, 1905 and July 20, 1905) (available at the Van Diest Collection,
Box 76, Copybook A, at 232-34, 398-99) (Mr. Smith was attorney for U.S.
Freehold and its succesors); Letters from Edmund Van Diest to Mr. Brooks, a
prospective investor (Jan. 1, 1906 and Jan. 10, 1906) (available at the Van Diest
Collection, Box 76, Copybook B, at 219-20, 234-36).
163. Letter from Edmond Van Diest to Paul B. Albright, manager of the
Costilla Estate (Nov. 4, 1907) (available at the Van Diest Collection, Box 77,
Copybook D, at 254) [hereinafter The Albright Letter].
164. See The Hallett Decrees, supra note 142; In the Matter of the
Adjudication of Priorities of Right to the Use of Water for Irrigating and Other
Purposes in Water District No. 24 of the State of Colorado, Decretal Order of 14
December 1905 (hereinafter the 1905 Decree). The November 4 letter from Mr.
Van Diest to Paul Albright, his successor as manager of the Costilla Estate,
prompted a detailed response setting out objections to the award of supplemental
water rights to the acequia rights holders in the 1905 Decree. Letter from Paul
Albright to Edmond Van Diest (Nov. 11, 1907) (available at the Van Diest
Collection, Box 50, Folder 325).
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by appropriators too junior to expect water in average years or
dry years. 6
Nothing immediately came of the survey, but the
succession of good water years led to the creation of a new
enterprise, the San Luis Power & Water Company, to develop
the water rights in the Culebra and Costilla watersheds
formerly held by U.S. Freehold, the Costilla Estates
Development Company and the Costilla Land & Investment
Company.166 The acequia farmers saw that this transfer might
cause the water rights ceded in the Hallett Decree to be
meaningfully asserted at last, and they tried unsuccessfully to
165. Indeed in the twenty-five years following 1905, only three produced
flows in the upper Rio Grande below the average for the period 1890-2002. See
Rio GRANDE FLOWS, supra note 160.
166. San Luis Water & Power Company was incorporated on April 15, 1909,
and purchased the Culebra and Costilla River water rights of U.S. Freehold and
its successors before November 1, 1910. COLORADO INCORPORATION RECORD,
BOOK 132, 167. On November 1, 1910, San Luis Power & Water pledged the
Culebra and Costilla water rights to secure the guarantee of repayment of
$800,000 of its bonds by the Costilla Estates Development Company. The
proceeds of the sale of bonds were to be used for water development projects and
for repayment of money already owed to the Costilla Estates Development
Company. Indenture-The San Luis Power & Water Company and Boston Safe
Deposit and Trust Company 2-4 (November 1, 1910) (available at the Van Diest
Collection, Box 20, Folder 127). U.S. Freehold's successor, the Costilla Estates
Development Company, in spite of success in promoting reservoir constructions
and bringing irrigation water, had never been successful in selling or developing
the great bulk of its lands. It transferred all water rights acquired under the 1900
Hallett Decrees to the San Luis Water & Power Company. A lawsuit was brought
by acequia rights holders in 1914 to enjoin Water & Power from exercise of the
purchased water rights and to enjoin water officials from enforcing the rights.
The position of the acequia rights holders was that the 1900 settlement had never
been approved by the state water court as required by law, but had been approved
only by the federal court. Summons and Complaint, Vigil v. Swanson (D. Costilla
County, Apr. 6, 1914). The acequia rights holders argued that, irrespective of
their agreement to the terms of the 1900 settlement-an agreement that in their
view had been forced upon them-water rights could not be created or transferred
by a federal court settlement in the absence of review and approval by the
Colorado water court. The acequia rights holders maintained that the only
effective adjudications of rights in the Culebra watershed waters were the 1889
original decrees and the 1905 supplemental rights decrees that established
supplementary water rights in the Culebra and its tributary streams. Their
position was rejected. The water court decided that the decrees entered in the
United States Circuit Court were valid and binding agreements between the
parties with respect to whatever water rights the ceding rights holders might
have conveyed. Order, Findings and Decree, Vigil v. Swanson (D. Costilla County,
Mar. 26, 1917).
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block it by challenging the validity of the Hallett Decree on
which the U.S. Freehold water rights depended. 167
San Luis Light & Power never functioned as a power
generating company, but the water rights to which it succeeded
were used for irrigation in the years after 1914. In some years
there was not enough water available after the acequia calls
had been satisfied. 168 In other years of more abundant flows,
the water might go unused because market conditions for farm
products or a scarcity of new immigrants willing to farm caused
the arid bench lands to remain fallowed. 169 This pattern of
fitful use persisted even though the Sanchez Reservoir, a
storage facility, had been completed in 1908-1909 to capture
and store flows of the Culebra not required to meet the water
calls of the senior acequias.1"0
E. Situating the Culebra Acequias in an Appropriative
Rights Regime After the Hallett Decrees
U.S. Freehold's initial challenge of acequia water rights
and the aftermath of that challenge modified the conception of
water rights among acequia water users. The company's
pressure introduced a new focus on seniority of rights and
showed that even the most senior water rights might be
vulnerable to challenge through the emerging doctrines of
waste, duty-of-water, and beneficial use. It is important to
note that until the 1889 adjudication and its aftermath, the law
of appropriation had not taken hold in the Culebra watershed.
Whether or not the acequias were aware of the formal change
in the law effected by the definitive choice of a system of
appropriative rights, they were slow to react to the change in
the legal foundation of their water rights.
It must be remembered that until the pressure brought by
U.S. Freehold began to take effect, demands for new
appropriations in this isolated valley were rather infrequent,
and competition among new and more established water users
167. Order, Findings and Decree, Vigil v. Swanson (D. Costilla County,
Mar. 26, 1917).
168. See JOSEPH C. GALLEGOS, The Acequiahood, in VOCES DE LA TIERRA:
FOUR HUNDRED YEARS OF ACEQUIA FARMS IN THE Rio ARRIBA, 1598-1998 (Devon
G. Pefia & Ruben 0. Martinez eds., forthcoming).
169. See Carlson, supra note 6; Lantis, supra note 123, at 404-07; and
Lantis, supra note 8.
170. See supra note 160.
440 [Vol. 74
2003] COMMUNITY ACEQUIAS
would have been resolved in any case with reference to an
earlier and older law of water. 17 1  Nine new acequia ditch
systems were established in the Culebra watershed in the
twenty year period from 1861 to 1882.172 None seem to have
been based on anything other than the customary practice of
allowing new ditch networks to be established when a
consensus existed as to the availability of water and as to the
compatibility of the new works with the existing network of
acequias.173 None seem to have departed from the older New
Mexico-derived law, which would allocate water among newer
and older ditches on principles that included, but which were
not limited to, seniority of water use. 74 While the evidence is
inferential and indirect, it seems that the expansions of the
acequia network that occurred in the Rio Culebra watershed in
the years following the organization of the Colorado Territory
and until the 1889 Decree were consistent with traditional
processes for accommodating new water uses to existing uses.
Customary conceptions of water rights were reshaped by
the external challenges of acequia water that culminated in the
171. See supra text accompanying notes 54-98.
172. See the 1889 Decrees, supra note 85, at 5.
173. The evidence for this statement is indirect. James A. French, Engineer
of the United States Reclamation Service, Report on the Sources and Flows of the
Rio Grande River by the New Mexico State Engineer's Office (Dec. 1910),
appendix A 6-29, at 156-75 [hereinafter The French Report] (comprehensive
report on the sources and flows of the Rio Grande River commissioned in
anticipation of the negotiations ultimately leading to the Rio Grande Compact);
The Albright Letter, supra note 163; and the the 1889 Decrees, supra note 85,
each offer some corroboration of the relatively informal process through which
new acequias were in all likelihood fitted into the landscape of existing water use
in the years preceding the the 1889 Decrees. The detailed accounts in these
sources of the points of diversion, means of diversion, and in the case of the
French Report, an exhaustive description of the courses and capacities of ditches,
strongly suggest a process in which the newer acequia ditches were methodically
fit into the existing water landscape. The relations of the newer acequias to their
neighbors must have been thought out with some care. The response of the
acequia rights holders to the 1914 water transfer application proposing the sale of
the Hallett Decree rights to San Luis Water & Power also suggests the communal
consciousness that seems to have shaped relations among the Culebra watershed
acequia parciantes. The complaint filed in response to the proposed transfer
communicates not only solidarity in the face of a common external threat, but an
understanding by acequia parciantes who took their water from different and
potentially competing acequias that the rights of all the acequia users were
elements of an integrated system managed to promote the health of the
community as a whole. See Summons and Complaint, Vigil v. Swanson, supra
note 166, at § XI.
174. See supra text accompanying notes 51-68.
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1889 Decree and the Hallett Decree. Acequia practices of water
sharing and administration by mayordomos for the benefit of
the community continued, but rights were increasingly
understood and exercised with reference to their relative
priority. There were continual disputes among existing rights
holders and between them and new appropriators.'75  A
continuing process of readjustment of water rights through
litigation and administrative actions unfolded in the years
after the Hallett Decree. 7 6  Senior acequia rights holders in
lean water years became willing to take advantage of a legal
regime that imposes the effects of water scarcity on juniors.
It is reported by older residents in the San Luis community
that physical altercations occurred on the ditches as acequia
parciantes struggled with the conflict between the customary
ways and the rights and opportunities created by the doctrine
of prior appropriation. 7 7 They tell the story that during those
unsettled years a parciante was killed by a shovel blow to the
head for stealing water. 178  If there indeed was such an
incident, it likely involved a fight during a time of scarcity and
arose from confusion about whether the old practice of sharing
the impact of scarcities among all users, or the new rule of
allocation of scarcity through priority calls, was to govern. The
1889 adjudication had made it plain that acequia water rights
175. The offices of the Colorado Department of Water Resources, District 3,
in Alamosa, have on file the comprehensive record of proceedings with respect to
water rights for Water District 24, which embraces the Culebra watershed. A
perusal of the file reveals the ongoing efforts of water claimants to obtain or
confirm water rights and to improve the terms of their exercise.
The decree of December 14, 1905 established supplemental water rights for
acequias existing at the time of the 1889 Decrees and recognized newly created
water rights associated with land conveyances made by U.S. Freehold in the years
after 1889. Decretal Order in the Matter of the Adjudication of Priorities of Right
to the Use of Water for Irrigating and other purposes in Water District No. 24 of
the State of Colorado 4-5 (Dec. 14, 1905). It was among the more significant later
proceedings. Id. Also of great importance were decrees in 1935 that, among other
matters, established storage and use rights with respect to reservoirs constructed
in the watershed. Decree of Adjudication in the Matter of the Adjudication of
Priorities of Water Rights for Irrigation, Power, Seepage Rights, Domestic Rights,
and Reservoir Storage Purposes in Water District No. 24 of the State of Colorado
(Feb. 11, 1935). Chief among these were the Sanchez Reservoir, with storage
water priority dates of 1908 and 1909, and the Salazar Reservoir, with storage
water right priority dates of 1911 and 1917. Id.
176. See the adjudication decrees cited supra note 175.
177. Interview by Gregory Hicks with Ernesto Vigil, Commissioner of the
Cerro Acequia (July 12, 2000) (on file with author).
178. Id.
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would be fit into the new structure of temporal priority, but the
consequences of the new rights structure were not brought
home until scarcities caused by lean water years and by the
exercise of the rights ceded in the Hallett Decrees created
circumstances where the senior rights mattered. In the face of
scarcity, acequia rights holders proved themselves willing to
insist on their rights under the new regime of prior
appropriation.
The template of efficiency that was used under the Hallett
Decree of 1900 to diminish the water rights of the Culebra
acequias may have had the dual consequence of providing an
unreliable source of water to irrigators of the arid uplands not
served by the acequia system and of stripping water needed for
productive and sustainable use of the land in the acequia
valleys over time frames longer than single irrigation seasons.
The surplus available water of good water years is a vital part
of the economy of the acequias, allowing the farmers to weather
the inevitable lean water years in an alpine desert dependent
on the vagaries of available annual snow melt. So-called
surplus water is essential for restoring moisture to the subsoil
and for extending cultivation to lands that can be irrigated only
in good water years. 17 9 The transfer of that water from
acequias injured the acequia farmers materially and continues
to do so, but it did not produce the hoped-for sustainable
development of lands away from the riparian zones first settled
by the acequia farmer.
A succession of intending settlers came and went from the
arid upland farms over the years,180 and long periods of non-use
179. See, e.g., Trinchera Irrigation Dist. v. First Nat'l Bank, 102 P.2d 909
(Colo. 1940). There the court affirmed a decree adjudicating rights to flood waters
of Trinchera Creek. The court's ruling had the effect of affirming an award of one
cubic-foot of water for twenty-six acres. This very generous duty of water was
approved on the basis of a quite specific form of beneficial use-the flooding of
arable land with surplus waters as a means of recharging water to the soil,
supporting a water table which made the land more productive and producing
durable seep flows to the Rio Grande and through the unconfined aquifer during
drier seasons.
180. Lantis, supra note 123, at 407-08. The great gulf between the
development aspirations of U.S. Freehold and its successors on one hand, and the
irrigation capacity of the Culebra watershed on the other, was stated succinctly in
the French Report, supra note 173:
Irrigation, in this district, as now practiced, is along the streams in the
lower lands, generally above the town of San Luis. This is carried on by
the native Mexicans and descendants of the early settlers of the valley.
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led to the U.S. Freehold rights being placed on the state
abandonment list in 1984, together with a number of acequia
water rights.' 8 ' In an ironic turn of events, acequia rights
holders argued that neither their rights nor those of U.S.
Freehold had been abandoned, but that water had been used to
the extent feasible given the unreliable patterns of
availability. 8 2 The acequia users plainly preferred the status
quo in which water from the unexercised U.S. Freehold rights
might remain available to the acequia users to the
abandonment of the U.S. Freehold rights and the creation of a
fresh opportunity by a new junior appropriator to try to make
effective use of an unreliable water source.18 3
F. A Contemporary Anecdote of Allegiance and Defection
Under Conditions of Scarcity
In spite of the revolution in formal water rights begun with
the 1889 adjudication and its aftermath, the norms of prior
appropriation still sit uneasily in the Culebra acequia
communities. The culture of prior appropriation remains
incompletely absorbed. An anecdote from the summer of 2000
provides a shapshot of the tension between the current legal
framework of prior appropriation and a continuing
commitment to communal water institutions.
In mid-July 2000, low water flows in the Rio Culebra
caused the water master of the acequias serving the town of
San Luis and the surrounding hamlets of San Pedro and
Chama to shut off water diversions to the Cerro ditch, a junior
[Tihe State Engineer's report [gives] as the area possible for irrigation
24, 226 acres; this means within the present irrigated area. The
[Costilla] Estates Company proposes to water from 70,000 to 100,000
additional acres.
Id. at 42; see also PAUL HORGAN, GREAT RIVER: THE RIO GRANDE IN NORTH
AMERICAN HISTORY 888-89 (4th ed. 1984) (summary description of the gulf
between the development aspirations for the San Luis Valley and the capacity of
the river and its tributaries).
French's analysis also appears in JAMES A. FRENCH, NEW MEXICO STATE
ENGINEER'S OFFICE, SURFACE WATER SUPPLY OF NEW MEXICO 1888-1917 (1918).
181. COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES, DIVISION 3
ABANDONMENT LIST (July 1, 1984).
182. See BONDS THAT BIND, supra note 6, at 109-16; GALLEGOS, supra
note 168.
183. See BONDS THAT BIND, supra note 6, at 109-16.
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ditch in the system. 184 Holders of land served by the Cerro
ditch would go without water, while the owners of land served
by more senior ditches would continue to divert water. This
outcome is to be expected under the law of prior appropriation,
but it produced substantial disquiet and intense discussion
within the community. The early shutting of a junior head
gate made plain the degree of water scarcity, and no doubt
created concern among more senior rights holders that their
own rights might produce no real water as a dry summer
progressed. But there was also concern for the harm done to
the community by the pointed demonstration that the system
of prior rights was creating water winners and water losers.
Why should there have been such disquiet after so many
years' experience with the consequences of prior appropriation?
The reason seems to have been that the very holders of senior
water rights, who benefited from the priority established by
Colorado water law, believed that their own interests would be
jeopardized if the holders of junior rights were forced to sell
their land and water rights because of continuing scarcity. The
possible shift of water away from acequia-dependent uses
threatened the end of the acequias as a water delivery system
and as a political, economic, and social institution vital to the
cohesion of the community."8 " A new generation of uses that
neither depended upon the acequia system nor provided usable
return flows to the acequias would reduce the total volume of
water carried through the acequias, frustrating the ability of
the earthen ditch networks to operate.18 6 Another basis of
184. The following narrative is based on direct observations by the authors,
who were in San Luis at the time of the events described and who attended the
meetings and witnessed the conversations described.
185. Such concerns are not unique to acequia communities but are
characteristic of many irrigation communities in the American West jeopardized
by the withdrawal of water and the contraction of local community. See
LAWRENCE J. MACDONNELL, FROM RECLAMATION TO SUSTAINABILITY: WATER,
AGRICULTURE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT IN THE AMERICAN WEST (1999) (discussing
the anguish experienced by farmers selling their water rights).
186. Colorado water law is in general highly protective of third-party water
rights threatened by proposed transfers or changes in the exercise of water rights,
but imposes no duty on a water rights-holder who has relied on an unincorporated
common ditch as her source of water delivery to continue using that source.
Abandonment of the ditch by the departing rights holder is not considered to
create a protected reliance interest by other water users along the ditch to the
continuing contribution of the departing rights holder's water to total ditch flows.
Abandonment of the ditch similarly relieves the water rights holder of all duties
to the ditch. Brighton Ditch Co. v. City of Englewood, 237 P.2d 116, 120-21 (Colo.
2003]
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concern was that the community of labor that has maintained
the ditch system at relatively low cost would be undermined if
land in the watershed were separated from the acequia system.
Neighbors would no longer look to each other to keep the
system up.187 At a certain point there would be too few owners
to maintain the acequia system, and those who remained would
lack the resources to purchase services to replace the many
acts of mutual aid and forbearance that define the acequia
neighborhood and allow it to function. The successor system,
and the successor landscape, would, it was feared, be inferior
with respect to functionality and to amenity.
Industrial-scale gold mining and logging on the private
lands of the upper watershed had already begun to affect the
timing, volume, and quality of water flows from the high
country, speeding up snowmelt and run off and diminishing the
availability of usable water flows to the acequia system. 88
1951); Compton v. Knuth, 190 P.2d 117 (Colo. 1948); Nichols v. McIntosh, 34 P.
278 (Colo. 1893); Strole v. Guymon, 37 P.3d 529, 532-33 (Colo. App. 2001);
VRANESH, supra note 20, at 279. The parciantes were concerned that for acequias
not organized as mutual ditches, there was a risk that ditch duties and mutual
expectations might not be enforceable. Very good arguments suggest, however,
that acequias, with their long-established practices of reciprocal obligation and
their long-continued customs with respect to such matters of water-rotation are in
every important way different from the common ditches contemplated by the rule
in Brighton Ditch, which seems to contemplate relations between strangers
unburdened by mutual reliance. This paper argues below that acequias should
not be viewed as common ditches. See infra discussion accompanying
notes 256-269.
187. The expectation of the contribution of labor to ditch maintenance is not
unique in Colorado to the acequias. The duty to repair and clean ditches is an
obligation imposed on rights holders on all joint or common ditches, of which
acequias are only one example. See VRANESH, supra note 20, at 278.
Nonetheless, the duty to contribute labor has a special resonance in acequia
systems. The acequia obligation pre-dated the modern law, and remains an
expression of older communal duties and of continuing commitment to a vision of
community. The annual spring ditch cleaning is an occasion defined by ritual and
festival. The assertion of these commitments is significant as a foundation of
community solidarity in a landscape of newly individualized water rights,
reaffirming commitment to acequiadad (acequia-hood) and the community of
labor that sustains it. See infra text accompanying notes 193-211.
188. Robert Curry, The State of the Culebra Watershed: The Impact of
Logging on the Southern Tributaries, 1 LA SIERRA 10-11 (Fall/Winter 1996). For
a comparable study, and description of the methodology used in studies of the
alteration of "stream hydrograph slope," see J.A. Jones & G.E. Grant, Peak Flow
Responses to Clear-Cutting and Roads in Small and Large Basins, Western
Cascades, Oregon, in 32 WATER RES. RESEARCH 959-74 (1996). The Colorado
Acequia Association, as part of its research activities for an EPA planning grant to
support development of a watershed protection plan, is also gathering data on the
alteration of stream flows in the Culebra headwaters and expects to report on its
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Those physical changes to the watershed, producing more
dramatic snow melt and run off events and destroying the
watershed's capacity to store water as snow, sharpened the
sense of risk. If the acequia system could not deliver adequate
water to its members, or could do so only through the
construction of reservoirs beyond the community's economic
reach, the community would collapse, as long-standing land
owners either sold off their farms or abandoned familiar
practices and commitments in favor of a new set of
arrangements not dependent on the acequia system or on the
functioning of a relatively intact watershed.
The events of July 2000 demonstrate a deep tension
between the pursuit of collective goals and the insistence on
private rights. The most favored rights holders understood
that their way of life depended on the acequia system and that
the acequia system could not be maintained without the
commitment of the relatively less favored. Yet in a time of
stress they insisted on their superior water rights to the injury
of other acequia parciantes and perhaps to the injury of a
viable acequia system.
By coincidence, on the very day that the closing of the
Cerro head gate was announced, there was a meeting in San
Luis of the board of directors of the Colorado Acequia
Association (CAA), an organization founded in 1998.189 The
meeting had been called to explore how the water rights
holders in the community might be brought together to deal
with the problem of weakened commitment to acequia
institutions. The early shutting of the junior head gates and
the demonstrated willingness of the senior rights holders to
insist on their seniority in a difficult water year provided a
focal point for the discussion of a persistent set of problems.
The central problems in the eyes of the CAA board were
protection of watershed functioning, improvement of conditions
of water flow through the watershed, and prohibiting the
severance of water rights from the acequia landscape. In their
view, the formula for the survival of the physical and social
landscape of the Culebra acequias depended on protection of
the natural capacity of the watershed to store and deliver
water and on strengthening communal commitments by
findings in a cumulative watershed assessment report to be issued in the fall of
2003.
189. See supra text accompanying notes 214-215.
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encouraging rights holders to tie their rights to the acequia
system, and to be responsive to appeals by mayordomos and
ditch commissions to make their water available for the greater
good. The board concluded that the social commonwealth and
physical landscapes that had been created over time by acequia
methods and institutions could not survive unless water was
wedded to the landscape and unless the capacity of the
acequias to deliver adequate water to all was improved,
physically and institutionally. The Acequia Association board
expressed the view that water is a situated resource, brought
into being by shared labor for the good of a community and
subject to the claims of that community and of the
watershed.190
The discussion acknowledged that rights holders, however
much they might be committed to a communal vision of water
resources, must weigh the advantages of agreeing with their
neighbors to bind their water rights to the acequia system in
the interest of greater security against the possible advantages
of holding tight to their priorities and the possibility of some
day selling or leasing their water rights outside the acequia
system. No less troubled was the question of how state water
law might respond to efforts to enforce mutual commitments
based on long-established customary practices. Could the
particular norms and rules systems of acequias be
accommodated under existing institutional and legal
structures?1 91  Were feasible modifications of existing
structures within reach?
The tension within the acequia community caused by the
effort to develop strategies for collective action in a setting of
privatized water rights is real, as the difficult conversations of
190. See supra text accompanying notes 12 and 43-60.
191. One institutional structure considered by the CAA at the July, 2000
meeting was the creation of a community water trust that could function as a pool
of all water rights. Such a trust might hold rights of first refusal with respect to
water transfers by rights holders and thus be able to keep water in the acequia
system. It might also be charged with rationalizing the distribution of the
parciantes' water in difficult water years to produce optimum allocations. The
technical challenge of managing such a process of regulation of irrigation flows
typically involves use of an artificial reservoir as a regulating tool. The
dependence of the Culebra on the natural functioning of the watershed as a
regulator of flows may diminish arrangement options. Any formal transfer of a
water right from an individual acequia parciante to a corporate body would of
course be subject to state approval and to inquiries into the beneficial use of the
water in the hands of both the transferor and the transferee.
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the summer of 2000 illustrate. Individual parciantes
understand well that their security may lie in collective
strategies for the management of water, and yet the press of
immediate scarcities often binds them to their individual rights
and to hopes that more generous water flows in better snow
years will save them and their neighbors. It is no small thing
that individuals remain amenable to persuasion by their
mayordomos and neighbors to the necessities of others. More
formal institutional arrangements remain elusive. The
transmission of acequia values and practices to future
generations currently depends on an ongoing process of
acculturation and persuasion of each new generation of
landowners by the present community of water users. The
reasons for the strength of commitment to acequia practices
and for the depth of feeling aroused when individual rights are
asserted to the injury of the common good are explored in the
next two Parts. Part IV will explore possible solutions to the
problem of creating the institutions and structures considered
by the CAA board to enforce mutual commitments.
II. WATERSHED DEMOCRACIES: ACEQUIA CULTURE AND SELF-
GOVERNANCE
Acequias are not just a form of sustainable irrigation
technology, an attribute discussed in detail in Part III below.
They are in fact among the oldest local governmental
institutions in the United States.192 This Part provides a
detailed discussion of the acequias of the Culebra watershed as
contemporary governmental and cultural institutions, which
has largely been neglected in the discussion of community
192. The U.S. Congress recognizes acequias as bona fide political
subdivisions of the state. The 1986 Water Resources Development Act, Pub. L.
No. 99-662, 100 Stat. 4082, 4302 (1986), directs the Army Corps of Engineers "to
consider the historic acequia systems [community ditches] of the southwestern
United States as public entities [allowing them] to enter into agreements and
serve as local sponsors of water-related projects." Id. at § 1113. Section 1113 also
states: "The Congress finds that ... these early engineering works have
significance in the settlement and development of the western portion of the
United States [and] therefore, declares that the restoration and preservation of
the Acequia systems has cultural and historic values to the region." Id.
The laws of New Mexico also recognize acequias as political authorities and
grant them certain rights such as the ability to collect taxes, impose fees, or
assess mill levies and the management of land uses within their respective
watersheds. Id. For further discussion, see RIVERA, supra note 3, at 148-50.
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water institutions. Further, we examine the reproduction of
the cultural values of the acequia and the maintenance of
traditional systems of self-management.'93
The great majority of acequias in the Upper Rio Grande
are highly informal, loosely organized civic associations. While
New Mexico acequias have bequeathed a rich and varied corpus
of historical and more contemporary records, the Colorado
acequias have not. Colorado acequias are formally
incorporated as ditch associations or ditch companies. Thus,
record keeping of decision-making processes is scant and often
difficult to trace. For example, in the Culebra watershed only
the San Luis People's Ditch, one out of the twenty-three
193. The social scientific and historical literature on acequias is quite
diverse. There is a large body of historical literature on acequias that includes
substantial research on the cultural sources of acequia customary law and focuses
on the underlying Roman, Spanish, Moorish, and Pueblo Indian influences. See,
e.g., CLARK, supra note 3; PHIL LOVATO, N.M. STATE PLANNING OFFICE, LAS
ACEQUIAS DEL NORTE: THE COMMUNITY DITCH SYSTEMS OF NORTHERN NEW
MEXICO, TECHNICAL REPORT No. 1, FOUR CORNERS REGIONAL COMMISSION
(1974); RIVERA, supra note 3; Brown & Rivera, supra note 31; Simmons, supra
note 5, at 135-50. All these approaches acknowledge the significant role of the
Islamic culture in shaping the customary law of the acequia system in Spain. For
a different view that emphasizes Roman influences and reduces the role of Islamic
culture in the development of acequia institutions in Spain, see Karl W. Butzer, et
al., Irrigation Agroecosystems in Eastern Spain: Roman or Islamic Origins?, in 75
ANNALS OF THE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN GEOGRAPHERS 479-509 (1985).
Several important autobiographical works on acequias have been published; these
include CRAWFORD, supra note 10, and Gallegos, Acequia Tales, supra note 13. A
few studies have focused on the environmental history and environmental ethics
of acequia farms, and one study focuses on the ecosystem services of acequias and
their relationship to principles of watershed management. Among others, see
RIVERA, supra note 3 and Pefia, Cultural Landscapes, supra note 7, at 107-32.
The Rio Grande Bioregions Project conducted a study on the cultural and
environmental history of acequia farms in the Upper Rio Grande between 1994
and 1998. See Pefia & Martinez, supra note 16. The only study on the ecosystem
services of acequias is Devon G. Pefia, The Watershed Commonwealth of the Upper
Rio Grande, in NATURAL ASSETS: DEMOCRATIZING ENVIRONMENTAL OWNERSHIP
(James K. Boyce & Barry Shelley eds., forthcoming Mar. 2003) [hereinafter Pefia,
Watershed Commonwealth]. There also is a growing body of research on
socioeconomic, cultural, and environmental qualities of acequias. For a study of
the social organization of acequias, see Clyde Eastman et al., Acequias, Small
Farms, and the Good Life, in 19 CULTURE AND AGRIC. 14-23 (1997). For reports
on contemporary acequia self-governance, see Brown & Rivera, supra note 31, at
6-14 and Lovato, supra note 193. In ACEQUIA CULTURE, Jose Rivera provides the
most comprehensive survey of historical and contemporary practices of acequia
management and governance. See RIVERA, supra note 3. In Acequia Tales,
Joseph Gallegos provides an important set of insider observations on daily ditch
management of the San Luis People's Ditch in Colorado. See Gallegos, Acequia
Tales, supra note 13. In MAYORDOMO, Stanley Crawford provides similar
observations for a ditch in Embudo, New Mexico. See CRAWFORD, supra note 10.
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principal acequias, is formally incorporated and maintains a
steady record of minutes documenting decision-making and
managerial processes. In most cases, ethnographic materials
provide the best, and often the only, source of data on processes
of social organization, decision-making, and management of
water rights.
Historians long have acknowledged that the acequia
system of local self-governance has roots in late antiquity. 1
94
Linguistics provides some clues about the acequia's historical
origins. The word "acequia" is derived from the Arabic term as-
Saquiya, which translates as "the water bearer." In fact, much
of the terminology for traditional acequia irrigation technology
and practice derives from Arabic words. 195 Some examples
include noria for well, atarque or presa for dam, zanja for
irrigation ditch, and tarea for the job or task each parciante has
for cleaning a section of an acequia.96 There are several
different kinds of ditches in an acequia network. The acequia
madre, or mother ditch, is the main stem ditch off the point of
diversion from the water source. The sangria, or bleeding
ditch, is a lateral ditch running off the mother ditch to deliver
water into a farmer's fields. The espinazo, or spinal ditch,
typically delivers water to the center of an irrigated field or set
of fields.
The acequia is managed collectively by the propietarios
(local landowners with water rights on the ditch) who elect a
mayordomo (ditchrider or water master) and a comisi6n
(commission that oversees the work of the mayordomo). The
parciantes are the voting members of an acequia. While in
New Mexico state statutes require that "votes ... shall be in
proportion to the interest of the voter in the ditch or water,"97
in actuality acequias there have differed greatly in the exercise
of voting privileges. Many acequias follow the customary "one
parciante, one vote" rule. 98 This is certainly the case in
Colorado's Culebra watershed, where all of the acequias,
194. See CLARK, supra note 3, at 9-10; Powell, supra note 2, at 111-16.
195. CLARK, supra note 3, at 9-10; RIVERA, supra note 3, at 2-5.
196. A useful glossary is provided in RIVERA, supra note 3, at 227-32. For
further discussion of the Arabic influence in shaping the vernacular of the acequia
institution, see ROSA MARIA CASTANER MARTIN, FORMA Y ESTRUCTURA DEL
LEXICO DEL RIEGO ENARAGON, NAVARRA YRIOJA (1983).
197. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 73-2-14 (Michie 1978).
198. Brown & Rivera, supra note 31, at 12.
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including the San Luis People's Ditch, follow the one parciante,
one vote rule.199
A. Five Principles Underlying Customary Law and
Traditional Management Practices of the Acequias
Most scholars agree that the customary law of the acequia
derives from a synthesis of Roman, Spanish, Arabic, and
Pueblo Indian sources. 200 According to separate studies by
Rivera and Pefia, five basic principles appear to underlie the
customary law and traditional management practices of the
acequias: (1) the principle of individual usufructary rights to a
common pool resource (CPR) which emphasizes the community
instead of the commodity value of water, (2) the principle of the
non-transferability of water, (3) the right of thirst, (4) the
practice of cooperative labor or mutual aid, and (5) the
principle of local self-governance. 20 1
The first principle of individual rights to a common
resource holds that water rights allotted to individual
parciantes are tied to ownership of farmland on the acequia
riparian corridor. Individual irrigators do not own the water
and instead have usufructuary rights to water-in-place. This
principle implies that water is considered a CPR and is not a
privately owned commodity. The right of parciantes to use
water is contingent on their exercising those rights in the
overall acequia system.
The second principle of nontransferability holds that one
cannot separate water from the land. Because water cannot be
treated as a commodity that can be exchanged for money, there
are strict controls against the conveyance of water to other
users outside the ditch for non-irrigation purposes. Water
cannot be severed from its role in the management of the land
and the transfer of individual irrigation rights is strictly
prohibited. By focusing on the interconnectedness between
water rights and the land upon which they depend, the first
199. Letter from Joseph C. Gallegos, President, Colorado Acequia
Association, to Devon G. Pefia (June 13, 2002) (on file with author).
200. CLARK, supra note 3; RIVERA, supra note 3; Pefia, Cultural Landscapes,
supra note 7; Simmons, supra note 5.
201. RIVERA, supra note 3; Pefia, Cultural Landscapes, supra note 7; see also
Pefia & Martinez, supra note 16.
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two principles illustrate the acequia emphasis on the
community and agroecological value of water. 2
0 2
Third, the right of thirst holds that all living things with
thirst have a right to water, and human use of water cannot
deny plants and animals their rightful share.20 3 The right of
thirst is directly derived from Islamic law, and its significance
has been largely overlooked in the historical literature. It is
also apparently the source of the most conflict between
acequias and modern state institutions such as the state
department of water resources and the district water courts.20 4
Fourth, the maintenance and operation of the acequia
relies on a deep-rooted tradition of mutual aid and communal
labor. One important aspect of this involves the annual
springtime ditch cleanup. In many communities, including San
Luis, this event takes place around May 15th, which is the feast
day of San Ysidro Labrador, the patron saint of the farmers.
The cleanup of the ditch involves the participation of all the
parciantes who must provide labor and supplies to clear the
acequia madre of debris, vegetation, and obstructions that have
accumulated over the course of the winter and spring. In some
cases, parciantes may hire a laborer to perform the work or, in
a few isolated examples, may pay a fee so the acequia can hire
workers to fulfill their share of the work. Moreover, water use
rights are conditioned by a variety of other rules including
participation in the maintenance and operation of the acequia,
respect for irrigation schedules, and conformance with rules
against waste of water or damage to other farmers and the
land. Repeated violation of these rules may result in the loss of
usufructuary rights.
Finally, the fifth principle embodies the idea that the
organization and administration of acequias is based on local
202. F. LEE BROWN & HELEN M. INGRAM, WATER AND POVERTY IN THE
SOUTWEST (1987).
203. On the "right of thirst" in the context of Muslim societies, see DANTE A.
CAPONERA, WATER LAWS IN MOSLEM COUNTRIES (1973). For a comparative study
that includes discussion of water law in the American West, see James J.
Wescoat, Jr., The 'Right of Thirst' for Animals in Islamic Law: A Comparative
Approach, in ANIMAL GEOGRAPHIES: PLACE, POLITICS, AND IDENTITY IN THE
NATURE-CULTURE BORDERLANDS 259 (Jennifer Wolch & Jody Emel eds., 1998).
For further general discussion in the context of Spanish and Mexican colonial law,
see CLARK, supra note 3, at. 9; BETrY EAKLE DOBKINS, THE SPANISH ELEMENT IN
TEXAS WATER LAW, 63-70 (1959); RIVERA, supra note 3; Pefia, Cultural
Landscapes, supra note 7.
204. See discussion infra accompanying notes 256-257.
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self-governance. The election of acequia officers, the
mayordomo and comisionados, is governed by each individual
association of parciantes. The process of decision-making is
thus place-based and driven by the authority of the members of
a given acequia. Moreover, local acequias are granted
considerable leeway to define and enforce regulations that
directly involve them in watershed-wide land and water use
planning and regulation. It is the quality of local self-
governance that has led some scholars to characterize acequia
institutions as watershed democracies. 20 5
These customary principles are not abstractions or mere
memories of a cultural heritage and political legacy that has
long since past. Despite the imposition of the appropriative
rights regime, these principles continue to guide the
organization and management of contemporary community
acequias throughout the Upper Rio Grande. For example, in
1989, a Houston-based multinational corporation, Battle
Mountain Gold (BMG), offered the San Luis People's Ditch
$50,000 for temporary water during the construction of a gold
mine and cyanide leach vat milling facility located in the Rito
Seco Creek watershed about six miles northeast of the town of
San Luis. The People's Ditch firmly rejected the offer on two
separate occasions in years when plenty of water was available
for all the acequias. As the former mayordomo of the San Luis
People's Ditch explained, "You cannot sell the water and
separate it from the land. The water belongs to the
community. It is not for sale."20 6 Instead of selling BMG water,
the San Luis People's Ditch and other local acequias filed a
lawsuit against BMG opposing the corporation's plans to
transfer agricultural water rights to industrial uses.20 7  This
incident illustrates how the riparian and community value of
205. RIVERA, supra note 3; Pefia, Cultural Landscapes, supra note 7.
206. Interview by Devon G. Pefia with Joseph C. Gallegos, President,
Colorado Acequia Association, in San Luis, Colo. (July 8, 1990) (on file with the
author); see also Devon G. Pefia & Joseph C. Gallegos, Nature and Chicanos in
Southern Colorado, in CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM: VOICES FROM THE
GRASSROOTS 141-60 (Robert D. Bullard ed., 1993).
207. BMG had acquired two farming properties from absentee owners in the
northern part of Costilla County; and center-pivot sprinklers irrigated these
acres. The company proposed to transfer the water from the farms to the mine
site. The case was tried in the Division Three Water District Court during
November and December, 1989. See Dist Ct., Water Div. 3, State of Colo., Case
No. 89CW32.
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water remain fundamental principles guiding the management
of acequia water rights in the Culebra watershed.
The persistence of the usufructuary principle is also
evident in the contemporary affairs of the Culebra watershed
acequias. In interviews, the parciantes of the San Luis People's
Ditch confirmed that an adjudicated right to water does not, in
their estimation, mean that the irrigator "owns the water."
Instead, the parciantes manage the water as a collective
resource owned by the acequia as a whole because the flow
volumes must be maintained at a constant rate for the entire
system to function. This is the primary reason for the position
that water cannot be sold or severed from the acequia because
the loss of even the smallest amount would impair the overall
functioning of the ditch.2 °8
The persistence of the principle of the right of thirst is also
evident in contemporary acequia management practices. The
overwhelming majority of acequias in the Culebra watershed
remain earthen works (that is, they are natural dirt channels
and are not lined with cement). Interviews with parciantes
reveal shared narratives that describe a desire to leave ditches
unlined because a more natural acequia provides important
services to the human community and to wildlife. Joseph C.
Gallegos, President of the CAA and former mayordomo for the
San Luis People's Ditch, has described natural, unlined ditches
as "equal opportunity providers."20 9  Research reported
elsewhere demonstrates that the acequia farmers of the
Culebra watershed are aware of the ecological benefits they
receive from the maintenance of the unlined ditch system, as
discussed in greater detail below in Part III and Table 1.210
The persistence of the principle of local self-governance has
been repeatedly illustrated by the practices followed for the
election of mayordomos and other acequia officials. The
acequias still widely follow the practice of one-parciante, one
208. Devon Pefia, Ruben Martinez & Louis McFarland, Rural Chicana/o
Communities and the Environment: An Attitudinal Survey of Residents of Costilla
County, Colorado, in 4 PERSPECTIVES IN MEXICAN AMERICAN STUDIES: EMERGING
THEMES IN MEXICAN AMERICAN RESEARCH 45-74 (1993).
209. Interview by Devon G. Pefia with Joseph C. Gallegos, President,
Colorado Acequia Association, in San Luis, Colo. (June 3, 1996) (on file with
author); see also Devon G. Pefia, A Gold Mine, an Orchard, and an Eleventh
Commandment, in CHICANO CULTURE, ECOLOGY, POLITICS: SUBVERSIVE KIN,
supra note 13, at 264 [hereinafter Pefia, A Gold Mine].
210. Pefia, Cultural Landscapes, supra note 7; Pefia & Martinez, supra note
16; Pefia, supra note 160.
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vote and elect their representatives on that basis. Moreover,
some acequias have become directly involved in the process of
local land and water use planning and regulation. One
important example is the Acequia de San Antonio in Valdez,
New Mexico outside of Taos. This acequia adopted and
enforced a local ordinance regulating the construction of roads,
bridges, and culverts that impact the functioning of the acequia
system.211
The acequia farmers of the Upper Rio Grande continue to
be bound together in arrangements of mutuality for the
allocation of water in a social landscape where labor and
wealth are invested in the maintenance of common
institutions. The underlying, and decidedly communitarian,
principles of the acequia system are clearly at odds with the
values of the dominant society, and their preservation is
notable. How then do acequia farming communities internalize
and reproduce the norms of collective resource use and
management in the context of a broader political economic
system that is decidedly market-oriented and that privileges
private property rights? How does the common property
resource regime of the acequia survive and thrive in such a
milieu? What are the practices that maintain the structures
and traditions that promote mutuality and mutual assurance
within a manageable group that embraces the values of a
common property resource regime? The answers to these
questions, in part, reside in an examination of the quotidian
labor processes of an acequia.
B. The Reproduction of Acequia Managerial Values and
Quotidian Labor Processes
The day-to-day operation of an acequia system is not
simply governed by the set of rules adopted by the parciantes in
the manner of customary law and practice. Instead, it involves
an intense set of on-going intimate relationships between and
211. The text of the ordinance partly reads: "Notice. This ditch is property
of Acequia de San Antonio in Valdez, New Mexico. Swimming, playing, boating,
or discharging of pollutants into this stream is prohibited. Anyone violating this
order will be prosecuted under the provisions of the acequia laws and section
forbidding criminal trespassing." The ordinance describes minimal standards for
construction of culverts, bridges, and roadways in a manner consistent with
acequia functioning, and describes application for permits from the acequia. See
RIVERA, supra note 3, at 189-90.
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among the parciantes, the mayordomos, and comisionados. As
Joseph C. Gallegos, the mayordomo of the San Luis People's
Ditch, explains, "To be a good ditch rider means you also have
to be a good psychologist-you have to be in a position to
understand human behavior and to resolve conflicts that could
spiral out of control."212 Intense social relationships on the
acequia create a sense of what Gallegos calls the "acequia-
hood," the neighborhood of irrigators or the condition of a sense
of place embodied by the affinities of belonging to the acequia
institution. 213 The sense of neighborliness is reinforced by the
annual cycles of labor activity. This involves not just the
spring ditch cleanup but a wide range of other activities related
to irrigating, planting, cultivating, harvesting, and processing
of crops. The circumstances of limited economic resources
means the acequia farmers must rely on mutual aid strategies
to survive. Thus, it is common for acequia farmers to share
resources including labor, farm tractors, plows, cultivators,
combines, and other implements, seed, and even land.
The traditions of mutual aid and cooperative labor are
evident in the organization and objectives of the CAA. The
Association's mission statement highlights this commitment to
mutual aid and cooperative labor by declaring that the
acequias are a "local grassroots participatory democracy. '"214
This participatory democracy extends to labor processes. It is
common among the Culebra acequias for parciantes to
participate in the planting, cultivating, and harvesting of each
other's crops. Elder farmers like Adelmo Kaber and Evan
Vald~z assist younger farmers with this work and in the
process share their local knowledge of agroecology. For
example, Adelmo Kaber often makes suggestions to younger
farmers about the appropriate crops for a given soil type or
recommends the least erosive techniques for plowing fields
before planting. The reproduction of local agroecological
knowledge is therefore completely dependent on the intimate
social relations that characterize the interactions among elder
and more youthful parciantes.
212. Gallegos, Acequia Tales, supra note 13, at 241.
213. GALLEGOS, supra note 168, at 4.
214. COLORADO ACEQUIA ASSOCIATION, PROTECTING AND EXPANDING THE
NATURAL ASSETS OF THE COLORADO ACEQUIAS THROUGH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
A LAND AND WATER TRUST, at 1 (draft, Apr. 2001) (on file with the author)
(proposal and concept paper prepared for the Ford Foundation) [hereinafter
COLORADO ACEQUIA ASSOCIATION].
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The Association has over the years emphasized the
importance of reproducing the next generation of acequia
farmers. A concern for the needs of limited resource farmers
extends to the provision of services for women and youth who
are just starting to engage in agricultural work. One strategy
has been to provide new farmers with support in acquiring
heirloom seeds, gaining access to planting, cultivating, and
harvesting equipment, and mentoring them in the arts of flood
irrigation.
The sharing of resources also involves an informal network
of seed savers and exchangers. In fact, the practice of heirloom
seed saving is one of the most significant cultural traditions
among acequia farmers of the Culebra watershed. Heirloom
seed saving represents a connection to past generations and is
an important agroecological adaptation to place.215 Through
seed saving and exchanging, acequia farmers in the Culebra
watershed cooperate in the development of horticultural
varieties that have been adapted to the unique climatic and
hydrological conditions of the San Luis Valley, i.e., a high
altitude alpine desert environment with a three-month growing
season. These heirloom crop varieties, which agroecologists
call native land races, demonstrate a high level of resistance to
natural pests, are adapted to drought conditions, and are not
damaged by the desiccation caused by the intensity of solar
radiation at an elevation of nearly 8,000 feet above sea level. 216
The Corpus A. Gallegos family farm includes several varieties
of calabasa (squash) with names like the "Elaiza Special," in
honor of the great-grandmother who first introduced and
developed this heirloom variety more than ninety years ago.
Adelmo Kaber and Veronica Sanchez are equally proud of an
heirloom variety they call "Romaldita," aptly named after
Kaber's ninety-year-old mother who first planted this calabasa.
Heirloom seed saving reinforces the customary values of
mutual aid, cooperative labor, and self-reliance.
The persistence of mutual aid and cooperative labor is
apparent in San Luis in another way. In 1991, the local
acequia farmers established a cooperative known as the
Culebra Cooperative Growers, in part to gain the power of
215. Pefia, Cultural Landscapes, supra note 7, at 119.
216. Id., at 114, 119. For further discussion of traditional polycultures and
native land races, see also MIGUEL A. ALTIERI, AGROECOLOGY: THE SCIENCE OF
SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE 107-44 (2d ed. 1995).
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higher volume purchases of seed. The cooperative also
provides training and support for farmers interested in organic
certification, the niche marketing of heirloom crop varieties
including chicos (a white roasting corn that is a high-end
delicacy in the region), and workshops on holistic resource
management. The Culebra Cooperative Growers is important
because it addresses technical needs that are usually left
unmet by the United States Department of Agriculture and its
various agencies including the Natural Resources Conservation
Service (NRCS).217
However, the Cooperative is especially significant because
it addresses the vital issue of the reproduction of acequia
values and organizational norms across generations.
Institutions for collective governance of common property
resources are often challenged by the need to reproduce
themselves.2 18 The acequias are accomplishing this, in part,
through the establishment of grassroots organizations like the
Cooperative that have instituted special programs to assist
young farmers who are just getting started and have limited
resources. As one mayordomo explains, "Without the youth,
the acequia way of agriculture cannot survive. We can protect
the water and the land, but if we don't prepare the next
generation, then this way of farming will just disappear."219
In times of drought, as was the case during the 2000 and
2002 growing seasons, the need for other forms of mutual aid
and cooperation became apparent. The 2002 drought was so
severe that only three of the twenty-three acequias were
apportioned water sufficient for irrigation. Many of the
farmers were thus left high and dry. Where circumstances
permitted, farmers from dry acequias planted on extra acreage
on land belonging to farmers with running acequias. For
example, Adelmo Kaber, a farmer on the Cerro Ditch without
water for the 2002 irrigation season, planted chicos, beans,
217. For further discussion of the relationship between Hispano farmers and
the USDA, see Devon G. Pefia, Environmental Justice and Sustainable
Agriculture: Linking Social and Ecological Sides of Sustainability, policy paper
prepared for the Second National People of Color Environmental Leadership
Summit, Washington, D.C. (Oct. 23-27), available at http://www.ejrc.cau.edu/
summit2/sustainableAg.pdf.
218. See OSTROM, supra note 1; JOANNA BURGER, ET AL., PROTECTING THE
COMMONS: A FRAMEWORK FOR RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS (2001).
219. Interview by Devon G. Pefia with Evan Valdez, President, Colorado
Acequia Association, in San Luis, Colo. (Oct. 8, 2000) (on file with author).
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calabasa and other crops on several acres belonging to Joseph
C. Gallegos, who was able to irrigate with water from the San
Luis People's Ditch.220 In this manner, the acequia farmers of
the Culebra watershed manage to find new ways to share
scarcity. Because the extant legal regime of prior
appropriation does not allow for the sharing of water scarcity,
the farmers cooperate by growing food together on the limited
land that can be irrigated. Of course, while these adaptive
responses to water scarcity are laudable, they do not eliminate
the economic hardship that results wherever ditches run dry
under the restrictive demands of priority calls for limited
water. The principle of the right of thirst is abrogated, and
parciantes are prevented from managing their water resources
on the basis of collective goals of the community.
The persistence of customary norms and principles of
collective management are evident in the everyday operation of
the acequia system. The usufructuary nature of acequia water
rights implies the existence of a collective basis for revoking
water use rights for parciantes who engage in a variety of
behaviors that are discouraged and controlled by the
community to protect the watershed and the functioning of the
ditch. This may involve the imposition of informal sanctions
including ridicule, isolation, withdrawal of cooperation, and
even the shutting and locking down of compuertas (headgates)
for acting "como tildeo" (a bird similar to the sandpiper).221
Control can also involve more formal sanctions including fines
for water waste or for taking water out of turn. Wasteful
irrigation practices are especially frowned upon and can result
in being labeled a "water hog." In the more extreme cases,
water hogs face fines or are subject to strict supervision under
the watchful eye of the mayordomo.222
The annual spring ditch clean-up; the tacit skills and
experiential knowledge related to flood irrigation; and the
sharing of labor for planting, cultivating, irrigating, harvesting,
and processing of crops-all these represent the persistence of
acequia customary norms of mutual aid and cooperative labor.
220. See Devon Pefia's field observation notes on effects of 2002 drought on
irrigation practices and interviews by Devon G. Pefia with Adelmo Kaber and
Joseph C. Gallegos, in San Luis, Colo. (May 17, 2002) (on file with author).
221. Interview by Devon G. Pefia with Joseph C. Gallegos, President,
Colorado Acequia Association, in San Luis, Colo. (May 15, 1996) (on file with
author).
222. Gallegos, Acequia Tales, supra note 13, at 240-42.
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To avoid the breakdown of the values underlying collective
management of the acequia system, the parciantes must also
continuously work at reproducing the highly specialized
artisan knowledge that is necessary for the skillful practice of
flood irrigation with gravity-driven ditches. It takes years of
practice and mentoring by a skilled practitioner for a younger
farmer to develop the needed level of competence to irrigate
with acequia technology. One elderly parciante, a former
mayordomo, once explained how
[y]ou can't just open the headgate and let the water go. You
have to tend the water. Watch it, change it. Keep it under
control. The one thing you can always count on about
water... is that it just keeps coming. To be a good irrigator
you have to be patient. You cannot rush things. You have
to know the shape of your [crop] fields. How the land slopes
here and there. You must know every little bump; every low
area where the water might slow down and settle.223
He cautioned that it takes decades for a parciante to become
skilled enough at flood irrigation so that soil erosion and waste
of water are avoided. The process of transmitting irrigation
skills always involves direct, experiential knowledge and
lifelong mentoring relationships. The second author has had
the privilege of participating in this process over the past
decade on the numerous occasions when he was invited to an
important predawn ritual-El cambio de agua (the changing of
the water). This local knowledge cannot be easily reproduced:
"It is a lot like becoming a priest or a rabbi," Joseph C. Gallegos
explains:
You don't get ordained overnight. It takes years of training
and practice, right? It is the same with acequia irrigation.
You don't just put a shovel in someone's hands and let them
have at it. The only way to learn a sense of the water is
through years of practice. 2 4
223. Interview by Devon G. Pefia with Corpus C. Gallegos in San Luis, Colo.
(Sept. 13, 1997) (on file with author).
224. Interview by Devon G. Pefta with Joseph C. Gallegos, President,
Colorado Acequia Association, in San Luis, Colo. (June 8, 1998) (on file with
author).
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C. Resistance of the Culebra Acequias to Modernization
These informal relationships and modes of personal control
are unfolding in the context of significant processes of cultural,
demographic, technological, and legal change. As Gallegos
notes:
The personal relationships on the ditch are changing.
Managing the ditch is less personal and more formal each
passing year .... It used to be that the ditch was managed
on a person-to-person level. The members' word was the
law. The human aspect was foremost, and the law was
distant and removed from the everyday work of the ditch.
Today, it is getting more formal, and this can create
problems, because the law does not abide by the land.225
The arrival of newcomers, including a significant and growing
number of non-Hispanic farmers, is one source of the changes
occurring in even the most traditional of acequias. Again,
Gallegos: "[With more newcomers on the ditch, well, they want
to follow everything by the book. They think the old way is a
wasteful manner to manage water, and with the changing
laws, new technologies, and more complexity, the potential for
conflict is increased. 226
These changes, as well as the ecological and economic
threats posed by industrial logging, mining, and subdivisions,
led to the establishment of the CAA, which is part of a
relatively recent trend involving the establishment of
watershed and statewide acequia organizations. However, the
formal organization of Colorado acequias is much older and
dates back at least to the early 1960's and President Lyndon
Johnson's "War on Poverty." The formal incorporation of the
San Luis People's Ditch dates back to this period and was in
fact a response to opportunities created by federal anti-poverty
programs in rural areas. The State Engineer's Office had
demanded that the San Luis People's Ditch be lined with
concrete, and the ditch parciantes found themselves obliged to
secure financing to "modernize" their acequia madre. To obtain
this funding from the federal government, the San Luis
People's Ditch first had to incorporate as a ditch company in
225. Gallegos, Acequia Tales, supra note 13, at 241.
226. Id.
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order to be a qualified borrower under the terms of the rural
anti-poverty program.227
Despite such adaptations as formal incorporation and
gradual modernization, resistance to the modernization of the
ditches, in their physical and in their institutional
arrangements, persists. Resistance seems strong in the
Colorado acequias, which unlike some of their New Mexico
counterparts, have rarely embraced a vision of modernity in
exchange for proffered financial support. The New Mexico
acequias have been "beneficiaries" of state-funded support for
several decades, and have received that support on condition
that the ditches be concrete-lined. New Mexico acequias in the
northcentral Rio Arriba region remain steadfastly committed to
traditional earthern works in current landscape practices, but
many acequias in the Middle Rio Grande Valley (between
Albuquerque and Santa Fe) have lined numerous acequia
madres.228
Commitment to a system of earth, including gravity-fed
ditches and the waterways that the adequate functioning of
such a system requires, lies at the heart of the water practices
of the Culebra village acequias. The very functioning of the
acequia network depends upon the porousness of the system.
Water constantly escapes from the network of earth ditches
into the unconfined aquifer of the watershed, replenishing
ground water flows that in turn support springs and surface
water flows in the Culebra and its tributaries. 229 What this
means is that water comes to rights holders not only directly
through the ditch network, but as a result of the water's
movement through the landscape. This light hold on the water
also provides sub-irrigation to the 633-acre community grazing
commons of the chief Culebra town of San Luis and supports
uncultivated woodlands and windbreaks that shelter wildlife
and livestock and retard soil erosion.230 Command of the water
is incomplete, but the capacity to use the water for longer
periods while producing extensive landscape benefits is served
by this incomplete command. It is a system that disperses and
227. Interviews by Devon G. Pefia with Corpus A. Gallegos and Joseph C.
Gallegos of the San Luis People's Ditch, San Luis, Colo. (May 15 and Aug. 12,
1997) (on file with author).
228. Authors' observations.
229. See supra note 20.
230. Pefia, Watershed Commonwealth, supra note 193.
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C. Resistance of the Culebra Acequias to Modernization
These informal relationships and modes of personal control
are unfolding in the context of significant processes of cultural,
demographic, technological, and legal change. As Gallegos
notes:
The personal relationships on the ditch are changing.
Managing the ditch is less personal and more formal each
passing year .... It used to be that the ditch was managed
on a person-to-person level. The members' word was the
law. The human aspect was foremost, and the law was
distant and removed from the everyday work of the ditch.
Today, it is getting more formal, and this can create
problems, because the law does not abide by the land.225
The arrival of newcomers, including a significant and growing
number of non-Hispanic farmers, is one source of the changes
occurring in even the most traditional of acequias. Again,
Gallegos: "[Wlith more newcomers on the ditch, well, they want
to follow everything by the book. They think the old way is a
wasteful manner to manage water, and with the changing
laws, new technologies, and more complexity, the potential for
conflict is increased."226
These changes, as well as the ecological and economic
threats posed by industrial logging, mining, and subdivisions,
led to the establishment of the CAA, which is part of a
relatively recent trend involving the establishment of
watershed and statewide acequia organizations. However, the
formal organization of Colorado acequias is much older and
dates back at least to the early 1960's and President Lyndon
Johnson's "War on Poverty." The formal incorporation of the
San Luis People's Ditch dates back to this period and was in
fact a response to opportunities created by federal anti-poverty
programs in rural areas. The State Engineer's Office had
demanded that the San Luis People's Ditch be lined with
concrete, and the ditch parciantes found themselves obliged to
secure financing to "modernize" their acequia madre. To obtain
this funding from the federal government, the San Luis
People's Ditch first had to incorporate as a ditch company in
225. Gallegos, Acequia Tales, supra note 13, at 241.
226. Id.
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Even in the case of the "modernized" San Luis People's
Ditch, parciantes have in some cases attempted to mimic the
functionality of the older earthen ditch with the new concrete
ditch. The new ditch structure blocked the subirrigation of
ground along the ditch margin and caused a corresponding loss
of the corridors of phreatophytic trees and shrubs that
functioned as windbreaks and animal habitat. Noxious weeds
typically filled the void. Some parciantes have attempted to
address the problem of an improved ditch by conducting water
from the San Luis People's Ditch not into pipes or smaller,
tributary concrete ditches for more exact distribution of water
to irrigated lands but directly onto the ground where the water
is allowed to seep onto the upper end of pasture lands for
subirrigation. This effort to replicate the ditch landscape
created by earthen ditches has been successful near the places
where the concrete ditch can be made to "leak" at the
individual take-out gates of farmsteads. However, control of
noxious weeds and the loss of windbreaks remain a cost of ditch
modernization along much of the length of the concrete-lined
portion of the San Luis People's Ditch.
Some of the conflicts between the acequias and Colorado
law are rooted in the differences between customary law and
the doctrine of prior appropriation. The right of thirst
underlies the decision by most acequias to maintain their
ditches in a more natural state with earthen-work banks that
support habitat for wild plants and animals many of which are
important sources of food or medicine. Thus, many acequias
resist lining the ditches with concrete to reduce leakage along
the riparian corridors. The State Engineer's Office and water
courts tend to view this as a wasteful and inefficient practice.
There is increasing pressure placed on the acequias to
"modernize" and line the ditches to reduce the loss of water to
phreataphytes (riparian vegetation).235 In fact, under Colorado
water law, the loss of water to vegetation, including the
creation of wetlands through sub-irrigation, can be considered
"non-beneficial evapotranspiration."236 This corresponds with
the idea that the state can compel irrigators to become more
efficient in their use of water to meet with the doctrine of
maximum utilization by reducing evaporative losses of water.
235. Pefia, Cultural Landscapes, supra note 7, at 117-18; Pefia, A Gold
Mine, supra note 209, at 263-65.
236. Pefia, A Gold Mine, supra note 209, at 265.
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The logical extension of this doctrine in technological terms
means that irrigators should abandon the gravity-driven
system of flood irrigation and use perforated pipes or drip
irrigation to deliver water to crops, that the leaky earth banks
of acequias should be lined with cement to reduce losses to
riparian vegetation, and that the acequias should adopt other
tools and practices to apply water more precisely to crop lands.
The resistance of the acequias to modernization is further
complicated by the environmental history of the Culebra
watershed. Some proponents of ditch modernization have
blamed local acequia farmers for the degraded state of the
common lands and the watershed. They have suggested that
Hispano livestock owners have been the principal source of
land and watershed degradation caused by overgrazing and
overstocking of sheep and cattle.237 This argument has been
invoked to attack the legitimacy of the struggle to restore the
historic use rights to the Sangre de Cristo common lands and to
undermine the claims of the acequias to protect their water
rights and irrigation technologies and practices.238 However,
research scholars have demonstrated that the degradation of
the Culebra watershed was largely the result of enclosure of
the common lands by the Taylor family, an event that
precipitated the first large-scale commercial logging operations
in the watershed. Prior to 1960, la Sierra was largely roadless
and unlogged, with the exception of the Salazar Tract and the
Whiskey Pass Road. Overgrazing in the watershed was also
the result of the arrival of the railroad at New San Acacio in
1910, which tied the area to mass markets for wool across the
region. The overstocking of sheep was largely a consequence of
237. See, e.g., TOM WOLF, COLORADO'S SANGRE DE CRISTO MOUNTAINS
265, 275 (1995).
238. For further discussion, see Devon G. Pefia & Ruben 0. Martinez, The
Capitalist Tool, the Lawless, and the Violent: A Critique of Recent Southwestern
Environmental History, in CHICANO CULTURE, ECOLOGY, POLITICS: SUBVERSIVE
KIN, supra note 13, at 141-76 [hereinafter Pefia & Martinez, The Capitalist Tool];
and Devon G. Pefia, Identity, Place, and Communities of Resistance, in JUST
SUSTAINABILITIES: DEVELOPMENT IN AN UNEQUAL WORLD (Julian Agyeman, et al.
eds., 2003) [hereinafter Pefia, Identity and Place]. This was apparent during the
course of negotiations between local representatives and governmental appointees
to Governor Roy Romer's Sangre de Cristo Land Grant Commission. During one
particularly heated discussion in October of 1995, an official from the Colorado
Division of Wildlife stated that local people could not be trusted to participate in
the co-management of the Taylor Ranch because they had overgrazed the Vega, a
633 acre village common outside San Luis.
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the intrusion of large commercial operators from outside the
area, many of which came from Conejos County on the west
side of the Rio Grande. 239
The CAA is only too acutely aware of the complex and
controversial state of the area's environmental history. With
support from the EPA, the CAA has initiated a long-term
watershed-monitoring program and planned for a pilot
watershed restoration project. The key problems identified by
the Association's members include sedimentation of the water
courses and ditches caused by runoff from the numerous
logging roads and skid trails that have been constructed on the
Taylor Ranch over the past thirty years.2 40
This resistance to modernization does not mean that
acequias exist in a timeless, unchanging, and romantic
prehistory. On numerous occasions, the acequias of the
Culebra watershed have had to adapt to changing
circumstances. This is no where made clearer than the process
that led to the formal incorporation of the San Luis People's
Ditch. Corpus A. Gallegos and Joseph C. Gallegos both confirm
that the bylaws for the San Luis People's Ditch, adopted in the
mid 1960's, were essentially derived from a "boilerplate"
document. 241 These boilerplate bylaws were opportunistically
used to incorporate in order to qualify for money to modernize
the acequia madre as a result of pressures coming from the
State Engineers Office to reduce leakage along the mother
ditch to increase the delivery rate to the users farthest down
the ditch. These boilerplate bylaws require that the votes for
mayordomo and commissioners should be apportioned on the
basis of the number of shares each parciante has (as quantified
by the irrigated acreage for each parciante). However, the
boilerplate bylaws do not reflect the actual practice of one
parciante, one vote for mayordomo and commissioners, which
again, ethnographically, can be shown to constitute a very
239. For more on the environmental history of the Culebra watershed, see
generally Lantis, supra note 123; Pefia & Martinez, The Capitalist Tool, supra
note 238, at 154-57.
240. COLORADO ACEQUIA ASSOCIATION, PROPOSAL FOR A CUMULATIVE
WATERSHED ASSESSMENT AND PILOT RESTORATION PROJECT, GRANT PROPOSAL
SUBMITTED TO THE U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (May 1998) (on
file with author).
241. Interview by Devon G. Pefia with Corpus C. Gallegos, farmer in San
Luis, Colo. (June 7, 1996) (on file with author); Interview by Devon G. Pefia with
Joseph C. Gallegos, President, Colorado Acequia Association, in San Luis, Colo.
(May 17, 2002) (on file with author).
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dense set of informal relationships among the parciantes,
mayordomo, and commissioners.
Superficially, it would appear that the acequias, as
reflected in these boilerplate documents, have evolved under a
default organizational form imposed by the pressures of
modernity. However, for the acequia farmers, the adoption of
these bylaws was merely a step toward the goal of receiving
federal rural antipoverty funds to modernize the mother ditch.
It was an instrumentalist, and not a normative, use of the
formal process of incorporation. The reality is that, despite the
adoption of boilerplate bylaws (reflecting the problematic
norms of the common or mutual ditch association under the
doctrine of prior appropriation), the San Luis People's Ditch
continues to follow the customary practices reproduced over
generations through the survival of local legal norms that treat
individually allocated water rights as rights subject to the
functionality of what is managed by a community more as a
common property resource. 242  In more recent times, the
parciantes of the San Luis People's Ditch have initiated
discussions to review and revise the bylaws to bring them in
line with extant customary norms and practices. These include
a desire to recapture a culturally specific sense of place by
officially restoring the original name of the San Luis People's
Ditch, which was La Acequia de la Gente de San Luis.243
III. THE LANDSCAPE ECOLOGY OF THE ACEQUIA: WATERSHEDS,
ECOSYSTEM SERVICES, AND SUSTAINABILITY
The following Part discusses customary acequia practices
in the Culebra watershed and their effects on the landscape
ecology of the watershed. In a previous study, a team of
interdisciplinary researchers identified three major ways that
acequia systems contribute to the ecological and economic
integrity of the watershed. 244 First, the acequia system
242. See supra discussion accompanying notes 161-62.
243. Letter from Joseph C. Gallegos, President, Colorado Acequia
Association, to Devon G. Pefia (July 10, 2002) (on file with author).
244. The formal model used to arrive at these estimates is presented in
Pefia, Watershed Commonwealth, supra note 193, and is based on a synthesis of
the principles of ecological economics outlined in the compilation NATURAL
ASSETS: DEMOCRATIZING ENVIRONMENTAL OWNERSHIP, supra note 193, and the
work of the ecosystem services theorist Robert Costanza; in Robert Costanza et
al., The Value of the World's Ecosystem Services and Natural Capital, 25
[Vol. 74
COMMUNITY ACEQUIAS
generates agricultural income in goods and services sold in
markets as well as through informal barter. In addition to
being productive agricultural systems in their own right, the
acequia agroecosystems are storehouses of native wild plant
and landrace crop genetic diversity. The value of heirloom
landraces and traditional knowledge to local plant breeders
includes annual savings from reduced seed purchases, reduced
agrochemical inputs, and reduced losses to pests and other
pathogens. These heirloom landraces have additional value as
a "firewall" protecting agricultural and food security from
threats posed by the erosion of genetic agrobiodiversity.
Second, the raw materials, open spaces, wildlife habitat,
vernacular architecture, and built environments generated by
the acequia system produce significant artisan, subsistence,
and amenity values. Third, as detailed below, the acequia
system provides ecosystem services such as soil formation and
water quality. For example, the anthropogenic wetlands
created by acequias produce higher water quality, which in
turn reduces the cost of water treatment and pollution
mitigation.
The historic acequia agroecosystem annually produces
significant agricultural, open-space, wildlife habitat, water
quality, forest conservation, and other environmental and
economic values. The acequia landscape mosaic, including
croplands, meadows, anthropogenic wetlands and woodlots,
and riparian corridors, consists of a landscape pattern and a
set of complementary agroecological practices. For example,
the trees and vegetation that grow in the acequia riparian
corridors, a landscape feature created by water seepage from
earthen ditches, act as a shield against wind erosion. The
preference for unlined earthen ditches also stems from a desire
to produce ecological services such as habitat for edible and
ECOLOGICAL ECON. 3 (1998). Artisan production includes hand-crafted wood
products (furniture, wooden saints in the form of retablos and bultos, and other
art objects); building and shelter materials (vigas, latillas, fenceposts, lumber);
wildcrafted herbs and medicinal plants; hand-woven rugs, blankets, vests, and
coats; hand-made artifacts; and tools for the home and ranch. Subsistence
production includes crops harvested from family garden plots and orchards;
vegetables and fruits canned for storage, barter, or sale; medicinal and edible
plants wildcrafted for home use; hunting and fishing for the family table;
gathering of firewood; and related services to produce these subsistence goods.
Amenity production includes the sales and services generated by the tourism
industry such as lodging, food, and other retail sales, but does not include sales of
arts and crafts.
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medicinal wild plants. The preference for rotational inter-
cropping (an agricultural practice) conserves soil and
replenishes soil nutrients (an ecological service). The choice of
landrace cultivars is further informed by local adaptations to
climatic and other ecological limits. The mosaic thus extends
biological diversity by blending native and domesticated
landscapes to create a watershed-wide stock of natural
assets.
245
Table 1 provides a synopsis of the types of economic and
ecological benefits provided by the mosaic. In addition to the
ecological services, Table 1 includes the value of farm income,
goods, and services (including formal and informal sectors but
not subsistence activity),246 and the value of revenues from
artisan, subsistence, and amenity economies associated with
the presence of the mosaic.
A. Acequia Ecosystem Services and the Maintenance of
Local Landscapes and Economies
An important issue involves the calculation of benefits of
the acequia system in the Culebra watershed. Approximately
273 families in the Culebra watershed use acequias to irrigate
approximately 24,000 acres of privately owned croplands and
pastures. These acequia farms are the heart of the local
agricultural economy. An additional 10,000 acres of
anthropogenic wetlands are produced by subirrigation from
acequias. We estimated the annual output of crops for cash
sale from the Culebra basin acequias at $9.4 million. This
includes the substantial savings provided by the landscape
mosaic in the form of reduced outlays for agricultural
production inputs. In this region of Colorado, industrial-style
farms spend considerable amounts on herbicides and chemical
fertilizers. Generally, the Hispano acequia farms of the
245. For further elaboration of the biological and cultural principles
underlying this approach see Pefia, Watershed Commonwealth, supra note 193,
and G. Stanley Kane, Restoration or Preservation? Reflections on a Clash of
Environmental Philosophies, in BEYOND PRESERVATION: RESTORING AND
INVENTING LANDSCAPES 69 (A. Dwight Baldwin et al. eds., 1994); see also R.
EDWARD GRUMBINE, GHOST BEARS: EXPLORING THE BIODIVERSITY CRISIS (1992).
246. It is difficult to develop an accurate estimate of the size of the informal
sector, but our survey research indicates that the informal sector is very large,
and in some cases even rivals the formal sector of the regional economy.
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Table 1: Economic and Ecological
Landscape Mosaic
Services of the Acequia
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Culebra watershed do not use these agrochemical inputs: they
have always been "organic," relying on natural control,
principally crop diversity and rotation, to protect crops from
pests and maintain soil fertility. Additional savings are reaped
from the local practice of heirloom seed saving, which means
that the acequia farmers do not need to purchase seed
commercially.
Artisan and amenity values contribute an additional $3.9
million in goods and services, largely via income derived from
tourism. The "unique cultural landscapes" of northern New
Mexico and southern Colorado account for at least two-thirds of
the tourism in the region, according to the New Mexico Office
of Cultural Affairs. In Costilla County, the hunting and fishing
component of the tourism economy is particularly important,
and here the acequia farms play a critical role. Most of the
county's "blue-ribbon" trout fisheries are located on stretches of
the local creeks that course through the heart of the acequia
bottom lands.
We also estimate the contributions of the so-called
informal economy. Interviews revealed that most acequia
farmers are engaged in a substantial amount of barter of goods
and services. It is common, for example, for farmers to trade
services (such as plowing) for a portion of the crops harvested.
In a sample of twenty-two farmers, the average value given to
this barter by the respondents was $3,000 a year. 247 From this
average we calculate that the annual value of informal barter
among the 273 acequia farming families in Costilla County is
about $820,000.
Taken together, the estimated annual economic impact of
the acequia farms in Costilla County from agricultural
production and artisan, amenity, and subsistence values is
$14.1 million. This amount represents roughly forty percent of
total personal income in the county-including income from
jobs in other sectors like retail sales, government, and county
services. Especially since Costilla County is an economically
distressed region with high unemployment and poverty, the
impact of the acequia farms is critical to the local economy.
The ecological services provided by the landscape mosaic in
Costilla County include substantial annual savings in the form
247. Based on unpublished survey of parciantes by Devon G. Pefia, San
Luis, Colorado (June-July 1998) (on file with author).
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of soil conservation and soil formation. Hydrologist Robert
Curry, Director of the Institute for Watershed Science at the
University of California at Monterey Bay, views the acequias
as "soil banks" which, more than reducing erosion, actually
create soil as the combination of irrigation practices, perennial
polycultures, and crop rotations adds depth and organic
materials to the soil horizon.248 We estimate that the acequias
yield at least one million dollars per year via soil protection in
the Culebra watershed.
A second important ecological service of the mosaic is the
protection of water quality, thanks to the presence of
anthropogenic wetlands and riparian corridors. In addition to
underpinning the benefits derived from the protection of fish
habitat, the water quality services they provide reduce the
costs of water treatment by an estimated $5.5 million a year.249
Taken together, the annual value of the ecological services of
soil building and water quality is approximately $6.5 million..
While it is possible that modernization of the acequia system
would increase the agricultural output of the Culebra
watershed, the ecosystem services would be lost. Yet, the
acequia system cannot easily be modernized. The land
holdings within the acequia system of the Culebra watershed
are too small to be reorganized within the parameters of larger,
mechanized economies of scale. The cultural landscape
features of the mosaic would have to be radically transformed
and thus destroyed, to modernize agricultural production, and
this would result in irrevocable losses to the local community
and ecosystem.
These findings compel us to reexamine the prevailing legal
norms that legitimize concepts of efficiency and maximum
utilization based on a privileging of private and individualized
appropriation and consumptive uses of water that have clear
economic but unclear ecological or social benefits. The next
Part discusses alternative concepts of efficiency and proposes
an approach that would allow for the protection of acequias,
their landscape ecology, and cultural traditions within the
context of the dominant doctrine of appropriative rights.
248. Letter from Robert Curry, Director, Institute for Watershed Science,
University of California, to Devon G. Pefia (June 6, 1996) (on file with author).
249. Letter from Costilla County Water and Sewage Department to Devon
G. Pefia (Oct. 8, 1999) (on file with author).
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IV. CONTEMPORARY WATER LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF
ACEQUIA SURVIVAL
The impact of water resources laws on the operation of
acequia systems is comprehensive. Water law defines the
terms under which acequia rights may be exercised and defines
limits to those rights. A matter of major concern to the
viability of acequia-based communities is the operation of legal
doctrines that affect necessary or desirable features of acequia
water allocation and delivery. There are four principal areas of
concern. These are (1) the prevailing legal standards for the
beneficial use (and waste) of water, (2) the scope of the right to
transfer water rights to new uses and to new places and modes
of use; (3) the protection of watersheds through appropriate
land use regulation; and (4) the development of legal
institutional arrangements to make acequias more effective
and robust as local water managers. This Part considers these
four areas briefly and offers proposals either to clarify or
strengthen the protection the law affords acequia practices and
traditional acequia governance.
A. Beneficial Uses and Optimal Utilization-Acequia
Practice and Doctrinal Evolution
Acequia water rights are rights of very long standing, and
so are often the most senior water rights in a legal system that
gives priority to first-in-time users. While all water rights
under an appropriative system are formally limited by the
doctrine of beneficial use, which prohibits waste of water, that
doctrine has not in general been applied to require greater
efficiencies of older diversion and application technologies. The
chief reason is the strength of the locality rule that measures
the adequacy of diversion and application methods with
reference to generally prevailing techniques in a locality.2 50
250. See A. DAN TARLOCK ET AL., WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 178-79
(5th ed. 2002). Similarly, reviewing courts tend to take a tolerant view of duties
of water that have been established by adjudication referees in formal
proceedings, even though allocations might seem overly generous by
contemporary standards. See also sources cited in Shupe, supra note 20, at 87-95
(especially the Colorado sources at 94-95). When accusations of excess water use
are made, the water courts are inclined to dismiss cases once it has been
established that the amount of water diverted at the ditch head-gate does not
exceed the decreed right. Interview by Gregory A. Hicks with Judge Robert G.
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That customary level of tolerance is not taken for granted
in the Culebra acequia communities. The experience of the
Hallett Decree has had a lasting effect on community
understanding of how their water rights are viewed by the law,
prompting an unusual alertness to the necessity of justifying
customary water use practices as beneficial and not wasteful.
The acequia parciantes have had the experience, unusual
under Colorado law, of actually having lost decreed water
rights, the result of the challenge of the Hallett objectors. That
loss occurred at a time in the state's water law history when
the range of acceptable water duties was rather generous. 251
The singular experience of having lost water in a judicially
administered proceeding is remembered, and has produced a
certain determination among modern acequia right holders to
defend their methods. They know that acceptance by water
authorities of their irrigation practices cannot be taken for
granted. They know that they are viewed by outsiders as
dabblers in water and believe that water authorities see them
as people wedded by poverty and indolence to antiquated water
ways.
In their conviction that their traditional methods are not
necessarily immune to legal challenge, the acequia farmers
have perhaps anticipated a future that awaits all water users.
As the need for improved allocation of scarce water becomes
more pressing, it may be that senior rights, traditionally
exercised, will come under closer scrutiny and need to change
in the interest of efficiency or to accommodate new uses in an
over appropriated system. 25 2
Ogburn (Colorado Water Court, Division 3), in Alamosa, Colo. (July 15, 2000) (on
file with author); Shupe, supra note 20, at 86, 95. The degree of administrative
acquiescence in established patterns of diversion and application is indicated by
the discrepancy between enforcement efforts in most instances and the directives
of multiple sections of the Colorado Revised Statutes, including Section 37-92-
502(2): "Each division engineer shall order the total or partial discontinuance of
any diversion in his division to the extent the water being diverted is not
necessary for application to a beneficial use...." COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-502(2)
(2002); see also §§ 37-84-107, -108, discussed in VRANESH, supra note 20, at 205.
251. See text accompanying supra note 246.
252. See Shupe, supra note 20, at 73-74; Matter of Rules and Regulations
Governing Use, Control, and Protection of Water Rights for Both Surface and
Underground Water Located in Rio Grande and Conejos River Basins and Their
Tributaries, 674 P. 2d 914, 923 (Colo. 1983) [hereinafter Alamosa-La Jara]; Cache
La Poudre Water Users Assoc. v. Glacier View Meadows, 550 P.2d 288, 294
(Colo. 1976).
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The value of insisting on more effective systems of water
delivery and use is plain, so long as the conception of improved
efficiency of water use is a sound one. The strongest argument
in favor of the physical efficiency of the Culebra watershed
acequias is their long-term success in providing irrigation
water through an appropriate technology and their effect on
the functioning of the watershed. Among legitimate
considerations relevant in evaluating acequia water practices
are the provision of environmental services, including
watershed and endangered species services, and even the
preservation of a rural landscape and community. 253 Culturally
based systems of water use and water governance may be
important elements of the structures that create and sustain
environmental wealth. The preservation of some culturally
dependent natural resources like landrace fruits, vegetables
and grains, often depend on the protection of specific patterns
of habitation, land use, and social interaction which, if lost,
would also destroy the environmental assets they created and
sustained.254
Colorado's doctrine of optimum or maximum utilization of
water is consistent with the encouragement of the watershed
and landscape services provided by well-ordered acequia
systems. The pursuit of consumptive efficiencies is only one
element of optimum utilization.255 The current law seems to
contemplate that consumptive efficiency, or maximum
utilization, is not the ultimate goal. The more comprehensive
goal is optimum utilization which can and does include the
253. Alamosa-La Jara, 674 P.2d at 935; NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,
WATER TRANSFERS IN THE WEST: EFFICIENCY, EQUITY AND THE ENVIRONMENT
45-54 (1992); Pefia, Cultural Landscapes, supra note 7, at 113-26; Pefia,
Watershed Commonwealth, supra note 193. See generally ETHNOECOLOGY, supra
note 7, at vii-ix, 10, 13-14. The existence of area-of-origin restrictions and
requirements for preservation of minimum stream flows evince an emerging
willingness in contemporary water law to protect landscape values from market
processes. That may be so because of a prevailing skepticism that the price
negotiated by a rights holder for sale of its rights will capture the full value of the
water and adequately protect third-party and public interests dependent on the
water in place. See JOSEPH L. SAX ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES
196, 204 (3d ed. 2000).
254. Pefia, Watershed Commonwealth, supra note 193.
255. City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1, 85-86 (Colo. 1996);
State Engr v. Castle Meadows, Inc., 856 P.2d 496, 505-06 (Colo. 1993); R.J.A.,
Inc. v. Water Users Assoc., 690 P.2d 823, 828 (Colo. 1984). A rather narrow
application of maximum utilization occurs in Alamosa-La Jara, 674 P.2d 914
(focus is on consumptive efficiency and expansion of use).
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preservation of landscape and ecological values dependent on
water-in-place. 2 6 The legal status of acequia water practices
would be greatly improved were such a vision of optimum
utilization applied to acequia methods and to the results
achieved by acequia water management.
B. Transferability of Water Rights
An essential part of acequia history is that the provision of
water to private holdings was premised on the need of frontier
communities for a combination of individual and collective
flourishing. In the eyes of many parciantes communal claims
continue to supply normative and functional justifications for
encumbering with mutual obligations water rights that are
decreed to individual parciantes under Colorado law. In this
view, the property represented by a water right comes to the
owner freighted with obligations that condition the owner's
prerogatives in dealing with it. Property created by collective
effort is viewed as being properly subject to collective claims
and encumbered by continuing obligations to the community.257
Thus, the question of the freedom of individual rights holders
to transfer or change their water rights to new users or modes
of use that do not depend on or sustain the acequia system has
been a sensitive one in the Culebra acequia communities.
The possibility that the water rights of acequia parciantes
might be separated from the acequia system is viewed
generally as wholly inconsistent with the nature of those
rights. The suggestion of water transfer or sale outside the
community of acequia users can prompt strident declarations
that water is not for sale, or that to sell the water is to sell the
lifeblood of the community.2 58 A strong norm and practice
prevails that resists severing water from the network of
acequia-dependent users. 259
256. SeeAlamosa-La Jara, 674 P.2d 914.
257. See supra text accompanying notes 172-78, and for theoretical
engagement with these principles, see generally MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF
JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY (1983); Judith Andre, Blocked
Exchanges: A Taxonomy, in PLURALISM, JUSTICE AND EQUALITY (David Miller &
Michael Walzer eds., 1995); Elizabeth Anderson, The Ethical Limitations of the
Market, 6 ECON. & PHIL. 179 (1990).
258. See, e.g., RIVERA, supra note 3, at 150-51; Gallegos, Acequia Tales,
supra note 13.
259. As illustrated by the Kaber-Gallegos anecdote discussed earlier. See
text supra pages 103-04.
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The chief threat to these commitments is economic
pressure to sell or lease water. There is new concern within
acequia communities that collective values may some day
succumb to opportunities to turn water into cash. While
Colorado's commitment to the protection of third-party
interests threatened by proposed changes and transfers of
water rights is particularly strong,260 some clarification and
adjustment may be needed to assure that those protections
extend to the collective interests of acequia parciantes as
participants in a community irrigation system. Mutual ditch
companies have long had the power to adopt bylaws that
restrict the freedom of shareholders to transfer water rights to
prevent injury to the ditch or its member-shareholders as a
result of reduction of flows through the ditch.261 Acequias,
however, do not fit neatly into the system devised for
incorporated mutual ditch associations. Many acequias are
unincorporated associations, and for those acequias that have
incorporated as mutual ditches, certain aspects of that form of
organization are problematic.
For unincorporated community acequias, there is some
risk that the law will view them as "joint ditches" or "common
ditches," the default form of organization for ditches that are
not formally organized as mutual ditch companies. 262
Characterization as a joint or common ditch would prevent
acequias from controlling the defection of members proposing
to transfer water outside of the acequia system or to use water
in a fashion inconsistent with collective interests. The joint
ditch or common ditch is thought to create a severable tenancy-
260. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-305 (2002) (for detailed
categorization of the forms of changes and transfer of water rights that are subject
to third-party no-injury principles); see also VRANESH, supra note 20, at 258-266.
261. See, e.g., Fort Lyon Canal Co. v. Catlin Canal Co., 642 P.2d 501, 509
(Colo. 1982); In re Application for Water Rights of Certain Shareholders in the
Las Animas Consol. Canal Co., 688 P.2d 1102, 1107 (Colo. 1984); see also
VRANESH, supra note 20, at 285-87; Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Institutional
Perspectives on Water Policies and Markets, 81 CAL. L. REV. 673, 731-739 (1993).
Thompson explores in detail the problematic features of this capacity and its
possible abuse.
262. See VRANESH, supra note 20, at 278-82. Colorado law at present
acknowledges only common ditches and mutual ditches as forms of organization
for member-owned irrigation systems. Formal recognition of a acequias as a
distinct category of water institution with rules of governance and control over
water distribution appropriate to acequia functioning would remedy the
difficulties created by the poor fit between the forms of organization now
recognized by law and the operation of acequia systems.
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in-common among ditch members. 263 Water rights holders are
thought of as being able to sever their ties to the ditch at will
with no obligation to the ditch or its water rights holders for
injuries that might be caused by abandoning the ditch and
adopting alternative means of water diversion not dependent
on the ditch delivery.26 Further, the law that protects third
parties from alterations in the conditions of flow existing at the
time of the establishment of their water rights seems not to
operate to protect rights holders along common ditches from
changes in the condition of flow along the ditch.265
The imposition on unincorporated community acequias of
the no-duty rules applicable to unincorporated joint ditches
would be singularly inappropriate. Like mutual ditches,
community acequias are communal undertakings created and
maintained by the investment of their members, who are
participants in a shared regime of managing and maintaining
water flows. A close reading of Brighton Ditch Co. v. City of
Englewood, the leading Colorado authority for the absence of
mutual duties among water users sharing a common ditch,
makes plain that the absence of mutual duties in Englewood is
based on the absence of evidence of enduring reciprocal
obligations. 266 Where there is evidence of express contract or
even of a long-continued custom of limiting the exercise of
individual water rights in the interest of common ends, a basis
exists for enforcing reciprocal obligations and expectations with
respect to water use. 267
The rationale for the enforcement of mutual expectations
regarding water flow conditions in an irrigation system
constructed and maintained through common effort is not
limited to formally incorporated mutual ditches. The rationale
for protecting such promises is the desirability of investment in
user-owned water systems that allow users to build enforceable
networks of reliance and of mutual expectation. 268  Those
qualities of commitment define the customs of community
acequias and the relations of parciantes to each other. The
263. Brighton Ditch Co. v. City of Englewood, 237 P.2d 116, 120-21 (Colo.
1951); VRANESH, supra note 20, at 279-80.
264. VRANESH, supra note 20, at 279-80.
265. Id.
266. Brighton Ditch Co., 237 P. 2d at 121.
267. Id.; cf. Strole v. Guymon, 37 P.3d 529, 532-33 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001).
268. Fort Lyon Canal Co. v. Catlin Canal Co., 642 P.2d 501, 509 (Colo.
1982); Wadsworth Ditch Co. v. Brown, 88 P. 1060 (Colo. 1907).
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mutual ditch is a product of the law's decision to protect water
users' investment in their own natural resource commons,
embodied in the ditch and in the ditch rules. Acequias and
their users, whether or not the acequia is incorporated as a
mutual ditch, should have the legal right to challenge exercises
of water rights, including proposed transfers, whenever
necessary to protect the conditions of flows on which the
acequia system depends.
For those acequias formally organized as mutual ditches,
the problem is the poor fit between voting rules for mutuals
and the principles of acequia governance. Acequia rights
holders are strongly committed to acequia governance
grounded in one landowner, one vote.269 The voting structure
and share distribution within mutual ditches is based
proportionally on water rights serviced by the mutual ditch.27 °
The San Luis People's Ditch offers an example of the
tension that can result when standard form mutual ditch
governance rules are applied in an acequia environment.
When the San Luis People's Ditch was incorporated in 1966, it
adopted a standard set of mutual ditch bylaws. The adoption of
those bylaws was contentious because they contained voting
provisions that required that votes be apportioned on the basis
of the number of shares each parciante owned in the mutual
ditch, a number based on their respective numbers of irrigated
acres. These standard and obligatory voting provisions did not
reflect the established practice of one parciante, one vote,
especially for the election of the mayordomo and the ditch
commissioners. The new voting procedures were perceived by
the parciantes as inconsistent with a governance structure
under which the mayordomo and the comisionados were
obliged to be as responsive to the concerns of small holders as
to those of large holders.
After the adoption of the mutual ditch bylaws, the San
Luis parciantes, as required by law, cast their ballots for
mayordomo and for ditch commissioners on the basis of the
number of shares held in the ditch, but only after an extended
informal negotiation process intended to produce a consensus
as to who the mayordomo and comisionados should be. A
highly social and discursive process of informal negotiation was
269. See supra text accompanying notes 197-199.
270. See VRANESH, supra note 20, at 282-85.
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used to mediate a hostile formal voting structure. In the end,
the election of acequia leadership conformed to essential
elements of acequia governance including consensus and
equality among parciantes. On other matters which are
brought to a vote and where the law of mutual ditches seems
less insistent, the San Luis People's Ditch has maintained the
one parciante, one vote structure. These include issues of
maintenance and operation of the ditch and matters of broad
policy.
It has sometimes been the case that newcomers to the
ditch have resisted the informal selection process of ditch
leadership, and insisted that voting on all matters be based on
shares in the ditch. 271 Such insistence on the formal rules is
within their rights, and illustrates pointedly the vulnerability
of a customary normative order in the face of incompatible
positive law. What is most acutely needed in this setting is a
formal recognition by the law that acequias should have the
capacity to adopt governance structures, including alternative
voting structures, consonant with their traditions and
customary practices.2 72 All that is required is a clear statement
that the law views acequias as a singular form of mutual ditch
entitled to adopt appropriate variant voting rights structures.
C. Watershed Protection Through Local Self-Management
The ability of the acequias to protect and improve
conditions of water flow in their watersheds is critical to their
survival. Community-based watershed management is
naturally a contentious matter, however. There is the concern
that a given community may lack the capacity to engage
competently in the tasks of water management. There is the
additional concern that the community's vision of how the
watershed should be managed will not correspond with the
public interest.
271. See Gallegos, Acequia Tales, supra note 13, at 238-39.
272. New Mexico's statute governing acequia elections provides for
alternative methods by which to calculate interests in the acequia for purposes of
determining voting procedures. Voting in ditch elections can be conducted on a
one user/one vote system, as well as others, including proportionality of water
rights. Wilson v. Denver, 961 P.2d 153 (N.M. 1998) (interpreting N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 73-3-3 (Michie 1978)).
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The recent Colorado Supreme Court ruling in Lobato v.
Taylor,273 restoring the use rights of the community to the
historic common lands of the Sangre de Cristo Land Grant,
demonstrates the importance to the future of the Culebra
acequias of managing land uses within the watershed
consistent with acequia functioning. The 77,000 acre Taylor
Ranch was part of the historic commons of the community, and
its passage into private ownership in the nineteenth century
give it the distinction of being a privately-owned watershed
critical for the survival of the oldest adjudicated water rights in
Colorado, the Culebra acequias. The Colorado Supreme Court,
in its ruling, restored the use rights of the land grant heirs to
graze their livestock, collect fuel wood, and cut timber.274 As a
result of the decision, it will be necessary to establish
institutional arrangements for local co-management of the
ranch property by the owners of the land and by the members
of the community who share usufructuary rights in those
lands. Modes of access must be negotiated and regimes for
exercise of the grazing, timbering, and fuel wood rights
restored to owners of the lands first settled by Carlos
Beaubien's grantees must be administered.
A critical task will be the establishment of an institution
for co-management that will be effective in managing and
conserving the restored commons and in managing that
commons with an eye to the functioning of the watershed as a
natural water delivery system. There exists a San Luis Land
Rights Council, but there are at least three reasons why the
acequia governing bodies are a better choice as representatives
of the community of usufructuary rights holders in co-
managing access to and use of commons resources. The
institutions of acequia governance have a long history of
managing common pool resources with one objective:
watershed protection. Culturally, the acequias are the only
institution with established practices to sustain local
participation in collective decision-making consistent with local
values. Politically, the acequias are the only institution that
can organize this participation in an equitable and democratic
manner. The heritage and experience of the acequias as a
watershed democracy offers the best prospect for equitable and
273. No. 00SC527, 2002 WL 1360432 (Colo. June 24, 2002).
274. Id. at *1.
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sustainable co-management of the restored commons of the
Sangre de Cristo Land Grant.
In the spring of 1995, shortly after commercial logging
operations began on the Taylor Ranch, La Sierra Foundation of
San Luis and the San Luis acequias pressured the Costilla
County Commission to develop a land use code to regulate
logging and its impact on the watershed. The code language
put forward by the acequias and by the foundation included a
unique watershed protection ordinance, ultimately adopted in
1998 that called for the application of the principles of
conservation biology to watershed management. 275  The
adoption of the land use code through House Bill 1041 and the
watershed protection ordinance were a demonstration of the
commitment of the acequias to accepting the opportunities for
local stewardship of watershed resources encouraged by House
Bill 1041.276 In 1995, acting for the acequias, La Sierra
275. See Costilla County Land Use Code, art. 5, Zoning District Regulations
at § 40ff. The version cited is published in the local legal newspaper, COSTILLA
CTY. FREE PRESS (Colo.), Jan. 2, 1998, at 50:1. Article 5 provides for the
establishment of ten zoning districts including a watershed protection overlay
district (WPD). Section 5.3 defines the WPD's Purpose and Specialized Submittal
Requirements. These establish two sets of regulatory values: (1) value of
watershed protection for drinking water, agricultural production, recreation,
aesthetic enjoyment, wastewater treatment and other activities, id. § 5.3.a; and
(2) value of watershed protection for wildlife and its habitat. Id. § 5.3.b. Both of
these values are to "be maintained and enhanced to protect the diversity of
wildlife species and to promote the health, welfare, and prosperity of present and
future inhabitants...." Id. § 5.3 at 11. The WPD includes five sets of
regulations: (i) prohibiting significant degradation of the "watershed
environment," (ii) protecting watershed from pollution, (iii) requiring harmony
with wildlife habitat, (iv) preserving the natural environment, historical and
cultural resources, and aesthetics of the watershed; and (v) ensuring
compatability with watershed protection values. These regulations were first
proposed by a team of experts brought together in 1996 by La Sierra Foundation,
the Costilla County Conservancy District, and the Acequia Advisory Board
(precursor of the Colorado Acequia Association). See Robert Curry, Devon Pefia et
al., Critical Analysis of Montana Best Management Practices and Sustainable
Alternatives (Oct. 15, 1996) (Technical consultant report presented to the Costilla
County Land Use Planning Commission, San Luis, Colorado) (on file with the
author).
276. Colorado, through House Bill 1041, has created a structure for
significant participation by local government bodies in the planning and
permitting of land uses that might pose threats to natural, historical or
archaeological resources of statewide importance. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-
65.1-107 to -202 (2001). The capacities created for local government through
House Bill 1041 are focused, however, on a defined range of activities that
embrace major public works, the siting and development of new communities,
and, through the capacity to challenge the efficient utilization of water resources
by municipal and industrial water projects, efforts to transfer water outside of a
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Foundation also developed a ballot measure to establish a
Regional Service Authority277 that could function as a taxing
authority, issue bonds and undertake indebtedness to support
land acquisition and restoration to improve watershed
functioning.2 78 More recently, the Costilla County Commission,
under the leadership of Commissioner Joseph C. Gallegos, has
developed a ballot proposal to establish the Rio Culebra Parks
and Recreation District, again to create a public entity that can
generate tax revenue, undertake indebtedness, and pursue
funding for the purchase and restoration of land on the Taylor
Ranch critical to protecting the watershed. The leaders of the
Culebra acequias have been persistent in developing a sound
vision of watershed management and in working to build
institutional capacities and community commitment to improve
and protect watershed and landscape values in the Culebra.
Finally, in 1998, the CAA decided to initiate planning for a
land and water trust. This strategy was partly a logical
extension of the earlier efforts by La Sierra Foundation to
acquire the Taylor Ranch in a partnership with Colorado.
However, the parciantes wished to focus on watershed
management instead of land grant rights. They hoped to
protect the watershed from the headwaters zone of the uplands
local government's jurisdiction. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-65.1-203 (2002). The
great value of these capacities in the settings defined by the statute is
demonstrated in City and County of Denver v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 782 P.2d
753 (Colo. 1989) (upholding the requirement that the City and County of Denver
obtain permits from Grand County to construct and operate water collection and
diversion facilities to be located within local government's jurisdiction), and Colo.
Springs v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 895 P.2d 1105 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994) (upholding
county board of commissioners' denial of permits for the major extension of a
water collection system based on cities' failure to satisfy county regulatory criteria
for wetlands protection and nuisance abatement). For a consideration of House
Bill 1041 and its effect on water development and water rights transfers, see
Geoffrey M. Craig, House Bill 1041 and Transbasin Water Diversions: Equity to
the Western Slope or Undue Power to Local Government?, 66 COLO. L. REV. 791
(1995). House Bill 1041 recognizes the principle of local control over
developments affecting local and regional watershed functioning, but its
effectiveness as a tool for preserving and restoring the functioning of watersheds
as natural systems is limited. The statutory list of the activities subject to its
reach does not include smaller scale residential development, timber harvest, or
mining activity impact on protected natural, archaeological or historic resources of
statewide importance.
277. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 32-7-101 to -146 (2002).
278. The statute enumerating the powers of Regional Service Authorities
specifically mentions their authority to make regulations to protect land and soil
and to engage in planning and preservation efforts. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 32-7-
111(q), 32-7-114.
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down to the farms, open space, and wildlife habitat of the
riparian bottomlands. This strategy recognizes the twofold
nature of the problems that threaten the future of the Culebra
acequias. The first threat involves ecologically harmful land
use practices like logging and mining in the upland headwater
zone. Parciantes know from local experience that degradation
of the upper watershed has in fact increased soil erosion and
sedimentation in the ditches. They observe changes in the
behavior of the watershed and attribute those changes to the
clearing of the canopy and to resulting alterations to the
snowmelt cycle, shortening the length of the irrigation season.
A second threat stems from a growing real estate market for
acreage in the riparian bottomlands that are the heart of the
acequia farming landscape.27 9 According to the CAA, "[A] land
and water trust [is essential] in order to more effectively
protect and preserve the natural assets controlled by Hispano
farmers and ranchers."280 The CAA has long struggled to
protect the headwaters in the Culebra watershed on the Taylor
Ranch property. The establishment of a land and water trust
is seen as the vehicle that will allow the Culebra acequias to
more effectively control the destiny of their own watershed and
prevent outsiders from gaining control of acequia farm land in
order to transfer water from the acequias.
CONCLUSION
Could there be a contemporary approach to water
management that takes advantage of acequia institutions as a
vehicle for protecting the flourishing of watersheds? A law of
"acequia-amenable valleys?" The effect of the Coffin decision's
vigorous extirpation of important parts of Colorado's water
history has been to create a substantial conceptual barrier to
recognizing traditions other than prior appropriation as either
legitimate or as true to place. Perhaps one of the most harmful
aspects of the widely held view that Colorado water law was at
all times defined only by a commitment to prior appropriation
is its marginalization of other traditions. And yet other water
landscapes existed, and survive, more or less intact, within the
279. For discussion of the globalization of property ownership in Costilla
County, see Pefia, Identity and Place, supra note 238, at 146-47.
280. COLORADo ACEQUIA ASSOCIATION, supra note 214 at 1; see also Pefia,
Identity and Place, supra note 238, at 161-63.
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context of the prevailing legal order. The effort to develop a
more refined water policy means that we cannot afford to
marginalize as quaint or as primitive watershed management
traditions that are long-established and that might serve us
well were they incorporated into and protected by modern
water law. Variant and useful water institutions that could
not be a part of the legal universe of the Coffin era can perhaps
be a part of our own.
Entering the town of San Luis from the south, from the
direction of the New Mexico state line, the traveler will see on
the right hand side of the road, just north of the Culebra River
bridge, a state historical marker that notes that the water
rights of the parciantes of the San Luis People's Ditch
constitute the earliest decreed rights of any water rights in
Colorado. Indeed they are. But the marker is misleading,
allowing the reader to infer a continuity between original
acequia water institutions and those that arose under the
doctrine of prior appropriation. The events leading up to and
following the absorption of the Culebra acequias into an
appropriative rights landscape instead formed a chapter in the
consolidation of Colorado's law of prior appropriation. The
shift to an appropriative system by the acequias marked a
definitive break with the earlier body of law in which acequia
rights had been situated. The learned conformity of the
Culebra acequias to the ways of Colorado prior appropriation
law and the willingness of acequia rights holders to pursue
advantages arising from that law should not obscure the
defensive, reactive posture of the acequias to the new legal
regime. Indeed, the parciantes continue to see the watershed
and the appropriate use of water in terms derived from an
earlier legal tradition. The persistence of acequia norms in our
own time may provide a vehicle for redeeming some of the
potential harm of severing water from landscape and social
context.
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